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Conflict in the Middle East

(Lack of) US Iran Peace Agreement Part 5

946 replies

OnePeppyFatball · 14/09/2026 10:37

Part 5

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Twiglets1 · 02/11/2026 09:28

Other things Tucker Carlson has believed to be true:

-Nuclear technology came from demons
-That Donald Trump might be the Antichrist ushering in the apocalypse by launching a nuclear weapon
-And that he himself was attacked by a demon

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/04/tucker-carlson-demon-war-room-podcast

Tucker Carlson credits demons for the invention of nuclear technology

Ex-Fox News host makes bizarre claim on Steve Bannon’s podcast, days after saying a demon attacked him in his sleep

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/04/tucker-carlson-demon-war-room-podcast

BelleHathor · 02/11/2026 09:35

@Newbutoldfather If it was the 2016 version of Trump I would find it hard to believe too, but this new version has a completely alien personality with Robert Barnes and others suggesting that he is not completely mentally competent like comparing himself to Ghengis Khan.

Re, Israel and it's own dirty work, it can't do it without American support and Israeli actions pose a risk to American assets in the region. Even Rubio in a brief honest moment (before walking back his statement) said about the attack on Iran in February : “We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action,” he told reporters. “We knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces, and we knew that if we didn’t preemptively go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties.”
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/mar/02/rubio-us-attack-israel-iran

Of course Trump has been briefed and Tucker even says so far he is not doing anything. However his administration is staffed with other like Hegseth, Rubio, Ratcliffe et al who do not want a deal with Iran. How honest do you think
that the information about the risks of actual fallout risks getting to Trump right now?

After all they showed Trump videos like this one to "prove" the success of their operations in Iran:
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/QEU7xYFDlBY
(RedTag: It's a video of when the US hit an anamorphic pictures of Iranian military assets)

Yup Tucker mentioned Russia, and tech Stocks took a hit last week especially (it's the AI bubble) so the market is already fragile.

US strikes on Iran triggered by Israel’s plan to launch attack, Rubio says

Democrats disturbed by rationale that Trump ordered pre-emptive strikes out of concern about Tehran retaliation

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/mar/02/rubio-us-attack-israel-iran

Twiglets1 · 02/11/2026 09:42

Carlson asked himself on his podcast whether Trump was “the antichrist” after the president launched a series of verbal attacks on Pope Leo XIV, who was born in the US and is an Iran war critic. The US president also posted to social media an AI image of himself as Jesus Christ.

“He’s mocking Jesus. He’s making fun of Christianity. The central figure of the religion is being held up for mockery,” the Tucker Carlson Show host said. “Could this be the antichrist? Well, who knows? At least that’s my conclusion. Who knows?”

After he was fired from Fox News in 2023, Carlson launched his own media company where he stoked controversy by interviewing Nick Fuentes, an antisemitic white supremacist, on his podcast.

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/apr/21/tucker-carlson-regrets-trump-support

Newbutoldfather · 02/11/2026 09:43

@Twiglets1 ,

‘Nuclear technology came from demons
-That Donald Trump might be the Antichrist ushering in the apocalypse by launching a nuclear weapon
-And that he himself was attacked by a demon’

Those aren’t the same kind of thing!

His bizarre spiritual ideas are very different from claiming that he has real world intelligence. Obviously, his credibility isn’t that high, but, equally, he is connected.

Twiglets1 · 02/11/2026 09:45

To conclude, I won't be taking anything Tucker Carlson says too seriously @BelleHathor

Other controversies that Carlson has invited over the years came after he promoted testicle tanning while he was still at Fox.

www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/apr/21/tucker-carlson-regrets-trump-support

Twiglets1 · 02/11/2026 09:49

Newbutoldfather · 02/11/2026 09:43

@Twiglets1 ,

‘Nuclear technology came from demons
-That Donald Trump might be the Antichrist ushering in the apocalypse by launching a nuclear weapon
-And that he himself was attacked by a demon’

Those aren’t the same kind of thing!

His bizarre spiritual ideas are very different from claiming that he has real world intelligence. Obviously, his credibility isn’t that high, but, equally, he is connected.

My point is his credibility isn't that high, as you say.

He's a religious nutter who interviewed an antisemitic white supremacist on his podcast and has a history of predicting every few months that Trump is about to unleash nuclear weapons. He hates Trump (which he has said himself) and I believe this affects his ability to be rational where Trump is concerned.

TopPocketFind · 02/11/2026 09:52

Trump is unpredictable and irrational , that makes him dangerous.

BelleHathor · 02/11/2026 10:01

Tucker Qatarlson, am I right 😉,

It doesn't really matter what or whom people trust.

Tucker met with Trump 11 times prior to the Iranian attack to try and convince him not to do it, that it would not be in American strategic interests and that it would ruin Trump's presidency. He was right, just look at the midterm Republican early vote collapse.

That some patriotic American's who actually respect their constitution and love their country are leaking to him in order to stop a disaster is more important.

I mean Trump dined with Nick Fuentes back in 2022:
https://abc7ny.com/post/donald-trump-kanye-west-ye-nick-fuentes/12494056/

And defended Tucker interviewing him:
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-defends-tucker-carlson-after-interview-with-nick-fuentes-far-right-activist-known-for-his-antisemitic-views

p.s When women were fighting for single sex spaces, no other MSM channels let them speak apart from Tucker at Fox despite being politically on different sides:
https://www.foxnews.com/video/6001444494001
https://www.foxnews.com/media/transgenderism-womens-rights-tucker-carlson-today

Donald Trump hosts far-right extremist Nick Fuentes, Kanye West for dinner at Mar-a-Lago estate

West, who has legally changed his name to Ye, posted a video Thursday on Twitter in which he claimed that Trump "is really impressed with Fuentes."

https://abc7ny.com/post/donald-trump-kanye-west-ye-nick-fuentes/12494056/

Newbutoldfather · 02/11/2026 10:11

The below is truly scary. Apparently, for ‘ethical’ reasons, you can no longer bet on whether the U.S will use a nuke or not.

However, before the market was taken down the odds were 22% that they would.

It seems to me incredible that people believe that there is a >1/5 chance of this happening. Imagine if you had said that just 3 years ago.

truthout.org/articles/polymarket-takes-down-betting-on-nuclear-detonation-after-backlash/

RedTagAlan · 02/11/2026 10:29

Quoting @BelleHathor . What Carlson said.

"No conventional weapon in the American arsenal can penetrate 300 feet of solid granite to destroy the tunnels where enrichment is supposedly taking place. "

300 feet of granite. So that's 91 meters. Would even a nuke get that far down. After all nukes are not penetrating weapons. They usually are designed to airburst above ground I believe, to try to reduce fallout. Because if they detonate on the ground all the soil etc gets irradiated and goes up, then comes down. I also think the panned operation Ploughshare needed nukes buried in boreholes, to dig holes. Thankfully they cancelled it.

So I went for a look, to see if there is any data of crater depth, and amazingly, not blocked... and even better, MIT have a calculator for it.

Nuclear Weapon Crater Size and damage Predictions – Nuclear Weapons Education Project (mit.edu)

That says- "Heavy or small underground strutures will be damaged only if they are 1.25 apparent crater radii of a nuclear explosion."

No mention of the type of material it hits, or where. But its 91m down, put numbers into the calculator.... and how fucking disappointing is that :-(
It says the same no matter what number is put in. Maybe it's my OS.

Anyway, blasts deflect off a rock ground. I have found a paper on the Castle Bravo test. 15 megatons. The biggest the US detonated. And it says the crater was 75 meters deep, 1.5 km diameter, and it spread fallout globally. But that was on soft coral.

The UK warheads on Trident go up to 100 Kilotons. Hiroshima was 15 Kt

That is why they put NORAD inside Cheyenne mountain after all. To protect it from nuke blasts.

Nuclear Weapon Crater Size and damage Predictions – Nuclear Weapons Education Project

https://nuclearweaponsedproj.mit.edu/electromagnetic-pulse-calculator/

Newbutoldfather · 02/11/2026 10:40

@RedTagAlan ,

I see no reason to not believe the below. It is based on the shock wave, not direct penetration. I did study a mathematical science many years ago, but I would have no idea how to even start a back of the envelope calculation to verify it!

As you correctly said, though, significant fallout cannot be prevented.

  • A low-to-mid yield device (around 10 to 300 kilotons) burrowed just 3 meters into hard rock can generate enough destructive seismic overpressure to collapse hard structures located roughly 70 to 100 meters deep.
  • Specifically, the B61-11 (with a variable yield up to 340 kilotons) or a high-yield weapon in the tens-to-hundreds of kilotons range is generally cited by defense planners as the scale required to crush or severely compromise deep mountain facilities (like those built 80 to 300 meters down). 1, 2, 3,
Key Limitations
  • Containment vs. Destruction: To fully contain a nuclear explosion and prevent massive radioactive venting in dry hard rock, a 1-kiloton blast requires roughly 60 meters of burial depth, and a 100-kiloton blast requires roughly 300 meters. Because a penetrator can only dig down ~3 meters, a 90-meter-deep target hit with a high-yield nuclear EPW will not be fully contained, resulting in significant surface and subsurface radioactive fallout. 1, 2]

B61 nuclear bomb - Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B61_nuclear_bomb

BelleHathor · 02/11/2026 10:52

@RedTagAlan Apologies about the long text, it's the subtitles from the video on Youtube.

SPECIAL ENCORE: Iran's Nuclear Program is Intact / Ted Postol
s

Is Iran close to having a nuclear weapon? Could they actually already have one? We told you on this show, Colonel Larry Wilkerson believes that Iran already has one. Whether they do or not, we don't know. But even now in the open, Iranian side has been talking more and more as we wonder if we are on the verge of the United States going back in and launching another war or a renewed war against Iran, will they go to a nuclear weapon? Do they have the capacity? On Friday, we had Professor Morandi on the show who showed this X post that he made of the Tehran Friday prayers where they are calling for a revision of Iran's nuclear doctrine. Tehran Friday prayer leader calls for revising Iran's nuclear doctrine saying enemies have trampled Iran's red lines and broken agreements and citing polls showing over 70% public support for the change and by getting rid and leaving the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the NPT, then that opens the door for them to go to nuclear weapons. Now, President Trump has been at nausea telling us all that it was obliterated. Secretary of War says it was obliterated in Operation Midnight Hammer in 2025 and we've got satellites watching etc. But as you may recall in July of last year, we had Professor Ted Postol of MIT on the show and he said at that time that yeah, sure, you've hit those three sites, Fordo and the other two and the mountains on the outside were obliterated. The facilities on the surface were blown up. But he said that underneath the there's probably we didn't get any damage. But he said that's not the only issue. There are tons literally of reprocessed nuclear material scattered throughout the country at various levels and he said there's all kinds of capacity for them to make other processing facilities that they could actually make a bomb and no one would even know about it. And given the fact that he said that a year ago and we are now at the place to where they may say we can make a nuclear bomb within days and you might not even know about it. Ted Postol talked about this a year ago and so since so important and this video was really well received at the time, we're going to replay it again here so that you can see why he has said then and why the reality now is that there could be a nuclear weapon within days if they make that decision. >> Uh we hear it was obliteration. It was a virtual obliteration. >> And given the 30,000 lbs of explosives and capability of those munitions, uh it was devastation underneath Fordow. And the amount of munitions, six per location, uh any assessment that tells you it was something otherwise is speculating with other motives. >> Well, that was President Trump claiming in the aftermath acting the [laughter] in the aftermath of attacking the uh Fordow nuclear site along with two others uh a couple of actually about almost a month ago now. Uh we found out subsequently maybe it wasn't quite as obliterated as he may think, but so far the administration has continued on. Now, you may notice in that uh in that clip there toward the end Secretary Hecker talked about how these uh big 30,000 lb penetrating bombs that we dropped obviously caused a lot of damage. And as you may also recall if you've been watching our show that Senator uh Professor almost said Senator Ted Postol, you should be, but Professor Ted Postol, who's back with us again today live, talked about how incredibly difficult it would be and how unlikely it would be for that to happen before it happened. And then now subsequently we have these uh a number of different claims here. And we're going to look today because Ted has some some pretty breaking information here that you haven't seen anywhere else either on uh even some of our other uh friendly uh YouTube sites or on the mainstream media is that he is going to contend here today that Iran has their capacity to make bombs and and maybe even closer than anybody thinks. And so I'm going to turn it over to you, Ted, if you can uh first of all you had some caveats about you know you don't you haven't actually been to the ground in Fordow, so if you can just put that out, but then but because of the evidence that you have you have a high confidence that what you're going to say is correct. >> Well, if if if if I were heading an intelligence assessment, and I could, I have the background to do it. Uh, at least I don't have the the the political um uh uh flexibility to do it maybe these days, but I I do have the technical skills to do it. If you look at the situation in Iran and you ask the question, what what would you best expect given what you know about their program, uh you would conclude essentially without doubt you would have you would call it a high confidence uh conclusion, but it it really is with very little doubt that they now, at this moment, have the capacity to produce really 10 atomic weapons. Actually, we have I haven't even an an estimate of the number. What I decided to do given all the smoke and mirrors that has been used by the administration and unfortunately the lack of of any kind of of journalistic attempts to really look into details, I decided to put together a briefing where I describe all of the technical capabilities that Iran must have in order to build an atomic weapon. Now, all of these capabilities are well they they already exist in Iran. That's that's one of the points of the of the briefing. Incidentally, those of your audience who want a copy of the briefing, please feel free to write me uh an Just call it Iran atomic bomb in the in the [laughter] in the heading. Uh, please be careful about the heading because I'm dyslexic and I have trouble scanning my emails. So make sure your subject says Iran atomic bomb and I'll be happy to send you the full monty here and it's a it's a lot of detail. I don't I won't go through the detail here, but I'll give you a sense of of how these conclusions were reached and what the evidence is. >> And what I'd like to do, Ted, is is just kind of as a bottom line up front and and you'll get into the detail or at least some of measured detail here in this a minute, is that it could be from the time a decision is made, it could be between five and six weeks uh according to what I read in your briefing here a second ago. Or less, but I I we'll get to that in a second, but to set the stage, that's what that what your assessment has come down to. Here is from Sean Parnell on July the 3rd telling you what the government official position is. >> You know, our assessment of of the battle damage around Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan remains unchanged. I mean, we we believe and and certainly all of the intelligence that we've seen have let us to believe that Iran's those facilities especially have been completely obliterated and the fact that we have degraded their program by one to two years, at least intel assessments inside the department assess that and I think their intelligence shares that conclusion. >> What's your assessments by this department? Think it's been degraded or delayed by one to two years? >> I think we're thinking probably closer to two years, like degraded their their program by two years, but but but what we've seen almost in fact just universally among our allies was them congratulating the United States, the President, the Secretary of Defense on on that bold operation and the idea that [snorts] American action in Iran has set the conditions for global stability. >> Global stability. >> Global stability. >> And probably to two years, he says. You what say you? >> Uh well, if he's defined uh that the damage that was done to these uh facilities near the surface, Fordo, I don't know what he's talking about. He has he's just blowing smoke. But uh uh to the Natanz facilities in Isfahan, uh uh they probably wouldn't surprise me if they've uh destroyed more stuff than they could rebuild in a in a long time uh uh even more than two years. That wouldn't surprise me. But that's not the definition of stopping the program. Stopping the program is stopping them from rapidly building an atomic bomb. So he's played this game of switch the objectives. If the objective is to stop them from rapidly building atomic bombs, then uh nothing has been done. In fact, uh we're worse off because uh we know and I'll show I'll demonstrate this in in a discussion and I'll give people data if they want to get a copy of the of the uh the briefing uh that uh you could build a clandestine facility that would be not much larger than twice the size of a studio apartment. You know, like 60 m 600 sq ft 1,200 1,200 sq ft would be enough to build a facility to produce the uranium. I'm not just talking about the enriched uh uranium hexafluoride gas from the centrifuges, but the uranium metal to produce uh atomic bombs. You need 1,200 ft of uh facility. You could build that anywhere. >> Now correct me if I'm wrong cuz I I scanned scanned through your briefing before we got on the air here, but there there's really two obviously there's a lot of factors, but two really important factors to to assess whether Iran has the capacity and that's one they have to already have some amount of uh 60% reprocessed material, nuclear material, and they have to have a certain kind of centrifuge. Is that correct? >> Or a certain number of of of their advanced centrifuges. But those centrifuges they're they're in the process of manufacturing them. They could have they could have that many centrifuges, the number that I uh I I assuming a cascade of 174 centrifuges. I'll even show you the configuration of the cascade. >> And I definitely want to see that. So the one of the first questions I have is uh whatever the number of them would be, if let let's just hypothetical for a minute and say that miraculously the bombs literally destroyed every single one of the centrifuges of the type you're going to talk about here in a minute. How difficult would it be for Iran to build new ones? >> Well, it would probably take uh uh months to build new ones. >> But probably not years. >> the unless the manufacturing facility was completely destroyed, which could be the which could be the case. I think uh the assumption that they don't have 174 of these centrifuges is uh is very unlikely to be correct because you have a production line, you have these things coming off the production line, you're storing them someplace before you're going to use them. They could easily have hundreds and hundreds of these centrifuges that they have not yet installed sitting somewhere. They would certainly I mean I just put myself you know I've been doing this for the audience. You put yourself in the position of the of the Iranians, you know. You're not stupid. You have to assume that that the Iranians are as stupid as these guys want you to believe when they give you these briefings. And the first thing you do is you say we secure these centrifuges immediately. We we you know we just make sure they're in a place where you can't get at them. And and then we deploy them them we see them. So it's very, very, very unlikely they don't have enough centrifuges for a cascade the size that they had in [clears throat] in Fordo. It's also very unlikely that they destroyed uh the centrifuges at Fordo, but that's another discussion and we can have that discussion we've had part of it. But very, very unlikely that they destroyed everything if if anything. >> So let let me ask you even before you get into the details of this kind of as a follow-up from your last show which which you did uh I guess in the immediate aftermath of the of the attack do have you since that time been able to assess or maybe obtain any additional evidence whether it's satellite photos or anything else [snorts] to say whether or not or to what degree the bombing at Fordo may have been effective. >> No, I have no information and I doubt they do either. I mean that statement was July 3. I mean what is this guy talking about? At that point the Iranians didn't know if there was any damage in Fordo. So what is this guy talking about? I mean it's I have to tell you as an American citizen I am tremendously disturbed by this lying that goes on routinely by our leadership and I'm also tremendously disturbed by the role of the intelligence community in allowing this lying although it's hard for them to do much if their leadership lies about their findings. But it would be good if some members of Congress pressed them on this and for example this briefing I've just put them to put together for your audience here could help any member of the Senate or the Congress who actually wants to know what specific questions to ask because this this shows you what they need to produce a bomb every you know month, month and a half. >> Okay >> So, without any further ado, please please jump in and explain how this could work. >> Well, let me remind your audience of a of a fact that I discussed in in one of the earlier discussions, which is how the uranium enrichment process, the character of the uranium enrichment process. Why don't we jump to slide six, Gary, which I showed in the previous talk. If you want to get a sense of how the uranium enrichment process works, think of it as me having a frying pan where I have water with sugar mixed into it and I want to extract the sugar from the water. So, I have a stove and I start heating the frying pan. In this case, we'll assume there's 10% sugar in in the liquid. And each stage of the heating, let's say 10 minutes of heating, doesn't have to be just I do an amount of work on on the system. I put energy in and evaporated a certain amount of water. And each 10-minute period, I evaporate the same amount of water because I'm putting a certain amount of heat in and the amount of evaporation that that occurs is proportional to the heat I put in. So, in the first step, I go from maybe 10% to to if you look at the leftmost diagram with the most empty units with the red line on the bottom, I have 10% enriched water with sugar. Then the next step, it becomes 11% and the next step, it becomes 14% as I move to the right. If I moved to the uh let's look at the last two columns and um and I have removed 80 units of water. That's it's it's the next column from the leftmost box. Um then I have 50% enriched uh uh uh you know sugar. And in the next unit I removed the last 10% and 10% water and I go to 100% enriched. So the curve below the graph below shows you how each step in the enrichment process brings me closer to a pure amount of sugar that's dry. Now it turns out that uh there's a unit called separative work. We don't have to worry in detail what it is but it's very close. It's similar but not exactly what I just illustrated here. So if we go to slide seven we have a quantitative curve here. It's quantitative um uh set of images here that says okay we start out with 1300 kg of natural uranium. And using a separation device I'll describe the separation device shortly. Uh I it's it's [snorts] in this case it's called a gas centrifuge but there are other kinds of but this is what the Iranians are using. In that three in that 1300 kg of um of natural uranium there's about 2500 kg of 90% enriched uranium. The problem is we have to get it out. We have to separate the uranium 238 from the uranium 235 which is the bomb material. So we need about 3500 units step units to get to 3 and 1/2% uh enriched uranium. That's the next step. So notice uh if you look at the very top, steps, [snorts] uh 10-minute steps on the frying pan. So um so if I um if I go from 3 and 1/2% to uh uh to 20% enriched, which is what the Iranians were doing for a long time, then I only need 1,500 more separative steps. The separative steps add up arithmetic-wise, you know, once I have a pan filled with uh 50% sugar, uh the next step is always the same, just as uh so these add up. They numerically had add up. And uh so if I want to go from 60% enriched uh uh uranium to 90% enriched, all I need is 120 separative work units. So I need uh I need roughly 100 over 5,500 separative work units to do the final step, almost nothing. And this was not an accident. This was a brilliantly contrived strategy on the part of the the Iranians to be extremely close to producing a nuclear weapon without producing it. Now this has the advantage from a political This is You know, there's a technical fact. Now Now we need to think about the politics of it. This has the political utility of not being a nuclear weapon state. Remember, this was going on under the International Atomic Energy Agency observations. So unless they were cheating in some way, and there's a possibility of that, uh they But all of the material was under oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency, including the 408 kilograms of 60% enriched uh uranium hexafluoride which could be used to produce 10 atomic bombs. 10 incidentally low technology atomic bombs. Atomic bombs that don't have to be compressed in a complicated spherical implosion. So these are straightforward to build for a state that's already got the uranium. Very straightforward. The United States did not even test our first atomic bomb. We just dropped it on Hiroshima without a test. We were so sure it would work. So this is the you know the this is the level of technology that would be required in the Iranian bombs that they could the the 10 bombs that they could manufacture. So the question is how do you enrich this um 60 kilograms uh 108 kilograms of uranium? Well first of all you have a device it's let's go to uh uh slide 12 please. [snorts] You have a device that's called a gas centrifuge. This is a complicated looking device and it is very complicated. If you look at the outer lining there with a light gray outer um uh outer color that's a casing. That's a case. And inside that case you can see a red lined uh cylinder. And that's a rotating cylinder. So the outside doesn't rotate. It's a fixed casing. The inside is rotating. The inside is maybe we know what its diameter is. It's about 8 in 20 cm. And the outside is about uh maybe uh 10 or 12 uh inches uh 30 cm. And um the rotation speed is fantastic. 70,000 rotations per minute. Now, the idea of having this fantastic rotation speed is you want to create uh a centripetal reaction, centrifugal forces that cause the gas inside the centrifuge to be pushed up against the wall of the centrifuge. And so you have a gravitational field that's maybe three 300 or 500,000 times stronger than the Earth's gravitational field >> Wow. >> pushing this So the gas So this image which shows the gas rotating uh in you know in a significant diameter of the of the centrifuge is misleading. It's just there so the diagram could be understandable. In fact, that gas is just pressed up against the wall. To give you a sense of how well balanced this centrifuge has to be, if I put a flea a flea on the outer wall of the centrifuge, the centrifugal forces would cause the centrifuge to wobble with a lateral force of 1 lb. >> Really? >> Yeah. So it'd be [laughter] It's at 70,000 revolutions per So you can imagine that when you construct this thing, you have to make sure that those walls are uniform in in um in in thickness, that there no inhomogeneities in the wall. Plus >> So so let me interrupt you for a second. Is is that the reason why I heard and I don't remember if it was the IAEA director general Grossi or if it was just one of the commentators on, but they said if these things had been functioning when those bombs hit at Fordo, even if the thing didn't get down that far, the vibrations would have probably wrecked all of them. Is that probably accurate? >> Absolutely. What they would have done and should have done and and I'm sure they did is they slowed they they turned them off. They slowed them down. And you know and then you you lock them in place. There's usually some kind of lock mechanism that prevents them from vibrating when they're in a stable state. So of course you would definitely you wouldn't sit there and let these things wobble around. So so yeah so I don't know what what is Grossi suggesting that these people are too dumb to they knew there was an attack coming. I mean they knew >> would be the implication that that that just the vibrations alone could have destroyed all of their centrifuges. >> Well it's a it's a true statement but it's it's it's misleading. It's like the statement that they put this program behind a couple of years. Yeah I mean if you're talking about the low tech centrifuges that are no longer playing a key role in the program yeah you may have done that. But so what? And on July 3rd you certainly did not know about the high tech part of the program. So I don't know where he gets his information and again I speak as an American citizen now. It it infuriates me that an official of the US government lies to the American public cuz this is aimed at lying to the American public. No question about it. This is not It has nothing to do with our >> you on because this is about unintimidated telling the truth. So that's why we're grateful to have you on. >> Yeah. So one way to think of this extraordinarily complex object it looks simple but it's extraordinary toward the force from the point of view of mechanical engineering. It's and control and it's absolutely an amazing piece of technology. You can you can think of it if we look at slide 13 as an enrichment device. So if we look at the image at the bottom here of this it's called a separating union unit you know, among more technical people. There's an input where gas where uranium [snorts] hexafluoride gas, which is a mix of uranium 235 and uranium 238 is put into the centrifuge. The centrifuge is spinning at a fantastic speed. Through amazingly clever engineering, it separates some of the U 235, which is lighter from U 238, which is heavier. And so the there's an input of a mixture of U 235 and U 238 and there's an output of slightly enriched U 235 to U 238, very slightly enriched and very slightly depleted from another mechanism. So if we go to slide 16 you can see one of these devices the these devices set up. These are probably Well, I'm not sure I know which what kind of centrifuge they are. Notice at the top of the of these devices there are three tubes coming out. Those are the tubes through which the uranium hexafluoride gas One of them is is a feed-in tube and the other tube is the other two tubes, one is for enriched uranium hexafluoride and the other for depleted uranium hexafluoride. But each one of these separation devices, these fantastically impressive mechanical devices has to it only does a very small amount of enrichment. So it has to be put in what's called a cascade. In the next slide, I show you an arrangement for the cascade. And let's go to the next slide thereafter 18. And um and I'll try I know this will be confusing without me having a pointer, but I'll uh I'll I'll give you the what you need uh for the members of the audience who are seriously interested to figure it out on their own. If you look to the left side at the bottom, there's a small arrow and it's labeled feed. The feed in to the it's in the middle. And this is the feed into the main cascade row. And notice that below the feed in line on the main cascade row, there's a depleted la a depleted uranium line coming out. Each of the centrifuges are putting out the depleted uranium into that line. Notice that that line goes down to the next row. And that next row that's a depleted line from the upper row goes into the feed line of the bottom row. Goes into the feed line. And below the feed line of the bottom row is another uh depleted line and that goes out. And that's the depleted part of the uranium that's called it's called tails or waste. Now if we look at the upper part, uh we look at let's again focus on the feed input which is in this in in the main cascade row. And if we look above the feed input, we see an enriched line coming out. Now that enriched line goes upward to the next row and it goes into the feed of the next row. Now the next row has a feed that above it that's going into the feed of the next row above it and so on. And the and the depleted line from that next row is going down back into the input of the of the row below it. And what we're doing is we're we're enriching and depleting and enriching and depleting and we're just recirculating this stuff in what's called a cascade. [snorts] Now if we want to see what an actual which the the cascade at Fordo I I actually I'm pretty proud I I could I I couldn't find an exact statement of what it looked like so I was was actually able to deduce it. So you won't find this anywhere else at least not to my knowledge. The next slide 19 shows you the arrangement of the Fordo cascades with 174 centrifuges. And do we know how how do we know they have 174? >> Uh it's the it's described by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the you know there is no there's no debate about that. >> Got it. >> So we know what this cascade looks like. And we have a pretty good first guess of its enrichment capability. And we know the enrichment capability is somewhere around 900 to 1,000 separated work units or swoos. All right we'll say it's 1,000 swoos. It's probably a a good guess. Now if we look at the next slide number 20 what I've done here is on the left is the original cascade you know cascade I was using to illustrate. And then what I've done is taken the main feed row to the right and arranged it so the whole feed row is side by side rather than long. And the only reason I'm doing this in this diagram is to show you that it's straightforward. Remember in the in the diagram we saw that was let's just go back to it. If we look again at slide 16 you can see those lines coming out and you see those lines can be bent and put where where you want them to. So that means you can the physical cascade, the physical arrangement of the piping in the cascade can be modified so the cascade is very efficiently arranged on the floor so it doesn't take tremendous floor space. So if we go back to to slide 20 and then go to slide 21 we can see that this this is the 174 centrifuges can be arranged in a in a pattern 24 ft by 26 ft. That's about 624 sq ft. So about 60 sq m. So if you if you had a studio apartment at one time in your life and it was a larger studio apartment you could have had your own cascade [laughter] in it for a rich This is not a big thing. It's not a big object. It's it's one of the big issues with and in slide 22 we see that these these these centrifuges are just arranged in a box-like pattern but the actual physical arrangement of the piping is different from that. So the question next is how much power do I need for this? Well I took a guess of about 30 or 35 watts of power for a cascade uh per uh per um uh separative work unit that the cascade has. It's actually almost certainly much lower than that. For example, if you look at the West, we require about 5 W of power for per separative work unit for our cascade, but the cascades are very advanced. They're much more advanced than what the um than what the Iranians are able to build. But in any case, it's a ballpark estimate. And if you ask, well, that seem like 30 or 40 kW of power for uh 174 centrifuges. And uh you know, you get 150 kW of electric power out of your Prius engine. You can just take the Prius motor, make sure you take the the electric generator with it because it's driving an electric motor. That's going to give you 150 kW of power, so you can run, you know, three or four of these cascades with your Prius uh with >> Wow. >> with a motor scavenged from a Prius vehicle. I like the Prius. I I own one, so >> [laughter] >> That's good to know. >> So I I know something about them. So um so operating and hiding these centrifuges in a small volume laboratory type situation is not going to be a problem. >> Okay, so let me ask you that's that's physically, right? But there is these claims that one of the things that the IAEA could do and in fact, one of the complaints of the Obama deal in 2015 was that they could have secretly had another site, but the some were claiming that the IAEA sensing equipment or stuff that we had from uh aerial capabilities could detect if this thing was operating somewhere else. What's the truth on that? >> Well, we could not detect them from other what we can do is look [snorts] we can do very very careful forensic uh analysis of the materials that are being produced uh by Iran. So, for example, they have to produce uh about 1,200 kg of uh of natural uranium hexafluoride. Natural meaning 0.071% uh 0.0711% of uranium natural. Now, the I I don't remember the numbers, but they have to mine a tremendous amount of uranium ore in order to uh get that 1,200 kg of of So, what you do is you start monitoring every level of their production. >> I see. >> And and if we and and if there's agreement, if they're allowing the monitoring, then you have uh a bookkeeping uh problem. And it's probably it's probably correct, I would say it's if the bookkeeping is done properly and the IAEA is in a position to do the counting and as long as the Iranians are cooperating, and all the evidence was they were cooperating completely with the International Atomic Energy Agency, then you know what they were producing. You don't know from any kind of satellites or secret, you know, these this is in the fantasy of some maybe this guy who was telling us that two years we were supposed [laughter] to the program >> Parnell. So so there's no detection equipment that we have whether from space-based or drone-based that you can detect? >> you can you can look uh for example, you can look for evidence of higher levels of enrichment. We found that. We found, for example, the IAEA found a sample uh a small amount of 87.5% enriched uranium hexafluoride. They it's not that there was a it's not that there was a lot of it, but they found that, you know, in parts per billion or million you can you can detect this radio isotope of of of uranium. You know, of uranium hexafluoride. So, we do know that for sure that the Iranians were testing their centrifuges to see if they could go up to the 90% limit. >> And how would that how would that have been identified? How would they have detected it? >> Because there's no other way that there would be 87.5% >> No, now how how I mean how did they know that there was 87.5? How did they detect that existed? >> they probably probably took what's called a swab test in the in a facility and they do this extraordinarily sensitive detection work, you know, of looking for the measuring the enrichment of of what they got on the swab. They could have had picograms of the stuff. You know, it could have been very very small amounts. >> But the bottom line is they have to be in the facility and take a physical test. You can't >> they were they they got it somewhere. They got it somewhere, right. So, but but it's very hard to hide that you're up to something else. >> Got it. >> So so that does indicate I I would if you asked me if I was your intelligence officer and you asked me, I said they have certainly checked to make sure that their understanding of what their centrifuges can do can do what they're expecting him to them to do. They're not enriching because we have, you know, a picogram is not a is not is nothing. But they are experiment. In other words, they have tested their capabilities. And it makes sense they would. I mean, if I were playing this game that they're playing, I would want to make sure there's nothing I quite missed >> Yeah. >> in my enrichment capabilities. So, so it's clear that they are they have been hedging. And of course, the whole idea is to hedge. You hedge by not having atomic weapons, so you don't provoke your buddies in Saudi Arabia and Turkey and Egypt to think of you as a nuclear weapons state and cause them to react. And you further But you you you look pretty threatening to the Israelis because, you know, you start fooling around with us. We're only a Nat's hair away from being an atomic weapon state to strike back. It's a very very clever, deeply thought out um uh policy. Something we don't see at all in the West. >> Yeah. Okay, so with with with given all that information is set up, how then can they move that to nuclear weapons capability and actually build a bomb in as you say between five and six weeks? >> Okay. Well, they have this uranium hexafluoride. It's uh uh we can take a look at at this material. This is a gas. I mean, it's it's a solid most of the time. It's it's it's sort of uh at at at room temperature it's a solid. It's uh it's looks like salt, crusty salt. I'll show you an image of some in a tube. And uh if you heat it up to maybe 170 180° Fahrenheit, uh 80° Celsius, it evaporates. And it's so it's in the centrifuge as a gas. And you're using the gas to You know, you separating the gas by having it pressed up against the wall and the heavier U-238 is closer to the wall, the lighter U-235 is slightly less close. And you're you're sipping it out stage by stage. So now you have this uranium hexafluoride. Let me just show you slide 31 shows you um uh shows you what uranium hexafluoride looks like as a solid. What? [laughter] >> Looks like cotton candy. >> Yeah. Yeah. It >> it's probably okay. Well, it's toxic, so >> I don't want to eat it, but >> want to lick it. [laughter] So you have to convert this to metal because it turns out that the uranium hexafluoride is about two thirds heavier than the uranium atom. So if you take uranium hexafluoride and you separate out the uranium atom, you will get two thirds the weight 0.66 the weight of uranium. So if you have 25 kg of uranium hexafluoride, which we which the IAEA is calling an atomic bomb, then 13 or 14 kg of uranium is associated, you know, if you separate take the fluorine off it. So how do you do that? Well, some of the people another In fact, this is what actually got me started putting together this briefing. Somebody made some claim about Well, they got to turn it into metal. Big deal, you know, it's a big deal. Well, nonsense. It's it's a it's a less of a problem than enriching with the centrifuges. Less of a problem. So I went out and I looked up a Russian paper on converting uranium hexafluoride to to metal. Let's look at slide 33. All right, very nice diagram. The Russians usually usually don't do good graphics, but I this one's a nice one. And we have a a man standing here, so that gives us a sense of scale. And if you look at the the leftmost part of this train, you see a red pipe and a green pipe on the left with hydrogen and fluorine coming in in pipes. And the pipes go [snorts] make a sudden drop vertically and then there's a a chamber called a chemical reactor. You can see it's in red too and it's going from left to right the the pipe center on the left side. That is is a chemical converter to convert hydrogen uranium hexafluoride to uranium tetrafluoride. So it's it's a two-step process we're going to go through over here. So what we do now uranium tetrafluoride I'll show you a picture of it shortly. It's called green salt. It's a solid. And so so out of this chemical separator through this pipe that's to the right of it is is a gas and let me tell you it's nasty stuff. It's hydrogen fluoride which is you know etches glass. I mean this is you know not it's chemically dealt with in industry all the time but it's [snorts] you know maybe Gary can do it in his garage but I wouldn't advise it to other people. And but >> You hear that Gary? Don't do it. >> I'm [laughter] taking notes. >> Yeah. And then it goes into a device called the cyclone generator a separator. And a cyclone separator let let me just show you I just want to I you know I know there's a lot of detail I just want to show you that this information for anybody who wants it that shows you this stuff is compact. It can be built by people who know what they're doing and we certainly know that the Iranians know what they're doing. So if we look at slide 35 we see a diagram you know a conceptual diagram of this this converter. But if we look at the next slide slide 36 we actually see a converter that the Russians built. And what I've done here is labeled it for anybody who wants the slide, you know, so that So if you look at the leftmost part of this exotic-looking device, you'll see there's a hydrogen inlet and a fluorine inlet labeled. And the hydrogen and fluorine is mixed together and and and pressurized through a nozzle. And then there's this combustion chamber where the hydrogen and fluorine is burning. I mean, this is a complicated device. I mean, and the hydrogen and fluorine are then at high pressure and temperature uh forced through another set of inlets. And this is a two rows of inlets because in between these two rows of inlets at the top you see uh an injection uh gas phase uranium hexafluoride and and and hydrogen. And at these high temperatures and pressures, what you get coming out to the right is a chemical reaction zone where you have atomic hydrogen, not molecular hydrogen, plus uranium hexafluoride, which then becomes uranium tetrafluoride plus hydrogen fluoride. This is really nasty stuff. All right, but so you have you have a mixture of solid particles and and gas. Well, you you don't want the gas the gas is nasty stuff and its waste. So if you go to slide 37, you pass it through a device which you saw in the original diagram. Uh let's uh let's go let's go back to um Sorry. I just want to remind your audience. Let's go back to slide 33. You can see this funnel-shaped uh cyclone separator. And the cyclone separator is separating the particles of um of green a green salt uh in from the hydrogen fluoride gas which is venting out through the top of this uh separator and then into this ventilation shaft that that's shown in the upper left corner. So um uh you can you can vent to your neighbor if if you don't like them but the but make sure you're not in the path of this stuff because it's really nasty. Um on on slide 38 you come up with this nice stuff this green salt. So now you have to separate the fluorine from the green salt. >> I know you're going to explain this but just just give us a sense here how many more steps to turn this green >> more step one more step and you got it. >> into a nuclear bomb. >> One more step. >> Holy cow. >> So so and and what you what you do is you go out let's look at slide 46. You go out and you get some reaction they call reaction vessels. They can withstand high pressures and temperatures and what you do is is you uh you you you you put what's called an induction coil around them. Let's look at slide 47. This is a a high current induction coil. I won't go through the details they're in they're in the slides for those of you who are interested enough in them and the induction coil creates a magnetic an oscillating magnetic field inside it and that oscillating magnetic field creates currents which heat the material in in inside the crucible. So if we look at slide 48 let's look at the lower right uh figure in slide 48 you can see this is a crucible with molten metal in it and an induction coil. Again the details are in the briefing for those of you who want to take care of it in your And then go to slide 51. And we have this crucible. Now the crucible is sealed. This thing is hot and it's also under high pressure. So here you have uh this row of six pictures. What you first do is you take the green salt and you mix it in with magnesium fragments. You know you you you just put magnesium in it. You just mix it stir it together this powder. And you start heating it. Once it starts heating the um uh the uranium the the uranium green glass starts melting. That's about 1,036 degrees Celsius. Then at 1,090 degrees Celsius we're we're looking at the third image from the left. The uh magnesium starts to vaporize. Now this stuff starts to combust. It starts reacting. You don't have to heat it at all now. It's heating itself. And it is hotter than hell. And it's it's well over 1,100 or 12 it's it gets to 1,500 degrees Celsius before you finished. And if we look at the rightmost section what happens is the uranium metal this is a this is a mix of materials. You have magnesium fluoride which is relatively low density and uranium which is very high density. So the uranium just falls out. It just slops out at the bottom of the canister. So uh all you do let's look at slide 53 is you open the canister and take out the uranium. That's the uranium there. And then there's some other steps but I'll skip them because you know we what we want to do is give your audience a sense uh you [clears throat] can you slide 55 shows an ingot of uranium and and and and if you go to slide 56 it's a not very good photograph of of uranium sphere being machined on a lathe. Notice that this lathe is not in an in a glove box. If it were plutonium, it would have to be in a glove box. That stuff much too toxic, but you can you can you don't need a glove box for uranium. [snorts] You have to be careful because you can ignite it because it does it does burn. All right, so now we have the uranium. So the final step let's go to the final step. All right, if you go to slide 58 we need a critical mass of uranium for a bomb. Turns out that 13 or 14 kg of 90 to 95% enriched uranium will give us a critical mass. How do we know? Let's go to slide 59. Courtesy of a typical technical book. Again I I put this out there because this is all in the open. I want people to know that, you know, if you're a non-specialist you don't know this, but if you're so so they can lie to you. But if you know anything, they can't lie to you. This should include incidentally members of the Senate or the Congress who want to know and want to ask tough questions. So I'm putting it out there for you guys in the Congress if you want this information. And if you don't want it don't blame me because it's your job to know this. It's there for you to know. Incidentally, one of my colleagues at Stanford, who I used to be quite friendly with, Condi Rice used to tell her students after she came back to Stanford after she was Secretary of State and she was accused of lying about you know, the claims that that >> weapons of mass destruction and all that. >> Saddam >> Hussein had aluminum uh had aluminum tubes which he was making um uh making centrifuges out of this device that I was talking about. She would tell the students that she just didn't know. She just didn't have anyone she could ask. Well, she could have asked me. I was a close friend of hers. She no longer talks to me, but that's fine with me cuz I don't want to talk with her, but she could have asked uh Sydney [clears throat] Drell. She could have asked the intelligence community. She was the Secretary of State at the time. She I mean, the fact that someone like this lies this way and gets away with it infuriates me because they are responsible. If they don't know, they didn't want to know. That's the bottom line. She was just lying about it and she knew or had to know. Anyway >> I I don't want to push you longer. We're running a little bit short on time. So that we got to this point now. How then do you get 10 nuclear bombs from 408 kg of 60% uranium? >> Well, you start you all you need is 37 and 1/2 kg of uranium hexafluoride to convert to metal. Uh divide uh 408 kg of uranium hexafluoride, you get a number like 10 or 11. That means you have enough uranium metal if you convert it for 10 nuclear bombs. So that's >> And so how long would it would it take from the decision Let's say they decide Friday morning that they're going to do it. How long would it take before the first one is produced? And by the way, let me clarify. When you say material for a nuclear bomb, that means like the the actual >> Yeah. Yeah. The bomb itself Let Let me just show you one more slide because this is important. This is quite important. is slide 63. This is an encyclopedia diagram showing you a gun assembled fission weapon. In other words, this is a spherical weapon. This particular does not have a big reflector, which we won't worry about for the moment, but you it could easily have it. And you could you could simply insert you you you would have a spherical weapon. You could simply insert the final pieces of uranium into it with with an a neutron initiator which was used in the first little boy atomic bomb. That simple. And you could get, you know, 15 kiloton yield from this nuclear weapon. The amount of materials you would need to build this would weigh about 45 kg. So I say, well, you want to build a casing for the bomb, you want to put it in a package, you want safety mechanisms. So I say maybe it weighs twice or three times more than the actual mechanism for the bomb. So the bomb weighs 100 150 kg. Well, your your ballistic missiles can carry 450 kg to, you know, weapon. They're now doing it routinely from Iran. So you have a nuclear delivery system too. It's already in your hands. >> Once you have their version of this thing you're showing on the screen right now in 63, how technically difficult is it to get that onto and have it function properly the ballistic missile? >> I mean if you can build well, nothing's a piece of cake, but if you have the engineering capacity to put conventional warheads on your current missiles and get them to work, you already have the capacity to mount this bomb on your system. There's nothing >> this this would be different shape and everything else from a standard extra high explosive warhead. Do you have any sense of how long >> to handle. >> Right, but but do you have a sense for how long it would take to manufacture that? >> I I think if you prepared uh we don't know how much preparation made. Uh uh you know, the the first bomb might take you 10 weeks because you you want to manufacture the casing and the assembly system. Although you may have done that already. I my own guess is they've done it already. Cuz you don't need to be in any way under International Atomic Energy Agency uh review. >> Needs for that. And so if they've tested already up to 87% or whatever that number was, if they've done that part, then it seems reasonable to suggest they would have done this part already. >> if they have one one cascade, but it could be sooner than that. You know, what if they have two cascades? [snorts] 348 350 uh centrifuges. There's no I mean I assume they have one cascade, but you know, who knows how many they have. >> So so we have here this this is from July 4th. The IAEA pulls inspectors from Iran. So from since July 4th, there hasn't been any eyes or ears on the ground. So the question is how hard would it be physically for Iran to do this now that there's no IAEA inspectors there? >> If they chose to move immediately, which they may not have done, I don't know. But if they chose to move immediately, they could they could potentially if they had done enough preparation. I you know, I I have to speculate it about this the alternate facility could take time to build, but my assumption is that they have built an alternate facility before anything happened. Because all of this material none of this is monitored by the IAEA. The only thing that was monitored by the IAEA was the centrifuge production. The number of centrifuges produced. But the IAEA admits that they have lost track of the centrifuge production. >> Mm. >> So if they lost track of the centrifuge production, that's the only critical item that the IAEA might have provided an insight on. And they they don't have an insight to offer on that. So those centrifuges that the IAEA didn't know how to track for some reason. >> Now looking back at how the North Korean weapon nuclear weapons program started, they they did a lot of the stuff they did a lot they didn't have IAEA inspectors there in the beginning, but we found out about it when they conducted an underground nuclear test. Would you expect to first do a nuclear test to to show it or or would there just be a bomb? >> they need a nuclear test. I don't think they need a nuclear test. >> why is that? Why do they not need one? If this is a >> a gun assembly bomb is very easy to make. What you'd make what you could do is make a gun assembly bomb out of uranium 238. And then explosively test the mechanism for assembling it. Which I'm sure is what we did with the Little Boy bomb. We didn't not test it. We made a Little Boy out of U 238 and made sure that the assembly mechanism, you know, shoving the plug in the middle of this barrel that that it went right. U 235 is going to behave no differently from U 238. So if you know the assembly mechanism if you know that you did the assembly mechanism correctly, then it doesn't matter. So you you would not even need to test the bomb. >> Well, that's a little bit concerning because the the the hope has kind of been that that would be an alert that something had happened, but now you're saying it's completely legitimate and valid that they may say they have one and we wouldn't have any way to know whether they did or didn't. We would have to assume they did. >> We would not know. >> And so if I can sum up >> would only know if we we knew that the 408 kg of 60% uranium was still under oversight, but we no longer have that data. >> So so the bottom line to all this is that as of right now, as we're speaking here, if you're >> worse off than we were. >> [laughter] >> It is worse than it was before. So Iran in their secret chambers, whatever, they can decide, all right, we're going to do that tomorrow morning and no one would know anything about it because we don't have any eyes or ears on the ground until a declaration was made or a bomb shows up. Is that is that accurate? >> Right. Right. >> Then that is profoundly worse than it was before. So we went from the 2015-2018 which was the best condition to then the second best which is what we had with the IAEA still on the ground. >> Right. >> And then now then this is the worst of all circumstances. Do you agree with that? >> I agree with it. >> That's not helpful. >> Well, if there are any staff members who work for Congress watching this by any chance, please feel free to contact me. Certainly send me an email for the slides. >> I know [snorts] there are some and in fact I'm going to forward this to one that I know of for a fact that watches our show. >> you know I I I I sent something to Tim Kaine two weeks ago and I I I'm familiar with how the Congress works so I made sure that his chief of staff got a copy and I made sure that his chief of in charge of security policy got a copy and neither of them have even acknowledged receipt of my email. >> And >> I don't think they understand what's at stake here. This this is this is profound. >> how you could be a professional in this area and behave this way. >> Look at the guy Sean Parnell from the DOD who made that statement and you want to you can't say that. >> What can I tell you? What can I tell you? Look look at Mark Kelly and his staff. >> Yeah, you add that to the list. Yeah, that's I laugh about it but >> I got from his staff he he should hate the possibility that they would be made public which I'd be happy to do. Writing me say no thanks, we're not interested in you and talking to you. >> So right now, >> I mean what what kind of people >> goes to nuclear weapons is is to be determined. We don't know that. But what we can say with a lot of confidence, and you correct me if I'm wrong here, that because of the bombing that we did on these three nuclear >> are potentially a nuclear weapons state. >> The but we've opened the door for it and because the IAEA has been kicked out because of that bombing >> The IAEA was the only thing in between them and secretly building it. It's a pretty uh you know it's pretty uh you know I don't know reckless but you know you you got to have a lot of courage and confidence in your security apparatus to go ahead and build those weapons. And I'm not sure they you know they may or may not have that but it's good enough to be only a few weeks away from it because you know this is a low ball uh estimate. You know they could they could have three or four or five of these cascades working. You know I I'm just assuming a single cascade. We don't we don't know how many of them. If if the Fordo centrifuges were not damaged, which there is a very good reason to believe there probably weren't, uh they have 10 cascades without the surreptitious test cascades that I'm postulating. You know you know [clears throat] that's that's that's that's less than a week to to enrich the uranium for a bomb. You know so you know these so um you know if you have the facts in front of you which I have presented here you and someone tells you that and you're a member of the Congress you have the facts to question what they're telling you. And I would like to see the members of our Congress do their jobs because they have a fiduciary responsibility to their citizens to ask these questions. When they stand up there and say oh I don't know anything, I really want help like Tim Kaine did and then his staff doesn' even acknowledge receipt of information. I'm sorry. I know it's impolitic for me to do this. You know, all my friends who are experts say Ted, don't say this and Well, I'm fed up. I acknowledge it. I'm fed up. If you ask me for help, you will get my polite help 500% of my attention. But don't ignore what I'm trying to do to help you. It's It's a disservice to the country. Forget about me. I'm an emeritus professor. Nobody cares about me. And they shouldn't. But you should care about what I'm telling you. >> And we do. And that's why we're That's why we're really grateful that you came on today even though it's a pretty alarming situation which we'll certainly try to expand here. And folks, listen, I all the folks I see we got a pretty good crew watching here. Listen, send this out to everybody that you can. This This This is something that needs to be shouted from the rooftops. Uh this is this is a very serious issue here that we may have made ourselves unwittingly incredibly vulnerable. >> Yeah, let these guys explain why I'm wrong. You know, it's easy enough. They're all geniuses. They all gather intelligence community from all over all these intelligence communities from all over congratulating them and before anyone could anyone including the Iranians [laughter] know what happened at Fordo. >> Let Let me ask you a question. Do Do you think that we showed you Sean Parnell's statement about he claims that this is the uh the consensus of the United States intelligence capacity. Do you think that >> I don't believe that. >> You don't believe this. So you don't think that our intelligence is is so misinformed or lack of knowledge that they would know what you talk to us. >> I believe that Tulsi Gabbard was freaked out of her mind. I don't know this. I want to be very clear. I have no contact with her. Uh was freaked out of her mind when she saw this this screw up, this goat rodeo beginning because they were discussing this for a little while. She tried to alert them to this In fact, she was so concerned that she went out on her own, on her own and produced this video, which was a very responsible video. Instead of attacking her for producing this video, the press should compliment her for trying to do the right thing. And she got attacked for it. She got reprimanded by Trump for it. But what she was doing was trying to issue a warning. And nobody in the so-called responsible public journalist community understood what she was doing. That's how simple-minded these people are. How little concerned they are about thinking through what's actually going on around them. It's it's I'm sorry to show so much anger on a podcast, but I've had it. >> Yeah. Well, I I can certainly understand why you could. And And when you've laid it out in such detail as you have here, it's understandable because this is this is some serious stuff. I mean, it's just >> was doing here? >> Yeah. >> Trying trying to get public attention to herself? That's what they're saying. That's ridiculous. What she's doing here is trying to make people aware how dangerous the situation is. She's doing a public service here. >> [sighs and gasps] >> Oh boy. Yeah. Well, let's pray to God we don't have those images in the black and white that are repeated today on a much larger scale. Things could go very south. But the the problem is going to be that if Iran gets this, that the I guess the deterrence dynamics and the the relationship between states in the region will be forever altered. And And we have a very very different situation on our hand if that comes to pass. >> I think so. It's altered by perception. I mean, from Iran's point of view, the the perception that they could have I mean, they're stating very emphatically that they don't intend to build a bomb. Who knows what they're doing? >> Right. But now we just have to hope that that's the case because we have surrendered every opportunity to ensure that that didn't happen because of some alleged less than perfect going all the way back to the 2015 Obama deal because it was allegedly not perfect. We got rid of that and then now then we have gotten rid of what was even left of it. And so now then we just have to rely on their good graces not to do what you say they have the technical capacity to do. >> Well, this is the old Russian statement that best is the enemy of good enough. And good enough is what we had. >> We did. Yeah. Well, listen we'll just have to keep monitoring this and certainly let us know if you come across any other additional information or any other things that gives you any concern and we'll pass that right along with >> available. Members of Congress staff people I'm happy to work with the staff. I don't expect to meet the Congress people. They're busy. I understand how busy they are. But I do know that the staff has a job and I'm happy to help with it. >> Yeah, and we've we've had your Gary's put your your email address up there along with the subject line that you have requested for and there it is again for anybody who may have missed it. And email Professor Postal let us let him know >> Yeah. >> if you have if you want that information or if you have any other information that would be great too or if you want to contact him to have him come brief somebody for example. >> Absolutely. Be happy to come down to Washington. >> Yeah, and if you do we'll get together. >> [laughter] >> Okay, absolutely. No question. >> Well, listen thank you very much for this. I mean it's very sobering but we're unintimidated and compromised to bring you the truth even something like this because everybody deserves to know the truth. >> very much. Let's let's watch out that Gary doesn't release all that hydrogen fluoride onto his neighbors. >> Yeah, I know when you go in the garage man [laughter] I was worried he was taking a lot of notes there so All righty. Thank you very much and we'll see everybody on the next episode of Daniel Make care. Bye-bye. >> [music] [music]

- YouTube

Enjoy the videos and music that you love, upload original content and share it all with friends, family and the world on YouTube.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=4s&v=Zz6gGA63Kcw

RedTagAlan · 02/11/2026 11:24

Newbutoldfather · 02/11/2026 10:40

@RedTagAlan ,

I see no reason to not believe the below. It is based on the shock wave, not direct penetration. I did study a mathematical science many years ago, but I would have no idea how to even start a back of the envelope calculation to verify it!

As you correctly said, though, significant fallout cannot be prevented.

  • A low-to-mid yield device (around 10 to 300 kilotons) burrowed just 3 meters into hard rock can generate enough destructive seismic overpressure to collapse hard structures located roughly 70 to 100 meters deep.
  • Specifically, the B61-11 (with a variable yield up to 340 kilotons) or a high-yield weapon in the tens-to-hundreds of kilotons range is generally cited by defense planners as the scale required to crush or severely compromise deep mountain facilities (like those built 80 to 300 meters down). 1, 2, 3,
Key Limitations
  • Containment vs. Destruction: To fully contain a nuclear explosion and prevent massive radioactive venting in dry hard rock, a 1-kiloton blast requires roughly 60 meters of burial depth, and a 100-kiloton blast requires roughly 300 meters. Because a penetrator can only dig down ~3 meters, a 90-meter-deep target hit with a high-yield nuclear EPW will not be fully contained, resulting in significant surface and subsurface radioactive fallout. 1, 2]

Cool. You used AI.

My quick bit of lookup was for size of nuke needed. And your AI thing got it. Albeit a very wide range.

"Specifically, the B61-11 (with a variable yield up to 340 kilotons) or a high-yield weapon in the tens-to-hundreds of kilotons range is generally cited by defense planners as the scale required to crush or severely compromise deep mountain facilities (like those built 80 to 300 meters down). 1, 2, 3,"

So it is not tactical nuke territory. Tactical is under 20 Kt. Hiroshima was 15 Kt

I would say the tactical nuke option is off the table. It's as we talked about before, rock is really difficult to get through. Bunker busters likely won't do it, or they do not have enough of them.

Earth-Penetrating Weapons

Earth-Penetrating Weapons

An earth-penetrating weapon (EPW) is designed to hit the earth at high speed and penetrate into the ground before exploding.

https://www.ucs.org/resources/earth-penetrating-weapons

Newbutoldfather · 02/11/2026 11:33

@RedTagAlan ,

‘Cool. You used AI.’

I am not sure what other reference you would have preferred here? As I said, I am not a nuclear engineer with a sideline in geology and fluid dynamics!

Of course the range is going to be wide. I suspect it depends upon the precise detonation depth, the explosive yield (which I imagine is not always constant as all radiation has a degree of randomness) and the exact type of granite, as well as the structures of the subterranean tunnels.

The point we can agree on, I think, is that it is possible, but will take a pretty big nuke and lead to significant fallout.

TopPocketFind · 02/11/2026 11:38

I thought Trump has repeatedly stated he won't use nukes and we have to take him at his word on that Confused

Newbutoldfather · 02/11/2026 11:43

@TopPocketFind ,

‘I thought Trump has repeatedly stated he won't use nukes and we have to take him at his word on that’

I agree, I really don’t think he will. However the fact that we are even discussing it as a serious possibility is incredible.

TopPocketFind · 02/11/2026 11:46

Newbutoldfather · 02/11/2026 11:43

@TopPocketFind ,

‘I thought Trump has repeatedly stated he won't use nukes and we have to take him at his word on that’

I agree, I really don’t think he will. However the fact that we are even discussing it as a serious possibility is incredible.

That's my point. But you have repeatedly disregarded that by stating the above.

RedTagAlan · 02/11/2026 12:11

Newbutoldfather · 02/11/2026 11:33

@RedTagAlan ,

‘Cool. You used AI.’

I am not sure what other reference you would have preferred here? As I said, I am not a nuclear engineer with a sideline in geology and fluid dynamics!

Of course the range is going to be wide. I suspect it depends upon the precise detonation depth, the explosive yield (which I imagine is not always constant as all radiation has a degree of randomness) and the exact type of granite, as well as the structures of the subterranean tunnels.

The point we can agree on, I think, is that it is possible, but will take a pretty big nuke and lead to significant fallout.

I was being sincere that you used AI. As in cool. It's blocked for me. Or it was last time I looked. Or maybe it's my OS.

This is the bit I was getting at. Quote " I suspect it depends upon the precise detonation depth,.." We know that, It's zero. Because nukes are not designed to penetrate. Unless they dig a hole with bunker busters, then drop a nuke into that.

And yup, it would have to be big. As in, a lot bigger than the Hiroshima yield.

I go with something you said earlier. Special forces raid. That is really the only option. Unless the Iranians have moved it. 600kg of Uranium is not all that big. Unless it is still the gas they use to refine it. But even then, not all that big.

Twiglets1 · 02/11/2026 12:51

BelleHathor · 02/11/2026 10:01

Tucker Qatarlson, am I right 😉,

It doesn't really matter what or whom people trust.

Tucker met with Trump 11 times prior to the Iranian attack to try and convince him not to do it, that it would not be in American strategic interests and that it would ruin Trump's presidency. He was right, just look at the midterm Republican early vote collapse.

That some patriotic American's who actually respect their constitution and love their country are leaking to him in order to stop a disaster is more important.

I mean Trump dined with Nick Fuentes back in 2022:
https://abc7ny.com/post/donald-trump-kanye-west-ye-nick-fuentes/12494056/

And defended Tucker interviewing him:
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-defends-tucker-carlson-after-interview-with-nick-fuentes-far-right-activist-known-for-his-antisemitic-views

p.s When women were fighting for single sex spaces, no other MSM channels let them speak apart from Tucker at Fox despite being politically on different sides:
https://www.foxnews.com/video/6001444494001
https://www.foxnews.com/media/transgenderism-womens-rights-tucker-carlson-today

Edited

Is the fact that Trump dined with Nick Fuentes back in 2022 and defended Carlson after his interview supposed to make any difference to my views about Tucker Carlson? It doesn't.

Trump as character reference hmm...

Newbutoldfather · 02/11/2026 13:05

@RedTagAlan ,

‘This is the bit I was getting at. Quote " I suspect it depends upon the precise detonation depth,.." We know that, It's zero. Because nukes are not designed to penetrate. Unless they dig a hole with bunker busters, then drop a nuke into that.’

The U.S have bunker busting nukes.

The B61-11 is one of them.

‘The Mod 11 is a hardened penetration bomb with a reinforced casing and a delayed-action fuze; this allows the weapon to penetrate several metres into the ground before detonating, damaging fortified structures further underground. Developed from 1994, the Mod 11 went into service in 1997 replacing the older megaton-yield B53 bomb. About 50 Mod 11 bombs have been produced, their warheads converted from Mod 7 bombs. At present,[when?] the primary carrier for the Mod 11 is the B-2 Spirit.[26
‘

From Wikipedia, confirmed by other sources.

Fuze - Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuze

RedTagAlan · 02/11/2026 13:45

Newbutoldfather · 02/11/2026 13:05

@RedTagAlan ,

‘This is the bit I was getting at. Quote " I suspect it depends upon the precise detonation depth,.." We know that, It's zero. Because nukes are not designed to penetrate. Unless they dig a hole with bunker busters, then drop a nuke into that.’

The U.S have bunker busting nukes.

The B61-11 is one of them.

‘The Mod 11 is a hardened penetration bomb with a reinforced casing and a delayed-action fuze; this allows the weapon to penetrate several metres into the ground before detonating, damaging fortified structures further underground. Developed from 1994, the Mod 11 went into service in 1997 replacing the older megaton-yield B53 bomb. About 50 Mod 11 bombs have been produced, their warheads converted from Mod 7 bombs. At present,[when?] the primary carrier for the Mod 11 is the B-2 Spirit.[26
‘

From Wikipedia, confirmed by other sources.

Cool. Now we see the limitations of my internet. Wiki is banned too.

I stand corrected.

Newbutoldfather · 02/11/2026 13:46

@RedTagAlan ,

I must admit I am very curious as to where you live, as I imagine are many others!

However, I guess it’s not safe for you to say?

RedTagAlan · 02/11/2026 14:59

Newbutoldfather · 02/11/2026 13:46

@RedTagAlan ,

I must admit I am very curious as to where you live, as I imagine are many others!

However, I guess it’s not safe for you to say?

Aye. I won't say where. It's not exotic. Tho it is still 30 degrees in the day. It is worth noting though, folk in free countries are in the minority. I only mention web limits because it does impact on what I can see.

That's it really. And an odd thing to consider. What is, or is not, a state secret... is a secret. So better to play safe. And I have been warned about posting stuff in the past, when I had a vpn.

Anyway, re that nuke bunker buster. I wonder if that is why Trump talked about re-starting nuke testing. Cos that bomb won't be tested.

Checking the date of that story-

Trump said the US would begin testing nukes. It caught even some advisers by surprise. | CNN Politics

OCT 31, 202. And that slots right into place. His strikes on the nuke facilities was in June. Leaked reports that there was not much damage. Then a few months later he talks about restarting nuke testing. And as you just pointed out, they have a nuke bunker buster. But that won't have been tested. Not with the nuke part.

Edit to add. The only post I ever reported on here for personal reasons was for potential doxing. They were trying to guess where.

Trump said the US would begin testing nukes. It caught even some advisers by surprise. | CNN Politics

When Chinese leader Xi Jinping inserted a reference to “twists and turns” in his relationship with President Donald Trump in the opening remarks of their summit this week, he could hardly have imagined the twist that came minutes before the talks began...

https://edition.cnn.com/2025/10/30/politics/us-nuclear-testing-trump-advisers

OnePeppyFatball · 02/11/2026 15:35

WSJ:

“America’s Gulf allies are steeling themselves for a heavy U.S. bombardment of Iran that they expect to trigger a vicious cycle of retaliation against their own economic and civilian infrastructure as early as this week.
Their concerns are heightened by a lack of progress in the various efforts to reach a negotiated end to the conflict while the U.S. and Iran are threatening especially ferocious fighting if the conflict resurges.

President Trump has been leaning toward a large postelection attack that could target Iranian infrastructure and nuclear sites, but hasn’t decided whether to go ahead, The Wall Street Journal has reported. Iranian officials said over the weekend their response to any attack would be unrestrained.
“The only reason why I’m not finished with Iran is I want to be nice. I want to try and save all those lives if I can,” Trump said Sunday at a rally in Iowa ahead of Tuesday’s midterm elections. “But at some point we’re going to have to give them the hammer.””
“Governments including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were running security drills—including at airports—and attendees at a major energy conference in Abu Dhabi were cutting short their stays on advice from their governments. Schools in the capital of Saudi Arabia, which is also under fire from the Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen, will remain online this week. Dutch and Belgian embassies in the region warned Thursday that security conditions could deteriorate quickly in the region.
Anwar Gargash, senior foreign-policy adviser to the U.A.E.’s president, said at a security conference over the weekend that the country hopes the diplomatic efforts will pan out, but is “braced for the worst.”
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said at the same conference that a new round of escalation would be more destructive and that efforts in the coming days or weeks would be critical to heading it off.”
“The U.S. military has prepared options for attacks—restocking munitions in the region and beefing up defenses, including by moving troops out of vulnerable bases and sending another Patriot antimissile system to Israel.
Trump has ramped up threats before, most recently in late July, only to back down in hopes of a negotiated deal. ”
“Tehran politely welcomed a letter sent in late October by Vice President JD Vance seeking to open talks with Iran’s top national security official, Mohsen Rezaei. But so far it hasn’t responded formally to Vance’s request to discuss Iran’s nuclear program and hasn’t agreed to a meeting, mediators between the two sides said.
Talks in the main diplomatic channel, mediated by Qatar, are stuck on whether the U.S. or Iran should be the first to make concessions to move talks along, the mediators said.
Gulf states are growing alarmed that they may face more destructive Iranian attacks than at the height of the war in March. Iran lacks the firepower to blunt U.S. and Israeli airstrikes and has adopted a strategy of quickly raising the stakes in any exchange by attacking its more vulnerable neighbors across the Persian Gulf.”
“Iran has threatened publicly and in private diplomatic communications to attack a broad array of U.S. and Gulf targets in the region in response to any U.S. strike.
“There is no world in which a short and sharp strike by the U.S. will be absorbed by Iran,” said Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior director of the Iran program at U.S. think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “An intense infrastructure-based targeting campaign by Washington is likely to beget one by Tehran against U.S. partners.”
Some Arab states have warned Iran they could retaliate individually or collectively if Tehran targets their infrastructure, the mediators said. The U.A.E. carried out strikes on Iran over the spring, but other Gulf states largely sat out the fighting.
Gulf states are scrambling to come up with new formulas to break the diplomatic deadlock. ”
“Qatari mediators, who had previously proposed a seven-day period in which the U.S. and Iran would lift their restrictions on traffic in Hormuz to build confidence for further talks, traveled to Tehran on Friday with a revised plan that would cut the confidence-building period to two days, Iran says.
Under one of the proposals floated by Qatar, the U.S. would loosen its naval blockade if Iran halted attacks on shipping in the strait for an agreed number of days, the mediators and an Iranian official said. Iran would then allow international nuclear inspectors back into the country and start a discussion on its stockpile of enriched uranium within a few days, they said. Once inspections are completed, the U.S. would lift some sanctions, they said.
But Qatar has had difficulty nailing down an agreement. The U.S. is reluctant to lift its blockade before clear progress on nuclear issues, fearing Iran will buy time by rushing bottled-up oil shipments out of the Gulf, mediators said. Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman said Monday there had been no discussion of nuclear issues. ”
“Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi returned to Tehran from Doha on Sunday after talks failed to yield enough progress to trigger a visit from U.S. negotiators, mediators said.
Still, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said Tehran was willing to continue talks. “We are trying to solve the problem through dialogue. In this regard, the supreme leader of the revolution has also given the government certain powers,” he said without elaborating, state-run IRNA news agency reported Monday.
Last week got off to an unpromising start when officials from Saudi Arabia and allied nations Pakistan and Turkey traveled to Tehran and expressed willingness to discuss a regional security agreement with Iran if it agreed to join talks on its nuclear program, people briefed on the discussions said.
At the meeting, Saudi Arabia also asked for Tehran’s help reining in attacks on the kingdom by the Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen. Hours after the talks, the Houthis launched drone and missile attacks at targets including the capital, Riyadh, and the Persian Gulf oil hub Ras Tanura. ”
“Attacks have also continued at an unusually aggressive pace in the Strait of Hormuz as Iran tries to reassert control over the waterway.
“The U.S. and Iran clearly are on very different planes with regards to both their strategic end goals and the political priorities of their leaderships, which is to be at least seen as the victor of this conflict,” said Umer Karim, a researcher on Gulf security at the U.K.’s University of Birmingham. “This creates an incredibly challenging situation for mediators and regional stakeholders who will all bear the brunt of this conflict.”
The top U.S. commander in the Middle East briefed Trump on Thursday on military options for Iran, in a rare in-person visit to the White House as the U.S. weighs resuming major combat operations, The Journal reported.
Adm. Brad Cooper rarely briefs Trump in person, so the meeting could signal that the U.S. is moving closer to significant military operations.
“There are still substantive differences between both sides, so an escalation seems inevitable,” said Ali Vaez, an Iran expert and deputy Middle East program director at the International Crisis Group, a conflict-resolution organization. “Things will get nasty very quickly.””

Excerpt From
“America’s Gulf Allies Prepare for New Round of Strikes on Iran—and the Blowback”
Benoit Faucon, Summer Said
The Wall Street Journal
https://apple.news/APWdnJvH1S0mx6_9_Tu7HRA
This material may be protected by copyright.

U.S. Warns Gulf of Possible Short, Intense Renewal of Iran War After Midterms — The Wall Street Journal

There are signs that American, Israeli militaries preparing potential strikes to muscle Tehran to negotiating table

https://apple.news/PAQu320pP5CHaCRMF86n4dO

OP posts:
trumpredcard · 02/11/2026 18:50

KYIV, Nov 2 (Reuters) - Ukraine accused Russia on Monday of taking advantage of a rare, US-backed humanitarian ceasefire last week in the southern Kherson region to strengthen its military position there.
(The Times)

I would imagine that reports saying that Russia used the ceasefire to resupply etc would not be going un-noticed in the ME.

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