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Feminism: Sex and gender discussions

Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court

225 replies

Another2Cats · 27/03/2026 12:28

Again, I apologise for this being very long. TL;DR this looks to be the first case at the High Court which will consider the exclusion of trans-identifying men post FWS.

So, for some background, there was a case last year, just after FWS, concerning a trans-identifying man who had been banned from a women's pool competition organised by the English Blackball Pool Federation.

Back at the end of 2023, the Pool Federation changed their rules so that only women could play in women's competitions.

The trans-identifying man, Haynes, then brought a claim of direct discrimination on the ground of gender reassignment against the federation.

The trial took place during 2025 before the judgment in FWS was handed down. The court heard from several witnesses about whether pool was a gender-affected activity (Section 195(3) Equality Act) including Dr Emma Hilton - who is the interim chair of Sex Matters.

However, the FWS judgment came out before the County Court judge had made his judgment on the case and so the pool federation said that each side should make detailed written submissions about the effect of FWS on this case.

The judge agreed and the submissions for the pool federation were written by Sarah Crowther KC of Outer Temple Chambers and those for the trans-identifying man were written by Jane Russell KC. Some may recognise her name from the Sandie Peggie case (and other cases).

.

The judge decided that FWS was sufficient to decide the case in favour of the pool federation but, since he had heard detailed argument, he also set out his conclusions with regard to the sport exception (Section 195) and also about the provision of separate services (Schedule 3 para 28)

The court concluded that pool is a ‘gender-affected activity’ and that excluding those born as male from the female category is necessary to secure fair competition. The court also concluded that this was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

There is a link to the judgment here:

https://jrlevins.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/K01CT207-judgment-1-8-25-handed-down.pdf

.

Haynes has now been granted permission to appeal and has published the grounds of appeal on Haynes Instagram account. I've attached the images here. Haynes tried to get the case "leapfrogged" directly to the Court of Appeal but this was refused.

A brief summary of the grounds, which the judge who considered the application said were all arguable are as follows (personally, I don't they stand up at all, but this is the case he is putting forward):

1 There was no evidence that trans-identifying men had any competitive advantage over women. The judge failed to consider the "mental processes" of the federation and that they were significantly influenced in their decision to exclude trans-identifying men as they were in some way unfairly discriminatory.

2 In considering direct discrimination, the court applied the wrong comparator. Following Croft [Croft v Royal Mail [2003] EWCA Civ 1045] Haynes claims that the correct comparator in this case should be a woman rather than a man.

3 FWS, when applied to the facts of this case, does not comply with Article 8 and Article 14 of the ECHR and, in a claim by an individual, the ECHR applies, whereas it did not for the organisations claiming in FWS.

4 The Court failed to apply S195 Equality Act [the sport exemption] in a ECHR compliant manner. The pool federation did not show that it was necessary to exclude trans-identifying men for the reasons of safety or fair competition. Cue sports are precision sports thus not affected by power/sex. No explanation was given for changing from a testosterone testing system or handicap system.

5 Something about the court wrongly saying that another, professional, pool organisation would have refused Haynes permission to play in this federation's competitions

.

Frankly, I don't think any of those will really hold up. But it will be interesting to see what happens when it does get to court as this will be a High Court judgment rather than just a County Court judgment.

Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court
Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court
Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court
Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court
OP posts:
Thread gallery
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Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 12:22

HS - JR addressed you on GRA discrim and one way or another this is a HR matter
J ground 2 is confusing,
HS gr2 and 3 overlap. If the court feels it is bound by FWS,
J I am bound by FWS
HS in relation to the specific issue, if there is a convention issue here must say ground

to appeal or leapfrog certificate. To the extent that FWS considers the issues we are concerns, that is not a roadblock to a hr issue. There is a convention compliant way that isn't necessarily ruled out by FWS
J what is the construction for the interpretation of the EA that you are contending

HS we content that we are seeking to address circumstances in which a TW or TM is barred from playing in a sport category that is for their acq'd gender. When a TW cannot compete in a woman's competition and likewise for TM in a mans.

J I'm afraid I don't follow you. Let's assume we have a case of sex discrim, and we're in 195.1
HS it might be worth getting it out, finds page, 1st question is this a gender affected activity and if it's not then sex based categories are prohibited. If is gender affected, then sex discrim is permitted, that's where subsection 2 comes into play and the question...

J if this is a case of GRA discrim no real problem we're in section 1, if it's sex discrim its 2, what are you actually saying
HS what it's saying in 2, there are two possible constructions, when a TM is prohibited from playing, it's looking at when there is a woman's competition,

J what it's looking at is any form of GRA discrim or harassment, would be permissible in specific circumstances
HS if it's a gender affected sport it could be concerned with whether a TM can compete in woman's sport or whether a TW can compete in woman's sport

J it's concerned with any person who has the pc of GRA
HS links back MLF subs, it's concerned with someone who has that pc being excluded from a gender specific form of sport, its talking

about ....I suppose there isnt'... a third possible construction, where a sport isn't gender affected by trans people are excluded. The more realistic situation is where someone with the pc of GRA is excluded from participating in a gender affected competition, does it mean when they are excluded from their acquired gender

J I'm still going to try and pin you down, under the EA this is sex discrim, a convention compliant interpretation would come to the conclusion that it is GRA discrim.
HS well it is
J you're arguing that sec 195 should be interpreted to achieve a convention compliant outcome. So let's look at sec 195 and see what part of it supports your argument

HS one caveat, if I'm wrong in what I say, JR's arguments are still good
J I want to be quite clear on what you are saying before you explain it to me, you are saying that the ECHR (convention) requires a different interpretation.
HS our position that FWS doesn't look at the Convention.
J we can come back to that I'm just trying to pin you down, not very successfully, I think you're trying to say that a convention compliant interpretation would be different

HS one needs to consider if FWS on sport in convention compliant, if it is, appeal falls away, FWS applies. If it is wrong, then we need to look at this. FWS didn't have a victim, we have a victim, if there is a victim, you have to apply a

convention compliant argument. That language operates by referring to GRA in one of two ways; direct discrim in context of sport.
J how do you say it operates
HS applies when trans people are disqualified from competing in category of acqu'd gender

J applies when any trans person is disqualified from competing in category of acqu'd gender
HS that's the argument
J I'm being very clear, I just want to understand what the argument is, can I just probe that as a matter of construction, if you've got a case of sex discrim then why are we in this section

its' about GRA, section 195 is saying that it may be lawful if you satisfy these criteria. If there is a case of sex discrim why does 195,2 come into it at all
HS what 195.2 does is justify sex discrim in sex segregated sports, seeks to provide protection on basis of GRA in people seeking to compete in single sex sport.
J I want to understand what your construction argument is before we embark on the convention arguments. Looking at the construction of the EA, when is discrim unlawful, but it will be lawful to discrim in certain circumstances.

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teawamutu · 17/11/2026 12:22

The case appears to be that because FWS didn't explicitly say 'still a man even if knackers have been cut off' those post-op have technically changed sex. Am I right?

CassOle · 17/11/2026 12:24

It's the Eunuch = woman argument.

MelOfTheRoses · 17/11/2026 12:29

I thought there were human rights arguments against that.

Retiredfromthere · 17/11/2026 12:33

I hope this is a resounding defeat for HH. I followed the original case and recall that RMW brought in experts for American Pool and focused on speed of break and no precision to make his points. (This is a very TRA tactic, trying to co-opt evidence which does not apply and hope no-one notices).

I also got the feeling that the defendants were retired folk and seem to recall Anna Godwin being challenged about whether she recalled something correctly and saying something to the effect of 'I have had a brain aneurysm since that event'. She and her colleague were honest, straightforward and clear. I got a whiff of having had to educate themselves they like lots on this board had found out that they were in the right and were inclined to stick to their guns. But I felt very sad for them.

After the original case I did feel that Harriet was seriously misled about chances of winning. In part by the scientific data her team offered which was refuted by experts in the actual game of English pool who work with real humans and not only computer modelling of physics. No such sympathy now.

Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 12:38

And also lawful to discrim in some circumstances with pc of GRA. HS this was a GRA case, a gender affected activity, so that's what' brings 195.2 into play J at the moment, it doesn't come into play if you don't have GRA direct discrim, if it's sex we go straight into sec 1, that's why I'm struggling to understand what your argument is,

HS it links back to what JR said, 195.2 is seeking to effectively apply a test which reflects the need for proportionality because of HR arguments. It doesn't say that a TW can compete in every woman's sport

it's seeking, we submit, by highlighting the need for justification, reflecting the Art 8, Art 14 requirements for proportionality. It is context specific, it may be that our arguments were constructed wrongly
J it's not for me to say, you must put your arguments before the court

HS I'm trying to recognise what ML is saying, one way is to analyse how the HR requirements are satisfy and because of the reasons I indicated, sec 195.2 applies a test that reflects proportionality. One is adopting a particular interpretation in 195.2 to the concept of

direct discrimination. It may be that a better way of getting there, is that MLF arguments should be adopted to get to 195.2, because they are they convention compliant way.

J it would help if you identify what your argument is, so i can address it in my judgment. This is a defence to GRA discrimination, and if you don't have a GRA discrim case, then what happens.
HS perhaps we need to reconsider our position over lunch
J you have to decide what your argument is
HS if we are wrong and there isn't a convention compliant approach then we can ask for a definition of incompatibility.

J so if I can't find that then you'll ask for a declaration of incompatibility
HS yes, and because of FWS grant us leave to appeal. Now on to grounds. Will deal with ground 5 first. In terms of the facts, highlights of background from JR

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rebax · 17/11/2026 12:41

J it would help if you identify what your argument is, so i can address it in my judgment.

Is this 'you seem to be talking bollocks' in legal language?

Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 12:43

we do submit that there has been a GRC, the state has recognised acqu'd gender. ECtHR has recognised consistent between status and how someone is treated. Second thing I would highlight, oestrogen treatment for a lengthy period, even if that impact is uncertain.

HS conts - a meeting about approach with sports bodies, it was decided that women's events would be a cisgender category (women only), was announcement with reference to safety which disappeared then based on safety and fairness. And there was a reference to UPG, background

o decision, Ds had no access to expert evidence on relative strength etc. The UPG initially reversed decision, so not a party to this matter, but has now adopted similar policy to Ds. SC the actual position was that UPG was sued as well, agreed to change policy, and then on the county court decision, adopted the same policy.

HS So is not allowed to play pool.
SC [KC for the defendants] rises...
HS let me be clear, is not allowed to play pool as a woman
J not allowed to play in a woman's competition
SC Counsel is now giving evidence on a contested issue,
HS JJ position

HS - HH position is that would be only woman playing in an open category
J I need to make a finding of fact but lets go back to the law
HS the J did make a finding of fact on professional status preventing HH from playing in woman's category, the first is that the rule change

was announced on 27 Aug 2023, took effect on 3 Dec 2023,
J yes got that
HS the contract for HH to become a UPG professional in Jan 2024. The contractual provision wasn't in place at the time of the decision

J from what I understood, para 23, says there became a prof in 12/22 The point you are making is that during 2023 was not prevented by contract from entering into amateur competitions in that year. What I understood the judge to be saying is HH was subject to terms with UPG, and needed consent to play in country competition.

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Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 12:51

Just for context, Ground 2 is the judge had applied the wrong comparator and that in HH's case the comparator should have been a woman

Ground 3 is that FWS is incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR

Ground 4 is The judge incorrectly applied S195 EA2010 (sex-segregated sports)

Ground 5 is perversity. The judge was wrong to find that the other professional body would have refused to allow HH to play in the defendants league.

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Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 12:54

Back to TT

J so what is ground 5.
HS the contract he relied on when decision taken and rule change took place, that may explain para 7,
J just to be absolutely clear, there is no evidence of any contractual term that req'd HH to get consent
HS that is my understanding and there is nothing in the judgment that addresses that.

J so that's the first point, what's the second
HS HH WS - UPG would have had a problem with playing on another professional tour but not in an amateur competition, nowhere in the judgment have I seen engagement with the idea that UPG did not prohibit those playing in county competition
J I'm afraid I haven't understood your point
HS HH position is that while UPG prevented people playing in prof competition, but not in county competition. The judgment doesn't engage with that, we produced a documents to show that.

J so there was no requirement to get the permission of UPG in 2023 , he notes evidence but doesn't address it.
HS I haven't taken you to references,
J I was just looking at your skeleton to see if the x-refs are sufficient
HS can I give you 2 add'l refs

J are they in the skeleton
HS taking you to particular pages, document showing lists of players and document showing Emma Cunningham playing for county team and photo of Emma Cunningham, playing for county. MLF says Cunningham prevented playing on tour.

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Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 12:59

J so is it the hole below the waterline
SC complaint on tour events conceded, the only complaint that was left is that HH wasn't selected for the Kent A team, the judge says the only detriment that remains for consideration. The only place the rule applies in to county comp. So that's why the judge focused on the lack of contractual provisions.

J I don't want to hear your submissions,
SC I want us not to be confused by the timeline, the judge was looking at it prospectively,
J so there was a period of about 15 days was not available for selection

HS doesn't contradict anything I said
J it has helped to clarify the context, HH was bound by the contract from 1 Jan, so prospectively, so we may have been distracted
HS that's not what the convention says, any period for the rule

J so there was a period of 17 days, we don't know that there was a competition, and Ds say would have needed consent for any comps from 1 January, you're asking me to make a finding of perversity,

HS HH position is that UPG would not have objected to HH playing in county comps because others were allowed to play. The J said that he didn't need to decide about others playing because HH had not asked to be allowed by UPG to play. Why ask if knew wouldn't be allowed to play by Ds. We say she has standing if she is challenging a rule that might apply to her.

HH is an active pool player who has competed for a number of years, in a number of comps, including county. That rule of Ds was restricting her options.
J the judge found sex discrim and that was the end of the case.

HS can I come on to one other area of fact relevant to convention, ML has read about advantages and disadvantages of TW in sport, no published research on effective of GAHT, not possible to say what level of testosterone resulted in loss of muscle mass
J might be easier if you highlight the para,

HS a lot of judgment is concerned with whether pool is a gender affected activity,
J I've read 255 you highlight this because
HS I summarise as there is some bio difference between TW and cis woman that is relevant, however it is unclear how significant it is.

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Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 13:07

HS should say average trans and average cis.
J right
HS none of this was present, evidence relatively limited and uncertain, it's important when considering fairness. Fairness is necessarily identical to complete equality, we don't have height rules, we still have gender rules.

Women are at a relative disadvantage in basketball. Sport is based on physical differences, what one are acceptable and unacceptable. J looks at suppression of T, and is unclear, doesn't seem to reduce strength of average male compared to avg female. Also rejects argument

based on handicaps. 3 things to consider based on those finding. Ds skeleton relies on fact that TM can compete in woman's comp. A TM would be taking T, is it the greater unfairness allowing a TM to compete in woman's comp? At the time of the decision, this was true, the IOC was the default that trans athletes competed in categories

SC I'm not sure that the IOC is the relevant regulatory body
J JR took me to IOC guidance
HS the default was from IOC that trans people competed in acq'd gender and TM would be subject to T testing

J and third thing
HS and the third thing was that TW could compete in women's category, but that has changed. But at the time of the trial were allowed to compete.
HS turning to the law
J probably a good time to break

Morning session part 2 ends.

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BellaBlackberry83 · 17/11/2026 13:09

Well this isn't going well for HH. Could be wrong of course, but if the judge cannot actually identify your argument, then that generally does not bode well.

Tallisker · 17/11/2026 13:15

Why are they allowed to use the contentious and disputed term cis? Was cis mentioned in the Supreme Court judgment?

Retiredfromthere · 17/11/2026 13:18

HS So is not allowed to play pool.
SC [KC for the defendants] rises...
HS let me be clear, is not allowed to play pool as a woman
J not allowed to play in a woman's competition

I like this judge so far but not following that closely this bit did catch my eye.
First line HS, for HH's team saying that he cannot play pool (at all)
Second line TT reporting that the defence KC rises, presumably to point at that there is not an issue with playing for a mens team
Third Line Corrects themselves to point out that what they meant was HH could not play 'as a woman'
Fourth Line Judge clarifies that this is talking about HH not being allowed to play in a woman's competition.
I think that this last line from the judge clarifies that they HH can play in women's clothing, and present as a woman but cannot compete as a woman with other women. (So can play in men's competitions whilst dressed up as a woman).
I find the judges' questions and insistence on clarify comforting.

Mmmnotsure · 17/11/2026 14:05

HS gr2 and 3 overlap. If the court feels it is bound by FWS,
J I am bound by FWS

Thank you again, For Women Scotland!

Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 14:13

Sorry, I forgot to include a bit from this morning that the judge was robed but nobody else was. He asked why he was the only one, it turns out that everybody was told except him.

From TT

Judge enters, now not wearing robes either.
HS - can I go back to a point you challenged us on earlier. How does one achieve convention compatibility, assuming there is a convention component. We say that sec 195.2 imposes a GRA angle, piggybacking on the

J I do not understand the term piggybacking
HS the way it starts, the EA starts by saying a single definition of discrim,
J sorry
HS you know what this says, certain types of discrimination can be lawful. What provisions of the EA are incompatible? What is your primary case?

J you're trying to change to definition or the convention compels a different interpretation of gender reassignment and or a different definition of the requirements for single sex sport.
HS so reading sec 23, then with sec 195.2
J that is not how it works, sec 23 is the law,

HS I'll have to come back to that
J so your primary case is sec 23, not section 195.
HS the convention argument, the GRA is summarised in FWS which does look at HR convention, recognises background in Goodman and Bellinger & Bellinger.
J we're going into FWS

HS well we won't need to spend much time on it J so there's a very helpful summary of the GRA , the background, the requirements, how to get a GRC and what that does. I understand your client has a GRC. HS yes, it notes that sec 195 arises from section 19 in the GRA. And a GRC

is important for dignity, and to avoid unacceptable discordance in gender identity. The Strasbourg case law makes it clear that discordance is important. There is obviously a discordance between someone who has a sense of identity as a woman where the state has recognised that

situation but in an important aspect of their life, sport, they are not able to participate in women's competitions despite having done so in the past. HS the GRA also talks about relationships between private parties, the state's obligation is engaged because it is requ'd

to eliminate discrim between private individuals. That background is set out in the explanatory notes to the GRA. And that indicates that section 19 (predecessor to 195)
J 195.2

HS well, it's all 195, so 19.2 is 195.2. It is to ensure that people could compete in comps for acqu'd gender unless reasons of fair competition or safety.
J yup
HS 195 also important, don't need to take you to it. A couple of other points to make, in 195.2, the test to be applied requires consideration of necessity, that we submit is a test that allows for proportionality

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ItsAllGoingToBeFine · 17/11/2026 14:17

Isn't HS a QC? Do you think he embarrassed by having to try to put together this pigs ear of an argument? Dod he choose to take this case or does the cab rank thing apply?

IANAL but it really doesn't seem to be going well for him

MyAmpleSheep · 17/11/2026 14:22

@Another2Cats Thank you for posting the updates from TT, btw. It’s helpful to read them here.

Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 14:24

J can you say that again
HS so if we need to make a case of section 23 compatibility
J so it's a gender reassignment case
HS then we say that fair competition can seen through the lens of reducing gender incongruity, it imposes a stringent test, fair competition is a concept

J that's what it says, what is your point
HS the consideration is whether the advantage is such that a trans person has a disadvantage
J you're saying that 195.2 can be interpreted in accordance with the convention, good what's next

HS before moving on, there was consideration of this is FWS but without human rights concerns.
J when you say no arguments about the convention, there clearly were, the HR were clearly before the SC
HS they were before the SC,
J everyone argued the Convention supported their position.

HS not that there weren't any arguments but no findings about convention compatibility, because no victim
J the court, facing subs about whether or not in accordance with the convention, would give consideration to those issues. There's no need for a victim.

HS they did not on the face of it was address whether it was compliant with the convention, because there was not victim
J you're saying that without a victim they don't need to address convention compatibility.

HS there was an argument in JR123 that law officers can challenge legislation if not compatible with convention rights. Need to demonstrate incompatible in a large number of cases.
J page number?
HS it says that can be compatible in a number of cases but not in other cases. I have a copy of Z vs Hackney, its even more express. From letter g onwards, read the whole of 114 rather than piecemeal.
[J reading]
J right
HS it would be fairly odd if SC would come up with
J just going to make a note of that - would be fairly odd

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Hoardasurass · 17/11/2026 14:25

I feel so sorry for that judge trying to get a straight answer from a TRA that actually makes sense, but i can't help but laugh at his obvious frustration when he keeps pointing out that the cases relied on dont survive fws and that this is sex discrimination 🤣🤣🤣

MyAmpleSheep · 17/11/2026 14:34

From Z vs Hackney, 114:

…This means that the same legislative provision might be given a different
interpretation in different cases, depending on whether Convention rights or EU law
are applicable in the case or not. Although at first glance this might seem odd, in
fact it is not. It simply reflects the fact that in the one case circumstances are such
that an additional interpretive obligation has to be taken into account, but in the other
case no such obligation is in play: see R (Hurst) v London Northern District CoronerPage 48
[2007] UKHL 13; [2007] 2 AC 189, para 1 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill), paras 9 and
12-15 (Lord Rodger) and para 52 (Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood); and
Gingi v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2001] EWCA Civ 1685; [2002]
1 CMLR 20, paras 41-47 per Arden LJ (as she then was). If the position were
otherwise, Convention rights and rights under EU law would be given
disproportionate effect in domestic law, and statutory interpretation would become
an exercise in the imaginative construction of theoretical cases in which such rights
might be in issue in order to change the interpretation of legislation in cases where
they are not.

So the court can bend the interpretation of a statute in individual cases to satisfy HR convention issues, without changing its meaning in cases where HR issues don’t apply.

Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 14:38

HS if SC would come up with a convention compliant reading, didn't say it was doing that and was addressed on the part of it.
J you're saying that they weren't troubled if it was compliant one way or the other
HS they were interpreting domestic legislation,
J so on that basis, nothing in FWS stands in the way of your arguments

HS so about the need to be a victim, what I described as standing whether HH was able to bring this claim. Standing to be a victim under the convention.
ML [I think TT are referring to the judge here] is looking troubled...
J confirms page number. Is it any part of your case SC that HH isn't a victim.
SC no it is not. But it doesn't take us any further.

J so if its not being argued that she's not a victim, then lots not spend a lot of time on it, give me the page ref
HS it has to be read as at least obtaining a declaration that this is unlawful, because she is affected.

J all right
HS ECHR, ARt 8, Art 14
J is it breach of 8 or 14
HS we say both. Terms of A8, Strasbourg courts have recognised 2 things, a failure to give full legal recognition to GRA engages A8, and proportionality is not a rigid standard, this is a context where marginal appreciation is narrow and the harm is great so a very careful justification is required.

J that's the first point,
HS that's a summary of what we say, first is engaged and second proportionality, can we go on to the A8 case law
J there's no challenge that A8 is engaged let's deal with the case law on that basis.

HS starting with Goodwin, a passage of the judgment, engagement of the convention but also an overview of the situation that is relevant to proportionality,
J where's the passage
HS gives ref, para 76 sets out background,

para 77, applicant was TW who remained legally male, serious interference when domestic law conflicts with important part of person's identity, there may be feelings of vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety. Humiliation is important, HH evidence is that decision by Ds had lead

to a degree of vilification. Not surprising in the current context that id as trans person would lead to vilification and ended career. Importance of coherence of legal and administrative practices, refusal to recognise consequences of gender reassignment surgery paid for by NHS

here is an obvious issue where state has facilitated someone becoming for all intents and purposes a woman and on the other hand not recognising that. What Strasbourg has recognised is that it is difficult for the state to facilitate someone becoming a woman and then not

recognised that. It's not a matter of statutory incompatibility. There's a balancing exercise and countervailing factors. In that context, it recognised that - described as the unsatisfactory situation with post op transsexuals living in an intermediate zone, not one sex or the

other. And if FWS is applied, a TW can be disqualified from women's sport because a bio male. A TM can be disqualified from women's sport on the basis that it results in unfairness.

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ItsAllGoingToBeFine · 17/11/2026 14:41

Surely TM would be excluded from women's comps for doping testosterone rather than because they are trans?

Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 14:50

J did you formulate that differently
HS FWS used example of boxing, a TW could be excluded because they are a man, a TM could be excluded from same comp on the basis that it would be unfair. So both TW & TM could be excluded from comp
J provided other conditions are met
HS this interpretation has the ability to leave TW & TM in a position where they can't compete at all

J but a TM can be included in women's comp
HS they can be excluded on fairness, leaves trans people without any comp. Strasbourg has consistently rec'd important of recognition of gender reassignment and must be given significant weight.

Another case, ultimately who should pay for GRA and how German courts dealt with dispute. The passage is page 170, para 69, court starts by talking about how this related to the very essence of convention being respect for human dignity, the importance of that in this case.

J what para do you want me to look at
HS para 69. Matters relating to a most intimate part of an individuals rights. Then followed by AP, an important case,
J where's that
HS vol 2, recognised that gender recognition did not require surgery in the GRA, looks at why convention

is engaged. And consideration of rights, court looks at - considers margin of appreciation - essential aspect of individuals intimate identity, stressed the importance of personal autonomy, narrow margin of appreciation. Now, TH & Czech Republic, a 2025 case, para 52

J what was the page
HS 1960, you see recognition of the significance of greater weight give to social and legal recognition, important facet of individuals identity is in play and the right to a person's gender identity - makes it clear that it is a narrow margin.

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