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Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court

223 replies

Another2Cats · 27/03/2026 12:28

Again, I apologise for this being very long. TL;DR this looks to be the first case at the High Court which will consider the exclusion of trans-identifying men post FWS.

So, for some background, there was a case last year, just after FWS, concerning a trans-identifying man who had been banned from a women's pool competition organised by the English Blackball Pool Federation.

Back at the end of 2023, the Pool Federation changed their rules so that only women could play in women's competitions.

The trans-identifying man, Haynes, then brought a claim of direct discrimination on the ground of gender reassignment against the federation.

The trial took place during 2025 before the judgment in FWS was handed down. The court heard from several witnesses about whether pool was a gender-affected activity (Section 195(3) Equality Act) including Dr Emma Hilton - who is the interim chair of Sex Matters.

However, the FWS judgment came out before the County Court judge had made his judgment on the case and so the pool federation said that each side should make detailed written submissions about the effect of FWS on this case.

The judge agreed and the submissions for the pool federation were written by Sarah Crowther KC of Outer Temple Chambers and those for the trans-identifying man were written by Jane Russell KC. Some may recognise her name from the Sandie Peggie case (and other cases).

.

The judge decided that FWS was sufficient to decide the case in favour of the pool federation but, since he had heard detailed argument, he also set out his conclusions with regard to the sport exception (Section 195) and also about the provision of separate services (Schedule 3 para 28)

The court concluded that pool is a ‘gender-affected activity’ and that excluding those born as male from the female category is necessary to secure fair competition. The court also concluded that this was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

There is a link to the judgment here:

https://jrlevins.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/K01CT207-judgment-1-8-25-handed-down.pdf

.

Haynes has now been granted permission to appeal and has published the grounds of appeal on Haynes Instagram account. I've attached the images here. Haynes tried to get the case "leapfrogged" directly to the Court of Appeal but this was refused.

A brief summary of the grounds, which the judge who considered the application said were all arguable are as follows (personally, I don't they stand up at all, but this is the case he is putting forward):

1 There was no evidence that trans-identifying men had any competitive advantage over women. The judge failed to consider the "mental processes" of the federation and that they were significantly influenced in their decision to exclude trans-identifying men as they were in some way unfairly discriminatory.

2 In considering direct discrimination, the court applied the wrong comparator. Following Croft [Croft v Royal Mail [2003] EWCA Civ 1045] Haynes claims that the correct comparator in this case should be a woman rather than a man.

3 FWS, when applied to the facts of this case, does not comply with Article 8 and Article 14 of the ECHR and, in a claim by an individual, the ECHR applies, whereas it did not for the organisations claiming in FWS.

4 The Court failed to apply S195 Equality Act [the sport exemption] in a ECHR compliant manner. The pool federation did not show that it was necessary to exclude trans-identifying men for the reasons of safety or fair competition. Cue sports are precision sports thus not affected by power/sex. No explanation was given for changing from a testosterone testing system or handicap system.

5 Something about the court wrongly saying that another, professional, pool organisation would have refused Haynes permission to play in this federation's competitions

.

Frankly, I don't think any of those will really hold up. But it will be interesting to see what happens when it does get to court as this will be a High Court judgment rather than just a County Court judgment.

Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court
Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court
Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court
Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court
OP posts:
Thread gallery
7
Marymanna · Yesterday 11:01

It will be interesting to see the judge's interaction with SC and whether he will have to make fewer interventions to basically ask "what's your point?" I'm hoping that the difference in clarity between the two sides will be stark.

SabrinaThwaite · Yesterday 11:10

Looking back at yesterday afternoon, it seems that HH’s KC was trying to say that because the decision to ban males from the female game was made before FWS and scientific evidence, it must have been a breach of human rights.

The Sports Council published its report calling for protecting the female category in 2021 - so predates the 2023 decision to ban TIMs from women’s pool competitions.

Retiredfromthere · Yesterday 11:24

SabrinaThwaite · Yesterday 11:10

Looking back at yesterday afternoon, it seems that HH’s KC was trying to say that because the decision to ban males from the female game was made before FWS and scientific evidence, it must have been a breach of human rights.

The Sports Council published its report calling for protecting the female category in 2021 - so predates the 2023 decision to ban TIMs from women’s pool competitions.

I assume they are pressing the Human Rights angle because they want to take the case to ECHR? They have two KCs (+Robin) to try and force the judgement here to say something that will take their arguments there?

Re the scientific evidence there was a lot of convincing stuff presented by the defence in the earlier case that was about things like one expert having trained women and men for decades (sorry to be vague but he did feel there was a male advantage, was coherent and this was all pre FWS, as in people always knew it was so).

Is Robin White there so that the other lawyers (and judge) will hold back on saying anything about TW that he could be offended by or would feel like being cruel to a colleague. (Not sure what he will be adding otherwise, he did not do a good case in being part of the prosecution last time).

CatProcrastinator1 · Yesterday 11:28

Another2Cats · Yesterday 07:08

The 'junior' barrister is also a KC. I'm not too sure who might be junior here.

KS is Hugh Southey KC of Matrix chambers. Apparently he is a former Deputy High Court Judge and has led in 30 hearings before the Supreme Court.

According to the Legal500 he is a leading silk in the areas of police law, human rights, and immigration.

Sorry, I forgot to list the names of people from the start of yesterday.

From TT

J/ML/YL - The Honourable Justice Linden, barrister will use 'My Lord' or 'Your lordshi
HH or A – Harriet Haynes, Appellant
PH & AG or Ds - Paul Thomson, Chairman and Anna Goodwin, National Secretary of the English Blackball Pool Federation, Respondents

SC - Sarah Crowther, KC , Outer Temple for Ds
SMT - Sapan Maini-Thompson, junior for Ds
HS - Hugh Southey KC, for A
JR - Jane Russell KC, for A
RW - Robin White, for A

[EDIT]

Just to add that HH clearly has some money to throw at this case if he has two KCs and another barrister.

Edited

Thank you so much for copying an pasting, @Another2Cats .

Robin White is not a KC so the most junior of the Appellant's barristers, all three of them. I wonder how their fees are being met

It demonstrates the ridiculousness of the "outing" arguments that no one would know Haynes is a man unless the pool authorities had prevented them from playing in the women's league and more widely.

Glamourreader · Yesterday 11:33

Is the case finished now? Or when does it restart?

Columbidae · Yesterday 11:42

Interesting that Haynes is apparently "impecunious" and hasn't paid nor will pay any costs. I wonder who is funding this case.

ItsCoolForCats · Yesterday 12:25

Glamourreader · Yesterday 11:33

Is the case finished now? Or when does it restart?

Tribunal Tweets2 are still tweeting. I haven't had a chance to look at it this morning as I'm working, but here's the thread reader app link for the morning session:

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/2122980462188437669.html

Thread by @tribunaltweets2 on Thread Reader App

@tribunaltweets2: We return to Court 15 in Royal Court's of Justice this morning for Day 2 of the appeal by Haynes against the original judgment by His Honour Judge Parker in favour of the defendants, individuals...…

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/2122980462188437669.html

Glamourreader · Yesterday 12:30

ItsCoolForCats · Yesterday 12:25

Tribunal Tweets2 are still tweeting. I haven't had a chance to look at it this morning as I'm working, but here's the thread reader app link for the morning session:

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/2122980462188437669.html

Ooh thank you, I somehow couldn't find it x

Another2Cats · Yesterday 12:52

There was a lot from this morning so I'll split it up. UPG is the alternative professional league that HH also competed in. I have no idea who MLF is.

From TT

Judge enters. We begin.
HS 3 things. No claim against UPG. Letter before action but taken no further. And I will respond to MLF after her subms. And MLF has submitted a further authority on HR claims.
J why don't we hear from her
HS let me tell you what it is about.

HS it is possible to bring a free standing case under Art 4, but not relevant in this case.
J is that you complete
HS yes, that completes my submissions.
SC men have an advantage over women in pool, height, reach, handspan. It is a SAA. Sex affected activity.

The Cs invite he court to undermine the ability to have single sex competitions. The EA clearly provides for SAA to have single sex comps. Suggestions were made in court yesterday that my client has outed the C, and engaged in hate speech y'day I invite those to be withdrawn.

J I don't think that was meant.
HS it was not meant in that way
SC thank you. When HH played in EFBP was known to be a TW. Moved on to UPG, no longer in BP, Ds took opportunity to change rule when HH was no longer eligible.

SC G1 has been withdrawn, we note that for purposes of costs. G5 should come next; if that fails, case fails.
J not necessarily, q if they refused to provide service.
SC I paraphrase, then we go on to G2, necessary to succeed but not sufficient on its own. Then G3 and G4 stand alone.
J last bit again

SC if we do get to convention rights claim, I'm not really sure if that's pursued, and the other argument is if sec 195 should be read differently to the rest of the EA as sex means certificated sex.
J not sure I heard that from HS
SC It has been said in several different ways

J what I want you to ensure you address is the convention arguments
SC refusal to provide service, there is no freestanding claim under ECtHR
J to help you speed up, there is a contention in the claim form that damages must be awarded to comply with the convention
SC that's not sufficient as a freestanding cause of action.

J it's about the EA
SC its no part of my claim, we submit that the court was under the duty to consider
J pleaded case says comply with EA in terms of damages. Looking at the skeleton, it seems to be wholly a domestic pleaded case the convention does not appear.

SC yes that's correct. The SC indicated that FWS would be handed down, J asked for two sets of subs, orig case and following FWS decision whatever it might be.
J yes, just understanding the chronology

SC no claim for sex discrim in the case, only straight forward gender reassignment. Claim narrowed during the case, was not prevented from playing tour events in 2023, deposit made was honoured. Then HH would play on UPG in future. Rule was changed. It became clear that no deposit would be accepted for 2024.

OP posts:
Justme56 · Yesterday 12:58

Interesting:

"Costs are relevant here, my clients are volunteers, they are prudent and have some insurance but are crowdfunding to cover costs. HH has not paid the substantial costs order from the county court, says will not pay and cannot
pay because impecunious. Despite that, has instructed 5 counsel to appear here before you. Enough is enough, it might be interesting for lawyers to come argue complex human rights issues. But these are real people involved."

Another2Cats · Yesterday 12:58

J by the end of the trial the only detriment complained of was exclusion for the Kent Ladies' A team
SC yes
J but would have continued to play on that team except for rule change, judge does use 'detriment'
SC has to be read in conjunction with para 8, the rule was not operative for the EBPF

J the effect of the rule was that HH could not compete for Kent for Women's A in Women's Comp,
SC would have been able to compete in open
J open means anybody
SC yes, there are age categories but I hope we don't need to get into them

J so for 2024 season, was playing for UPG and was able to compete in UPG women's comp
SC yes
J that changed subsequently
SC after the trial
J so HH is not able to compete in UPG women anymore, I'm interested in the exclusionary effect
SC I'm not trying to be difficult but UPG is not my client I don't know what their rules are

[missed q and a on other teams]
SC we say that it is a straight forward case of SAA and there is no GRD.
J you don't actually need FWS do you
SC that's how I argued the case originally

J is the criteria for differentiation sex or GRA
SC I was going to do 195, but we can go straight to discrim
J as I understand the rules, bio women can compete, bio women with pc of GRA, bio men can't compete, and bio men with pc of GRA can't compete. that answers the why question which HS did not address

SC YL mentioned a case yesterday, my instructing solicitor found it over night, it did go to CoA, but didn't have to do with section 13 issues. I wanted to mention and have handed up a copy, my copy has now vanished and I'm going to have read off my junior's screen.

J I don't have a copy
SMT I can go get copies
J depends on how important the point is
SC point is in a criterion discrimination case it's not that relevant to construct a comparator because the discrim is obvious. Building the comparator is helpful when something else is in play. He referred to Cole, release of women prisoners, more likely to be released far from home, it was direct sex discrim.

J I've got the first point, not sure I like the labels but don't really need a comparator is what you say. And motivation cases?
SC motivation cases, need to look at factors that are extrinsic to the individuals. We say that the comparator is people who are eligible to play in EBPF if they are women then women's events and if men then men's events.

J HH is treated less favourably because wants to play in women's category, so discriminated against but why?
SC yes, its a long way around to an obvious answer, and the distinguishing characteristic cannot be because HH wants to play in women's comp and other women don't.
SC onto Croft, it doesn't mention a GRC, before the GRA the SC is setting out what Croft did.

J what the SC said is obviously very interesting, but its not binding in this case neither is Croft
SC what was going on in Croft was very different situation, we can turn it up if we need to, but the facts were these that Croft had indicated

desire to transition, should use indiv facilities during transition but at completion could use ladies. Croft said Royal Mail too slow to allow access to ladies. Neither was arguing that ladies toilets were only for those of female sex. Post FWS and the GRA, if there is a bio sex category, it is a bio women's category. J Swift said in GLP, should we turn that up.

OP posts:
Another2Cats · Yesterday 13:04

J Swift says something different to Pill
SC it looks to me like Parker added his bit to Pill, he does say agree with everything Pill has said, but Parker does deal with comparator

SC now paraphrasing Swift in GLP, analysis of Croft, recites what FWS, the only ref was to judgment of Parker and no reference to the completion of transition. There can't be any logical reason to depart from what Swift said there or from FWS.

SC briefly go back to the judgment, they were raised in written subs, start at para 90,
J yup
SC sets out issue at 61, 62 and ratio of FWS at 63, and then deals with 195 in para 65, J he notes 236 SC then going to para 93, sets out subs and summarises c's submission, and concludes that permitted sex discrimination under EA.

J so this is the incoherence point, I've got that
SC fine, I will move on, sex discrimination,
J I've seen that you don't even need FWS
SC the J carefully considered all these arguments and set out his reasoning which is impeccable. I'm going to turn to the convention arguments, the case is continuing to evolve so will do my best to respond to what I think they are pleading.

J yes that is true
SC they say breach of Art 8, and/or Art 14, first their reading of EA, must interpret EA
J can you formulate how you understood, I understood it to mean no difference between person's bio sex and bio sex of person undergoing GRA
SC court is invited to find that 'like' for the purposes of GRA is like sex
J can you give me that again

SC so that the acq'd gender of pers A is not a material difference in circumstances from a person with the bio sex = acq'd gender.
J right
SC says only apply when pc of GRA is engaged, but then any time gender identity is involved, you're then in Art 8, and if that is true you run right into FWS

J which held that there was a material difference
SC Sec 23 cannot be workable if that is the case, I cannot see a clearer case of the court being asked to go against the SC. That's the first way you are asked to read it down

J it doesn't say you should read cert sex as sex, they need to say that bio sex and GRA are the same.
SC that is literally what they are asking you to say. That's the first way of putting it. The second way it's put is section 195, that it should be read differently from the rest of the EA, that sex means cert sex.

J if they win on the ground being GRA discrim we'd also need to read section 195 in that way to prevail. Let's take a look at that. Can I just dig out the statutes here.
SC the EA? Tab 4,
J I have 195 in front of me - what is your point here

SC in the appeal skeleton, in order to give effect to convention rights, must read sex in 195 as cert sex, and then justify discrim
J so read GRA as bio sex then, right
SC yes, that turns it back into a sex discrim case, that's a pleading point, but this case doesn't survive FWS because it says that sex means sex and can't be read differently in different parts of the EA

OP posts:
Another2Cats · Yesterday 13:09

J in fact FWS deals with 195, says it would make it incoherent, no room for any interpretative work there if I can put it that way
SC now assuming that this is GRA discrim, then section 195.2 must be read differently

only evidence before decision maker can be considered and any lesser measures must be considered. There is some good news; not talking about lesser measures and the only thing they are talking about is testosterone suppression. And the other thing that has fallen away is a

the quality of the decision making. Not a public authority. I'm not quite sure where we are now, MLF said no declaration of incompatibility
HS can I clarify, if court comes to decision that no incompatibility, then can make a declaration of incompatibility

J but no incompatibility.
HS explains, that even if judgment is correct under the EA, it's domestic law, available to you to make a declaration of incompatibility with convention but we say EA can be read as compatible.

SC thank you for that clarification, we think its not appropriate to reopen this judgment and criticise the judge. Costs are relevant here, my clients are volunteers, they are prudent and have some insurance but are crowdfunding to cover costs. HH has not paid the substantial costs order from the county court, says will not pay and cannot

pay because impecunious. Despite that, has instructed 5 counsel to appear here before you. Enough is enough, it might be interesting for lawyers to come argue complex human rights issues. But these are real people involved.

J now what I need to understand is precisely what was not raised
SC certificated sex point was raised, but what we heard y'day for the first time was that sex & GRA were the same thing never heard that before, not even in appeal, the point on sec 195 was raised in appeal but the evidence in the case would have been different if the J was asked to consider proportionality of public duty

J I would have said alleged public duty
SC well, yes, I would have said the same
J I want to understand the difficulty, if an argument had been run about proportionality, then the evidence would have been different

SC there was a clear concession that it was not going to be a point that was argued or in dispute, given the complexity of the case, 4 experts, amazing we got through in the time
J do I have a transcript of RW opening arg
SC no, I have included RW opening subs, written subs,

J so looking at the point on FWS and the asserted failure to consider convention rights, SM said they should win on convention, as did Amnesty and Lesbian Intervenors prayed in SM subs
SC we say that although the SC didn't explicitly refer to Amnesty sub in FWS but if you follow the Amnesty subs, the SC responded para by para to their sub.

J HS may have another go, perhaps I did not understand his subs. But as I understand the law, the SC had to interpret the EA in a manner compatible with the convention.

OP posts:
ButMyGoshDontYouKnowIt · Yesterday 13:13

J HS may have another go, perhaps I did not understand his subs

Indeed.

nicepotoftea · Yesterday 13:13

J HS may have another go, perhaps I did not understand his subs. But as I understand the law, the SC had to interpret the EA in a manner compatible with the convention.

I mean, you would have thought so!

Another2Cats · Yesterday 13:14

SC now reading out FWS, no removal of rights for trans people, potentially vulnerable group remains protected as we have described. We say it is totally unsustainable that they somehow lost sight of those rights.
J so they are asking me to say that they didn't consider those rights and to reach a finding that the SC was wrong.

SC looking for my place - subs on scope of Strasbourg case law, gap between what Strasbourg says and where the C needs to be to achieve aims. We agree that gender identity is protected. They argue that Czech case requires a narrow margin of appreciation.

J can is just start in a different place. HS asked me to find that the Ds acted in a way that breached the rights of HH, I had come into this case thinking that I was being asked to find that the EA discriminates against trans people.

SC I hadn't understood there to be a suggestion that Ds were subject to horizontal direct effect discrimination, that has never been pleaded against us. In our submission, an astonishing and novel proposition to find that we are not a public authority.
HS we recognise that the obs on public authorities, the state must prevent private authorities from violating Art 8 & 14.

J that's what I understood, Semenya is a case where the court did not decide that the parties were in breach of 8 & 14 they said under Swiss law could not sufficiently ventilate complaints.
SC yes, that's right, when we get to Grand Chamber, the only finding was under Art 4,

J but read like an Art 6 finding, I'm happy to start with Semenya,
SC I'm still not 100% clear what the difference is from a HRA, our legislation, those are interpretive, we're going around in circles about what difference it makes

J what he points out is that the 3rd section of Semenya appears to be saying that the state is under an obligation to provide a mechanism for complaint, then surprisingly find that's a breach of Art 8 & 14 not Art 6.
SC well let's look at sec 3 of Semenya then

SC Semenya is not about GRA, domestic courts acknowledged tacitly that female athletes and Semenya were not materially different. Then at the bottom of para 196, says treated as if a trans athletes, not correct. Grand Chamber says no clear why compared to trans athletes, they

have clear advantage based on being born male. And the rules on trans athletes, and DSD athletes are now changed. We say the cases are not similar; Semenya was left with the choice of taking medical treatment that would affect physical and mental health or losing livelihood and

identity as a professional athlete. There are good reasons for court to be concerned. Semenya was saying that should be treated the same as women athletes. This is not about GRA treatment. Trans athletes don't have an entitlement to participate in sporting categories and ECrHR said that when choice was medical treatment or losing livelihood and identity, the convention rights are engaged.

OP posts:
nicepotoftea · Yesterday 13:19

Trans athletes don't have an entitlement to participate in sporting categories and ECrHR said that when choice was medical treatment or losing livelihood and identity, the convention rights are engaged.

But the argument from the claimant seems to be that medical treatment is necessary...

Another2Cats · Yesterday 13:19

SC the finding it Semenya was that the Swiss courts should have drawn a distinction between trans and dsd athletes and it didn't. Growing presence of trans athletes is a subject of social question and debate. We say they acknowledge the significant contested issue here.

SC cont from judgment now onto open categories and the contested issue of does testosterone suppression remove advantage. All supports conclusion that Strasbourg law is evolving.
J this is from a dissenting opinion on Semenya
SC it's a concurring opinion.

Now, Semenya went to CAS, which is arbitration, when it went to the Grand Chambers, the findings are that the request for reexamination are rejected, Art 8 either alone or with Art 14 claims are inadmissible. Art 6 was admissible and that was the Swiss law was insufficient. We get from Semenya, that this is an area where law is developing and contested and requires a wide margin of appreciation.

J what I don't find is that Semenya does not find anything that finds that GRA and sex are the same thing.
SC I cannot find anything in the authorities that support that if HS has any I'm sure he will share them.
J so found that question of art 8 & 14 were inadmissible,
SC found dealing with human rights,
J that's why Art 6 was engaged

SC yes, that's why we say it's not foundation for the C's case for art 8 and 14.
J so what about sec 3, perhaps you can sort that out between that
SC our proposition is that the court cannot go any further than domestic law unless the court is fully confident that that there is a breach, we say the opposite is true, that the Strasbourg court is feeling it's way on this issue

J can you help me on K?
SC it might be only a proverbial cigarette paper between the 2 cases,
J shall we look at K
SC the facts in K are very different, very clear that convention law had outpaced domestic law

J so what was argued before the county court was that it might not be clear the convention was engaged
SC its a bit like right to appeal, is it arguable,
J well the threshold is quite a bit higher

SC we say whatever the threshold of the test we don't come anywhere near that. The Strasbourg cases do not say that trans athletes should be allowed to participate in the sex category of their acqu'd gender. It doesn't come anywhere near that.
J let's look at K
SC directs judge to para

J yes that's clear
SC I'm not sure I can help ML beyond what is written there
J no that's fine
SC now looking at analogous circumstances, need to look at measure that is being impugned, says that doesn't meet convention rights because it doesn't do full proportionality test

OP posts:
Mmmnotsure · Yesterday 13:20

MLF - My learned friend

Another2Cats · Yesterday 13:26

J this is where the difficult arises, if it's Sec 23 it's one case, and if its 195 then it's a different case. HS says Ds have engaged in discrimination, breaching art 8 and 14 rights, and the state has not stepped in. Let me try it this way - you are saying that a TW is not analogous to a bio woman.

SC yes and I do rely on Semenya for that. HS latched on to everyone wants fair competition, and therefore they are all the same.
J you said need to consider measure impugned, where does it say that

SC if what's impugned is Sec 195.2 HS argument is everyone wants fairness because HH cannot compete in women's comp and all the women have fairness because they can. That fails because of the gateway of GAC, once that gateway is past, there is no way to have fairness with mixed sex categories. We say taken as a whole

you can't look at 195.2 in isolation, calls for fairness, and stop there. You were taken to Z v Hackney earlier, a proportionality test was used and failed in Hackney. The issue arose because there is no proportionality test in section 195.3b and where the EA requires that test it says so in terms. Decision says that regime established by EA is compliant with Art 14, further on sets out his reasons in more detail.

J yup
SC EA sets out an appropriate regime for PMALA, and relevant margin of appreciation and the general exemption for charities, the wide margin of appreciation applies - here talking about tax - but we would say also applies to other issues of public policy like fairness in sports. 195.3b is appropriate, doesn't need to be read as saying charities must apply a proportionality test,

because if it is so it destroys 195.3b, it would go against the grain of the legislation. What you are being invited to do is against the grain of the legislation and outside the powers of this court.
J duly noted. Your submission is that Parliament has decided on what needs proportionality and what doesn't. In relation to grounds of GRA discrim it decided to apply a stricter test

SC only two things fairness and safety,
J that is why I said to HS yesterday, you need to start upstream because the SC has decided that sex means bio sex, and that's what we have been discussing for the last day and half.
SC I have some further short points in my submission, if I could make it. There is a specifically designed proportionality test and we can't see why it should be different. We don't see why all lesser measures needed to have been considered and rejected,

I point to Latif, on whether it is incumbent on an employer to consider all potential adjustments, and denied because it would be required to prove a negative.
J in this case the J considered the case, and the arguments in the trial or perhaps in the submissions

SC we say the J did his job in this case.
J the court should have considered all alternative measures
SC I think that was directed at the Ds
J this is an appeal so was the judge wrong?

SC so can we go to the judgment, discussion about playing a different game or handicaps, seem to have away. Now we're talking about testosterone suppression.
J seems a reasonable approach, allowed HH to play, under those rules

OP posts:
Another2Cats · Yesterday 13:31

SC there is some doubt about how that was applied but what was clear was that women competitors complained about unfairness the position from the Ds issue, was balancing female competitors including those at the highest level were refusing to compete, how could they run a comp that was fair to all. Can I just have a look at the points of evidence that the J considered. We say it was a careful and

skilful analysis of the evidence was that testosterone suppression was never going to remedy the advantage of TW. J compares TW and biological women. Some differences will persist, skeletal differences will persist, reach and greater strength will persist. A great deal of evidence on relative strength and absolute strength. The J's finding was that relative strength might reduce

J relative to what
SC relative to previous strength and based on body mass. C's expert witness relied on a single paper, the J was very unimpressed by study, and compared

compared two groups and didn't provide an adequate basis to influence policy on inclusion or exclusion, J recorded the expert's concurrence that pharmaceutical measures would not impact skeletal issues. Expert of D said that strength gap persists despite pharmaceutical measures.

SC the judge gave very careful consideration to the evidence, and he ended up that there is no published research to establish changes. Judge found it was impossible to determine any expected change in strength. And then found that it would be difficult to find any measure

short of exclusion would address advantage of TW. Judge said he did not accept that testosterone suppression would result in fairness, does not show with any clarity reduction of differences. What would this rule look like? Previous rule said suppression enough.

Judge said very difficult to design a rule based on suppression that would make any difference. He does then go one to consider handicaps and alternative measures but those are not pleaded so we don't have to consider. We say it's difficult to see what more the judge could have considered and what more the Ds could have done, excluding TW from competition was the only rule that could have achieved fairness and was proportionate.

J if the judge is right that this is a case of DD, that's the end of the case, because that was not pleaded. If on the other hand it's a GRA case, then its not reasonable to read in an additional proportionality test.
SC HS will say that Ds didn't have the evidence
J HS will say that J didn't consider injury to HH for not being allowed to compete
SC a judge does not need to write down everything he thinks of.

J he doesn't explicitly say I've got to consider the disadvantage to TW, it wasn't put into the balance
SC that wasn't put to him so he can't be criticised for not considering it and he did consider impact on C
J he made findings of the impact on the C but did he make wider findings say on the number of TW excluding
SC no he did not.
SC I would say this, I'm not sure that this is a numbers game, how many TW excluded
J no I agree, need to look at pros and cons, but your central point is not how it was argued at trial
SC when looking at fair competition in sport the admission of one TW impacts everyone in the competition,

OP posts:
Another2Cats · Yesterday 13:32

J are you saying could be necessary for fair competition but not proportionate, not sure how'd use reconcile the two, might push you back to considering disadvantage of excluded group.

SC we are doing quite well on time, can we go on to a few points from 'Schidler' (sp?). First this is not a public authority judicial review, Ds are not a public body and can retrospectively justify, we also say that judge has properly considered FWS and picks up with the

HRA points, Art 8, looks at Goodwin, refers to various relevant cases, then says C says striking similarity to Goodwin, but in my mind many differences, scope of present case is far narrower, C's case is that identity has been taken from her. Addresses FWS & convention rights say that these were considered.

J wasn't judge asked to give an assessment and give leave to appeal, he dealt with it by referencing to the SC decision, he didn't consider it himself
SC that's all I'm going to say on convention rights, unless my learned junior has something to remind me of? No.
J let's break for lunch then.

Court rises. End of morning session part 2.

OP posts:
teawamutu · Yesterday 13:55

It reads like the judge is still asking plenty of questions and clarifying every point, but not from a position of complete incomprehension this time - meaning the defence are making rather more sense.

Am I being overly optimistic?

(And who TF is funding Haynes?)

nicepotoftea · Yesterday 13:56

SC when looking at fair competition in sport the admission of one TW impacts everyone in the competition

J are you saying could be necessary for fair competition but not proportionate, not sure how'd use reconcile the two, might push you back to considering disadvantage of excluded group.

Isn't the argument here that women are both excluded and treated unfairly?

Another2Cats · Yesterday 14:10

TT have said

"A great deal of attention section 195 of the EA. Background information may be useful here."

and then linked to google AI explanations of the relevant parts.

For context, these are the relevant parts of the section

(1) A person does not contravene this Act, so far as relating to sex, only by doing anything in relation to the participation of another as a competitor in a gender-affected activity.

(2) A person does not contravene section 29, 33, 34 or 35, so far as relating to gender reassignment, only by doing anything in relation to the participation of a transsexual person as a competitor in a gender-affected activity if it is necessary to do so to secure in relation to the activity—

(a) fair competition, or
(b) the safety of competitors.

(3) A gender-affected activity is a sport, game or other activity of a competitive nature in circumstances in which the physical strength, stamina or physique of average persons of one sex would put them at a disadvantage compared to average persons of the other sex as competitors in events involving the activity.

From TT

Judge returns.
SMT , Sapan Maini-Thompson, junior for Ds will address Ground 5.
SMT thank you, just as a starting point, we have handed up 2 docs, 1 subs by Amnesty in FWS and case of A vs NHS Commissioning Board, I'm going to address you on Ground 5.

J written subs
SMT overarching point, if C is unsuccessful in her claim, she did not suffer any detriment because of natal female rules. I will address you on supp skeleton of C, on authorities on meaning of perversity, relevant portions of J's decision and wish to address each of the paras in C skeleton on Ground 5.

J J didn't dismiss on grounds of no detriment, dismissed because of claim for sex discrim and no discrim.
SMT we found that he dismissed,
J he wouldn't have said no detriment, it would be withholding services,

SMT but in finding HH was barred from comp no provision of services because of natal female rule
J I don't find that language in the judgment, case fails because of no withholding of services, all go home.

SMT that finding was at the beginning in para 30, then goes on to set out his reasoning, I think that was his finding. Looking at supp skeleton, SC made point that grounds are a movable feast, this skeleton is similar. C suggests would have suffered from rule, had contract terminated C would have suffered in the rule.

OP posts:
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