As I understand it, Lacksie's saying the following:
A) Material reality is complex for two reasons: a) there will always be exceptions to common rules and patterns, and b) we can only ever experience it through individual human consciousness and perception.
B) On this basis, defining objective meaning is, in the case of sex and female consent in a medical context, fundamentally impossible, and associated safeguarding rules collapse under the weight of this complexity.
Where I think this all falls down is in Lacksie's extrapolation of B) from A). After all, this philosophy of indefinable complexity and the paramouncy of subjective reality is applicable to pretty much everything! So what I've not yet seen from Lacksie or others is anything approaching a convincing assessment of why it should be applied in this case, and not in other cases.
For example, Lacksie says:
"The pp's hypothetical depends on the assumption that everyone has the same understanding of these terms - male and female - as she does: what they mean and how they should be applied. But they don't. That's the entire point... DU understands herself to be female; you may not agree, but that is her reality..."
This is explicit and emphatic. Could Lacksie explain then, in the light of this,
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How clinical trials exploring how best to preserve life and health on a global scale with necessary reference to sex difference can be ethically and meaningfully administered?
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How a doctor should (for example) administer drugs such as ambien or morphine, or appropriate sex-specific treatment if required, to a) an unconscious patient or b) someone with Dr Upton's self-perception?
Next, if Lacksie feels that the objective reality of biological sex does indeed supercede self-perception in these contexts, I'd ask,
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How does one consistently and ethically distinguish between those instances in which self-perception does override objective reality, and those in which it doesn't?
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How does one present a sufficiently strong argument for these exceptions?
For example, Lacksie's clear that the sheet complexity of determining an objective reality (A) above) renders female patients' right to request and receive (given availability) a female clinician impossible to meet, or, at the least, effectively moot.
How, then, can this argument be made sufficiently strongly such that it unambiguously overrides the arguments others would certainly make for their own self-perception to be paramount at the expense of others? Consider, as examples:
- a white supremicist
- someone clinically depressed (the assisted dying debate)
- a parent convinced their child has ADHD and is entitled to accommodations in examinations despite the commonly accepted (but ever-evolving!) assessment demonstrating otherwise
- an egregious example of workplace disability discrimination nevertheless being dragged through the courts at immeasurable personal expense because the employer contests it
- fantasists etc. etc. etc.
- an infinity of others - take your well-chosen pick!
It will have to be a damn strong argument to counter-act these cases, especially in the light of the answers I find it hard to imagine not being given to 1) and 2), for which I can find no equivalent in scope and import in my above examples.
Lacksie? Alcove?
There was no acknowledgement to my last lengthy post on your side. Understandable in a busy, fast-moving thread, but I'd appreciate a direct and honest response to this one.
Edited to clarify lettering and numbering!