@Transperson I've also counted up the rest of your bollocks, unlike most men you have at least 20.
1. Rejecting gender roles justifies breaking social conventions.
People should be free to reject restrictive gender roles. That freedom does not establish access to every sex-specific facility. Freedom of expression and eligibility for female-only provision are different questions.
2. Bodily autonomy means choosing which facilities to use.
Control over one’s own body does not settle the conditions under which other people share intimate spaces. Invoking personal autonomy cannot make women’s privacy irrelevant.
3. No criminal offence is being committed.
The absence of a criminal offence does not establish an entitlement to access. Provider obligations and individual criminal liability are different questions. Code, paragraph 3.6.
4. Personal happiness does not require anyone else’s acceptance.
Agreed. But personal acceptance and access to female-only provision are separate issues. Respecting someone’s freedom to live their life does not require agreeing to every access claim they make.
5. Experiencing misogyny establishes membership of women’s social class.
Experiencing misogyny deserves recognition. It does not settle eligibility for female-only services. The Supreme Court expressly recognised that trans women can experience discrimination because they are perceived as women, while retaining a biological interpretation of sex in the Equality Act. Supreme Court summary.
6. Nobody has noticed or objected.
No observed objection is evidence of no observed objection. It cannot establish what everyone privately thought. Women may remain polite, avoid confrontation or stop attending. Equally, nobody here can know that every woman recognises someone as male. Neither assumption settles the policy.
7. Discomfort would be obvious from expressions or behaviour.
Reading body language is fallible. Someone who conceals discomfort will not necessarily provide a visible signal. Women’s privacy should not depend on another user’s confidence in interpreting their reactions.
8. Women can still enter, so they lose nothing.
Physical access is not the same as retaining female-only provision. Admitting both sexes changes what the service provides. Code, paragraph 13.130.
9. Biological sex has no definition because chromosomes, gonads and phenotype differ.
Biological sex has a reproductive definition: female and male reproductive roles correspond to large and small gametes respectively. Describing different sex characteristics separately does not demonstrate that sex itself is undefined. Schärer, Rowe and Arnqvist, 2012.
10. Transition changes biology, so female-only eligibility follows.
Acknowledging differences between transitioned and untransitioned bodies does not establish the conclusion. For the Equality Act, sex means biological sex; appearance is not the statutory substitute. Protection against gender-reassignment discrimination remains. Supreme Court summary.
11. Wearing a swimsuit prevents a privacy problem.
Covering one person’s body does not protect another person’s privacy while she undresses. The question concerns the circumstances in which women expose their bodies, as well as what they themselves see.
12. Nobody is being assaulted.
Presence and assault are different. Nevertheless, privacy and dignity can independently justify proportionate single-sex provision. Women need not allege assault to explain their objection. Code, paragraphs 13.107–13.116.
13. Other trans people’s access is their own decision and irrelevant here.
A proposed access rule must work beyond one individual. Leaving each prospective user to decide whether their own presence is acceptable gives women no dependable account of who the facility is for. A personal exception is not a workable public policy.
14. The consent remark was ironic and disproves individual vetoes.
The clarification should be accepted. Nobody needs permission from every other customer. But rejecting an unlimited individual veto does not answer whether a provider should maintain justified female-only provision.
15. A sincerely held moral framework is as valid as anyone else’s.
Sincerity does not establish that a conclusion is justified. A framework claiming to respect everyone must explain when women’s interests can place a real limit on someone else’s preferred access.
16. Male facilities create risks of harassment or assault.
Those risks deserve action. Providers should consider everyone’s needs and suitable alternatives; the Code specifically discusses additional private, lockable facilities. Women’s interests remain part of that assessment. Code, paragraphs 13.119–13.123.
17. A third space would be used after an objection, but otherwise the women’s would still be used.
That concession leaves the objection conditional on an alternative being available. Scarcity creates a genuine practical problem; it does not automatically resolve whose interests prevail. Proportionate single-sex provision can remain justified after balancing competing needs. Code, paragraphs 13.120–13.121.
18. Online objections do not count like objections in person.
An online discussion cannot establish what happened in a particular changing room. It can communicate women’s reasons for wanting female-only provision. As a father, I would not want my daughter required to confront an adult personally before her need for privacy receives consideration.
19. Unless women accommodate trans people, nobody will.
That assigns women responsibility for solving a problem they did not create. Providers, public authorities and those responsible for harassment also have responsibilities. Supporting female-only provision does not amount to supporting harassment.
20. Good intentions mean no harm is being caused.
Good intentions matter, but they do not establish every consequence of a decision. Treating women as equals requires taking their interests seriously even when doing so limits somebody else’s choices. Women’s boundaries need practical weight, not merely sympathetic acknowledgement.