Day 283, December 3rd. Summary of Arestovych and Feygin daily broadcast
Posted on 03 December 2022
π₯Battlefield overview
π₯Russia shelling Sumy, Kherson and Kharkiv regions
Russia continues to shell Sumy, Kherson & Kharkiv regions terrorising the civilians.β¨Artillery duels between Ukrainian and Russian forces continue in Kherson.
π₯Zaporizhzhja
Russian troops are frantically trying to reorganise & reinforce their defence positions in the occupied Tokmak and Melitopol, fearing the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the Melitopothe l direction.
π₯Bahmut
The main Russian army efforts are concentrated around the Donetsk region β a political objective to later sell the 100k KIA & sanction as βnecessaryβ to βdefend of so-called βDPRβ/βLPRβ.β¨Russian troops are trying to gain a tactical advantage to surround Bahmut & prepare an attack on Slovjansk/Kramatorsk, concentrating its strongest troops, sending waves of infantry and sustaining heavy losses.β¨The situation in Bahmut is still complicated but, due to the Ukrainian General Staff taking some countermeasures, the Russian troops are unlikely to succeed.β¨Even if Ukraine retreats from Bahmut, which doesnβt give a military advantage to Russia, Russia has already spent enormous resources (human and material) attacking Bahmut for 3 months. It will take Russia even longer to reach Slovjansk/Kramatorsk just to be kicked out of these cities as it happened once before (in 2014).
π₯Svatove-Kreminna
Russian sources complain about Ukrainian artillery attacks and potential advance North of Kreminna.
π₯Weapons supply to Ukraine
The weapons supply to Ukraine by the Western allies is partially delayed due to technical problems (logistics, production delays, etc.) but also due to political hesitation from some Western leaders that cannot imagine a post-Putin world.
π₯Russian propaganda β new old fakes
Russian state media, RIA Novosti, published an βinterviewβ with a βRussian intelligence officerβ that claimed that Ukraine sends βsuicide tanks with soldered hatchesβ to combat. This is a reused Russian propaganda fake that has been spread at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The absurdity of Russian propaganda reached a level which is self-explanatory and does not require further comment.
π₯ZNPP β Russia trying to sell a new βgesture of goodwillβ
The IAEA stated that the agreement on Russia leaving ZNPP may be reached soon. The future Russian retreat from Energodar is not a βgesture of goodwillβ by Russia, but a Russian attempt to avoid being trapped and save their troops when Ukraine counterattacks in the Zaporizhzhja direction
π₯Russian mobilization
Currently, Russia has 200k troops deployed in Ukraine, of which 15% are mobilized (up to 50% in some areas) and the rest are regular troops and mercenaries (Wagner, etc.).β¨Russia is losing about 600 soldiers every day. Thus, the mobilization in Russia didnβt stop. Arestovych would like to remind Russians that if sent to Ukraine, the second wave of mobilized will soon join the first one and also perish in Ukraine.
π₯Shoigu visited Lukashenko in Belarus
Shoigu visited Belarus and met with Lukashenko. The visit is probably just to demand Belarus to continue training Russian mobilised troops but there are no signs of preparation for a second attack on the North of Ukraine from Belarus.
π₯Terrorist attacks on European embassies
The Ukrainian embassy in Madrid was the first to receive the explosive package and an embassy worker lost two fingers in the explosion. More packages with explosives and animal eyes were sent to high-profile targets & governmental buildings around Europe.β¨After several countries recognised Russia as a country sponsor of terrorism, Russia dropped all pretence & started sending explosives to embassies in Europe. Moreover, it seems that Russia declared war on PETA as well, as the packages with animal eyes are an act of cruelty and animal abuse.
π₯Price cap for Russian oil β cutting Putinβs money supply
The Western allies seemed to have agreed on a price cap β $60-per-barrel. This is higher than proposed by Ukraine and Poland ($30), but still limits the oil revenue of the Kremlinβs regime.β¨Russia claimed that it wonβt sell oil to the countries that instituted the price cap, leaving Russia with the Chinese and Indian markets competing with cheap Iranian, Venezuelan & Gulf-states oil.β¨The price cap for Russian oil, the sanctions & reduction of European dependence on Russian gas are serious hits to Putinβs regime, limiting its financial options. Its effects should be visible by Feb 2023.
π₯Macron proposing security guarantees for Russia
As mentioned by Macron, the new security architecture in Europe should include security guarantees for Russia. As no one wants to invade Russia, the West can easily give a security guarantee to the Russian Federation in exchange for Russian nuclear disarmament after Russia is defeated.β¨Arestovych even suggests Russia signing βThe Budapest Memorandum IIβ.
π₯Putin βto visit Donbasβ β photoshop update required
Peskov stated that Putin will visit Donbas at some point. This is a cheap attempt to mimic Zelenskyβs visits to the frontline.β¨In reality, Putin is hardly brave enough to play catch with Ukrainian artillery & HIMARS or to meet with real people. Therefore, if Kremlin releases any footage of such a βvisitβ, itβs recommended to look for the faces of his well-known, trusted FSO bodyguards and the photoshop/video editing mistakes that were spotted in all the previous Putin videos (e.g. meeting with βthe mothers of the mobilized soldiersβ).
π₯Scandal with βDozdhβ & the βRussian liberalsβ
One of the hosts of the Russian liberal TV channel Dozdh (that was banned in Russia and re-opened in Latvia) stated that Russian mobilized troops are living in terrible conditions and that Dozdh βable to help many soldiers with equipmentβ. After an outcry & Latvia launching an investigation, the channel claimed that the person misspoke & fired the journalist who made the statement, which is a suspiciously harsh punishment for something that they claim to be βa mistakeβ.β¨There are cases of anti-Putin activists, including but not limited to Mark Feygin, who are forbidden to appear on Dozdh TV. This might be one of the conditions on which the βliberalβ Russian TV channel was given some grant money, potentially from the Kremlin sources, to re-open its media outlet in Latvia.β¨With few exceptions, many so-called βRussian liberalsβ have quite ambiguous opinions β ignoring Russian war crimes, refusing to support militant resistance to Putinβs regime and avoiding difficult conversations about the current state of Russia [fascism, imperialism, etc.].