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Miller v Chief Constable 18-19 November at Royal Courts of Justice.

82 replies

MalcolmTent · 16/11/2026 13:05

Just a heads up about this case.

"Miller v Chief Constable 18-19 November at Royal Courts of Justice.

@LincsPolice position is that ‘the victim must always be believed.’

This allows Person A to self identify as a victim, and to designate Person B as a suspect.

The police say that any requirement to consider objective evidence, to inform the named suspect of the allegation, or to conduct an investigation prior to recording the suspect in relation to the crime would be to disrespect the victim.

The ‘criminal’ record may appear on a DBS check.

In my case, it was a former officer who made the allegation - immediately after he was sacked for gross misconduct and deception. This, apparently, is irrelevant. In no way may this fact get in the way of believing him and criminalising me.

In 2019, it was the Fisher Price gangster Mrs B who played the system. In 2026, it’s disgraced cop Lynsay Watson.

Both found Chief Constables who willingly played along."

https://x.com/WeAreFairCop/status/2122239707962618259?a=IhFJEXdHGz4kRjnmdxU&s=19

WeAreFairCop (@WeAreFairCop) on X

Miller v Chief Constable 18-19 November at Royal Courts of Justice. @LincsPolice position is that ‘the victim must always be believed.’ This allows Person A to self identify as a victim, and to designate Person B as a suspect. The police say that...

https://x.com/WeAreFairCop/status/2122239707962618259?a=IhFJEXdHGz4kRjnmdxU&s=19

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Ereshkigalangcleg · Today 13:03

Tweets from Sarah Phillimore at RCJ 18/11

We say Lincs failed to comply with common law duty of transparency, to inform him of outcome of investigation by DS Singh. He said NFA when in fact a crime had been recorded against him. Further breach to interview re On Line Safety Act and NOT stalking.

According to Lincs police 'transparency in action' is shown by answering subject access request. that is a risible and hopeless submission.

Third common law error is failure to ask themselves the correct questions - the Tameside duty. Relevant para is in the O judgment. At no point did Lincs make inquiries about the motivation for LW's complaint. Evidence of intense conflict. The complaints themselves demand questions to be asked, such as LW lost his job because of HM - that is accepted without question and is obvious nonsense, as is LW statement. Questioning by DS Singh was farcical. HM wanted an address for service of proceedings.

Nor was there any proper inquiry as to whether elements of stalking offence were met. Lincs say met as two occasions HM went to LW property. That doesn't automatically equate to stalking and should have been put to HM.

No one appears to have asked questions about mental health of LW which is flagged up repeatedly. Nor the allegation that HM complaints were vexatious. That should have been a red flag to require further investigation. If vexatious, LW would not have been sacked. No questions asked about these highly relevant factors.

Then says HM conflates recording with investigation. It is all one decision making process, wrongly compartmentalised by Lincs. investigation was first a cursory examination of some documents but not the disciplinary hearing!

my bold

Ereshkigalangcleg · Today 13:07

Tweets from Sarah Phillimore at RCJ 18/11

If elements of stalking were present that is irrelevant to the officers' failing to ask the relevant questions.

Final point against Lincs is one of irrationality. Decision to record a crime was irrational in all the circumstances. Particularly so when what we have seen this morning about outcome 15. Recorded as a crime on the basis that evidential difficulties prevent further action. Crime was confirmed. That is not an allegation. Drill down on their document confirmed as crime. No idea what evidential difficulties are.

An extraordinary feature of this case which takes it well into realms of high irrationality is that when an investigation into allegations took place HM was not questioned about the crime he is said to have committed! Truly bizarre.

HM was interviewed about the Online Safety Act, it had no bearing on the crime recorded. Kafkaesque - HM can't find a sensible explanation. At the end of the interview, HM had no idea he already had a stalking offence recorded against him, 12 months after the stalking offence recorded he was then interviewed about something else. Truly bizarre.

Now submissions from junior counsel for HM on the 8th ground - unlawful processing of data. It's a free standing limb, so if court does not find on policy grounds or Lincs failures, still invited to consider if Lincs compliant with data protection regime.

What was HM told and when? When he was interviewed Nov 2024 it was to do with On line Safety Act, no mention of harassment and stalking re 2023 complaints. He was sent letter saying NFA and details of reported crime would be retained. HM assumed this meant re OSA - which couldn't be an offence as it wasn't in force. but in fact that referred to a record made a year earlier! That is a key part of the data protection regime, to have transparency about what information is held and why.

Second point is the nature of the information. Lincs say its not personal data as its anonymised. The data passed to the Home office is anonymised. But HM only knows that on receipt of defendants detailed grounds - not explained in the summary grounds. He accepts that is no longer personal data. BUT anonymisation doesn't apply to records held on Lincs system and his SAR shows crime of stalking is linked to his personal data. This is really crucial. One of key things that both defendants say, this is not a record of a crime, it is just an allegation. May be understood as a term of art but that is not what is said in the letter to HM nor would a non expert understand if it was conveyed to them in enhanced criminal records check.

my bold

Ereshkigalangcleg · Today 13:14

Tweets from Sarah Phillimore at RCJ 18/11

Stated very clearly para 3a) of second Def skeleton argument. But compare to what is actually conveyed to HM himself p325 core bundle, 'recorded as a hate crime' and has prejudice flags attached. Recorded on system as outcome 15, has been a crime and suspect identified. None of that indicates its just an allegation to anyone, other than someone steeped in arcane CRR jargon.

Link to impact of data processing on HM - core of case. Recording of crime linked to personal details is precisely why there is a material impact on HM. In short our position is that there is clearly a non fanciful possibility that this record might be disclosed as linked to his personal data.

I use language of non fanciful possibility as that is language of the case law.

Lincs police original recording of hate crime and refusal to delink it from HM personal detail, breaches 1, 2 and 3 DPA principles.

  1. Retention of information must be necessary and that requires a proportionality exercise. 2. Purpose of processing must be specified and legitimate. 3. Adequate, relevant and not excessive.

Consent was not given so was it necessary? No suggestion that Lincs ever carried out analysis. No consideration of DBS check, impact on reputation etc let alone looked at context of long and difficult altercation between HM and LW.

Failure to do this is fatal to necessity. Defendant says they rely on legal framework and your real target should be on systems for retaining data. But non of that absolves Lincs police of need to act lawfully when they make data processing decision and then refuse request to delink data.

Lincs then rely on policy behind recording rules. Our primary submission is that this policy is in breach of art 10 but even if you are not with us on that, that is insufficient as the authorities make clear, needs to be a consideration of proportionality on the particular case as well. For those reasons I invite your Ladyship to find that there is no necessary processing of data here and therefore no policing purpose in continuing to hold it.

Second principle - specified, principled and legitimate. But HM had absolutely no idea this crime had been recorded, despite being interviewed. Very difficult to see how Lincs can say with a straight face that they have complied with 2nd principle of DP.

3rd principle - not excessive. HM has no issue with police keeping records, understands need for police to keep records to detect and prevent crime. LW allegations could be stored somewhere. But the problem is that the police stored the information by recording it as a crime under outcome 15 and linked it to HM personal data, all of which means a non fanciful prospect it will have impact on his life without him having any idea it was done.

Judge - help me here. If there was an enhanced check carried out for whatever reason, if recorded as an allegation would that still be disclosed

Junior - it isn't clear. If recorded with that context, as information or intelligence (we just don't know) the risk of being disclosed becomes negligible as it has that context around it. Will see it is an allegation with context. But if down there as a crime record, higher risk.

Don't know what Lincs systems are but police do grade intelligence reports as reliable etc

Defendant's responses - said HM now trying to advance a different case, that is wrong. Said we haven't identified appropriate statutory regime - misunderstanding. Arguments re substantive argument re DPA and finally argument that Lincs has provided reassurance about disclosure, which just hasn't been provided.

Lincs say argument of breach of DAP arises from original recording and refusal to delink. Lincs complain we haven't pleaded case like that, but claim hasn't changed. See claim form itself p10 core bundle.

We pleaded re National Statistics as we had no idea then it was anonymised.

P59 the remedy sought was an order requiring the record was cancelled and any related records. Finally in the reply, didn't then understand the statistics point, always concerned that could be disclosed. No ambush or evolving case as is suggested. If there has been any confusion, hope I have now cleared it up.

Defendant says we haven't identified correct statutory basis for management of police information, claiming that its a whole set of different legislation which you haven't attacked. But look at Miller 1 where similar point made in CoA p317 authorities bundle. That point was successfully run at first instance but unsuccessful in CoA. To say guidance didn't cause chilling effect is artificial. The creation of the record means the risk of disclosure is there.

Decision to record LW complaints re hate crime against HM is a data processing decision and that breaches the principles of Data Protection. So Lincs arguments about statutory and administrative regime misses the point. We agree there is a whole regime there. If HM had come to know of this record, there is a whole process to do that. But that is not what happened here. We are challenging the original decision to record, more fundamental.

Finally various other arguments raised as to why DPA not breached - said its not a case of refusal to remove untrue or unsubstantiated allegations. But this really was an unsubstantiated allegation which police didn't realise when made recording. It should have been obvious from the complaint itself.

LW objected to the Fair Cop tweet about his dismissal and he claimed that it was a fake tweet purporting to be from the police and it was harassment. A quick look at that tweet showed that was not a reasonable interpretation. This really is a very similar situation to case of O where original complaint falls away and shift to different allegation which is never put.

my bold

Ereshkigalangcleg · Today 13:17

Tweets from Sarah Phillimore at RCJ 18/11

Lincs police are inconsistent with purpose of recording. They say its to comply with reporting rules. Then for the purposes of investigation. A very different thing. Can't have been for investigation as no investigation carried out when record was made. Far from HM shifting his position, Lincs have shifted with the purpose they say this data is for.

need to have some kind of record of criminal allegations, that is not excessive. But no explanation as to why the record has to be made in this way which could have a material impact on HM and the burden is on Def to show that.

The Lincs evidence does not provide reassurance on risks of disclosure. If just this, unlikely disclosed. But that is a very big 'if'. A very big if for any complainant. None of us know what might be being held. It is an obvious and potentially very large risk.

LW is a serial maker of complaints - on all the evidence before you. Two other judgments show you that LW has made very similar complaints against others - Cambridgeshire Constabulary 2026 and Greater Manchester police 2025. Simply to illustrate that LW has made complaints to other police forces and we have no idea what other recordings made.

As HM says in second statement, he is not reassured by Ms Woods at all.

DP claim, remedy sought is same as other grounds but there is also a damages claim and in assessing that draw your attention to two sections of HM evidence, 1st statement. and in second statement para 46-67. Set out in detail the effect on him of the recordings, rather than the impact of LW behaviour.

Submissions for Harry Miller conclude 15.52.
Now first defendant until about 16.25.

CassOle · Today 13:19

@Ereshkigalangcleg thanks for C&Ping all those tweets.

Ereshkigalangcleg · Today 13:24

Tweets from Sarah Phillimore at RCJ 18/11

So far as this claim concerns Sec of State it is a policy challenge, to non statutory guidance issued to police forces re recording rules. By way of overview the SoS response to claims of unlawfulness is that crime recording rules require recording of allegations not finding of guilt, primarily for statistical purposes.

Police would record and retain such allegations independent of rules. Rules are designed to further legitimate policy objectives including needs of victims. Also incorporate objective checks and wider safeguards so rules operate fairly and with due regard to article 10. possibility of individual unfair decisions capable of being made does not mean rules are unlawful.

It is essential that complaint is adjudicated upon with true understanding of the rules. Deal with standard of review and then the two grounds, applying that standard of review. Finally, some concluding remarks.

Starting point is s44 Police Act 1996. SoS may require police to provide information connected with policing. in particular information in form of statistics. Annual Data Requirement, referenced in witness statement. p219 core bundle. para 6. Explains that crime recording is mandatory function for police forces, to account to Home Office. annual data requirement is mechanism to collect data to formulate official statistics

Turning to guidance, Mr Williams' statement p242 core bundle - national counting rules in existence for many decades but in modern form since 1998, having undergone revision. Primary purpose is therefore to govern the recording of crime to provide statistical data required by home Office. but also serve purposes relating to identification and treatment of victims of crime. Non statutory guidance therefore test of lawfulness through prism of Gillick test.

Revised counting rules are the product of extensive empirical research which demonstrated problems with consistency in recording crimes and tendency to underrecording.

On the Record - thematic inspection report on Police crime reporting. 2000. p 274 contents page to give you sense of scope of this report. Crime recording at part 1. Executive summary. Look at some of the findings in the body of the report.

Found most police officers applied similar rigorous standard of evidence re crimes. What evidence required for NCHI? Most forces were prepared to no crime if dispute or doubt. conclusion in general with exception of serious crime, officers tended to seek evidence beyond reasonable doubt to record but used balance of probabilities to no crime.

under victim led crime reporting, police justified non crime if victim did not wish to pursue. Many officers said recording of such offences a waste of time. These findings are picked up in Executive summary. Way forward - merits and demerits in both form of recording, need nationally consistent and reliable methods.

Fast forward to 2014 HMIC inspection report - making the victim count. Lot longer than the other report. Crime recording process starts with call to incident handling. disengagement by victim and police which means crimes that should and could have been recorded at first call are going unreported. Details taken by call handlers often insufficient. That section of report recommended victim always be believed and this should be institutionalised and recording of crime should not be delayed.

What that shows is there was empirical research which underpinned development and still problems a decade on re consistency and under recording of crimes. but whole idea of NCRS was to remedy this.

Mr W statement - stress his credentials as a witness and research he has done - consistency in recording of crimes is necessary to ensure national crime decisions can inform public policy decisions. If dependent on judicial finding captures only small amount of crimes. Need data set that more accurately captures nature and scale of offending, to identify trends and assess impact.

information gathered is used internally re training. Management meetings to identify emerging crime trends. On a monthly basis meetings using crime recorded to determine risk to public and management.

If we needed to wait for outcome of prosecution we would not be able to identify trends as they emerge.

So with that body of evidence in mind and uses for which data is put, the threshold test in for reporting was devised. NCRS. National Crime Recording Standards.

It was a deliberate policy decision to enshrine a victim focused approach. To reduce extent to which recording decisions depended on differing approaches at initial stage. So police undertake objective assessment on assumption that information given is true, which is reinforced by direction on when to record.

General interpretation of principles - timeliness of recording. When information at first point of contact satisfies requirements. Must be recorded in 24 hours.

Investigation, whether by visiting for statement or seeking account would undermine the objectives of early recording and that was precisely what 2000 investigation revealed was happening.

All of this inevitably means that what is being recorded is not that a crime has been committed but someone has made an allegation that a crime has been committed.

It is well established that the application of NCSR, the data does not tell us how many crimes committed but how many reported to the police. Importantly, no one not even HM understands that the recording of a crime denotes the commission of a crime!

See HM skeleton argument. Para 10 p3 we see the very first and said to be crucial point of contact, word crime does not have the ordinary meaning of crime in everyday language. It is a term of art. An allegation is made. HM has understood this from the beginning. It is therefore difficult to understand the evidence relied on that HM himself understood as the import of such a record, particularly as he is a former police officer. He did ask re SAR for information in relation to this matter.

Lest there be any doubt about the policy objectives, one only has to look at the Vision Purpose statement in the supplementary bundle. Want to be the best crime crime reporting system with accurate statistics that puts needs of victims at its core... victims recieve the service they deserve, inform public of scope and risk of crime, allow intelligence on risk... inform development of policy to reduce crime.

conclude 16.25

my bold

Ereshkigalangcleg · Today 13:25

CassOle · Today 13:19

@Ereshkigalangcleg thanks for C&Ping all those tweets.

No worries, I’ve just seen she also did the thread unroll thing 😂 oh well

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