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Feminism: Sex and gender discussions

Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court

223 replies

Another2Cats · 27/03/2026 12:28

Again, I apologise for this being very long. TL;DR this looks to be the first case at the High Court which will consider the exclusion of trans-identifying men post FWS.

So, for some background, there was a case last year, just after FWS, concerning a trans-identifying man who had been banned from a women's pool competition organised by the English Blackball Pool Federation.

Back at the end of 2023, the Pool Federation changed their rules so that only women could play in women's competitions.

The trans-identifying man, Haynes, then brought a claim of direct discrimination on the ground of gender reassignment against the federation.

The trial took place during 2025 before the judgment in FWS was handed down. The court heard from several witnesses about whether pool was a gender-affected activity (Section 195(3) Equality Act) including Dr Emma Hilton - who is the interim chair of Sex Matters.

However, the FWS judgment came out before the County Court judge had made his judgment on the case and so the pool federation said that each side should make detailed written submissions about the effect of FWS on this case.

The judge agreed and the submissions for the pool federation were written by Sarah Crowther KC of Outer Temple Chambers and those for the trans-identifying man were written by Jane Russell KC. Some may recognise her name from the Sandie Peggie case (and other cases).

.

The judge decided that FWS was sufficient to decide the case in favour of the pool federation but, since he had heard detailed argument, he also set out his conclusions with regard to the sport exception (Section 195) and also about the provision of separate services (Schedule 3 para 28)

The court concluded that pool is a ‘gender-affected activity’ and that excluding those born as male from the female category is necessary to secure fair competition. The court also concluded that this was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

There is a link to the judgment here:

https://jrlevins.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/K01CT207-judgment-1-8-25-handed-down.pdf

.

Haynes has now been granted permission to appeal and has published the grounds of appeal on Haynes Instagram account. I've attached the images here. Haynes tried to get the case "leapfrogged" directly to the Court of Appeal but this was refused.

A brief summary of the grounds, which the judge who considered the application said were all arguable are as follows (personally, I don't they stand up at all, but this is the case he is putting forward):

1 There was no evidence that trans-identifying men had any competitive advantage over women. The judge failed to consider the "mental processes" of the federation and that they were significantly influenced in their decision to exclude trans-identifying men as they were in some way unfairly discriminatory.

2 In considering direct discrimination, the court applied the wrong comparator. Following Croft [Croft v Royal Mail [2003] EWCA Civ 1045] Haynes claims that the correct comparator in this case should be a woman rather than a man.

3 FWS, when applied to the facts of this case, does not comply with Article 8 and Article 14 of the ECHR and, in a claim by an individual, the ECHR applies, whereas it did not for the organisations claiming in FWS.

4 The Court failed to apply S195 Equality Act [the sport exemption] in a ECHR compliant manner. The pool federation did not show that it was necessary to exclude trans-identifying men for the reasons of safety or fair competition. Cue sports are precision sports thus not affected by power/sex. No explanation was given for changing from a testosterone testing system or handicap system.

5 Something about the court wrongly saying that another, professional, pool organisation would have refused Haynes permission to play in this federation's competitions

.

Frankly, I don't think any of those will really hold up. But it will be interesting to see what happens when it does get to court as this will be a High Court judgment rather than just a County Court judgment.

Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court
Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court
Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court
Haynes v Blackball Pool Federation is back on - this time at the High Court
OP posts:
Thread gallery
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Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 15:01

J right
HS one particular issue in TH, para 58, the domestic authorities disregarded the fair balance between rights of individuals and rights of the state. That's important because it goes to the point about the comparator, if domestic law provides because of bio gender alone

bio sex alone I should say, if a person can be disqualified from competing in acq'd gender then there's no consideration.
J that's what 195.3 is doing
HS but it's not, its about disqualifying men from women's competition

J your sub on Czech case is based on a narrow margin of appreciation, and the state is required to have a system to assess proportionality
HS onto 195.3
J your case will take us there eventually, so let's just let that play out
HS Ellen Caine case, important to recognise context, clear in para 30, what was being argued for was a right to be neither gender and never been recognised by Strasbourg.

J what point are you making
HS go to para 40, no para 33 & 34, back to pages, court cites with approval being relevant, proportionality, identified facts being relevant considering MofA (margin of appreciation)

coherence of legal requirements and practices. There is a highly important aspect, it is about private life, there is a discordance between social reality and law if county court is right, HH is in all respects a woman but the law prevents her from women's competition, and its

about coherence. Those issues are of real importance. While we have Caine open, another passage, paraphrasing, perhaps slightly pejoratively MLF's case, trying to develop Strasbourg case law beyond where it is. The point is are we making a case that it consistent with the principles.

J I can't go further than I am confident the court would go
HS further than you are confident the principles of the court would go, that's what we say. That's really the Art 8 case law, in our skeleton we cite cases based on engagement, one aspect we submit of why Art 8 is involved, it protects someone from stigmatisation and hate speech.

J from what
HS well from hate speech, as in Goodwin
J it's not about that
HS Goodwin is relevant because marking someone out as trans, marks them out as less of woman.

OP posts:
Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 15:15

J so far you've taken me to case law that Art 8 is engaged. So are you now going to take me to why what is here is a breach of Art 8.
HS can I say something about Art 14
J what I want you to get to is why the convention law says your client wins, and what this is about is it the defendant's decision or the law that is wrong.

HS the way in which I'm going, I'm going to address the factors that engage Art 14, that then determines if there has been a breach, then move on to convention compatibility.
J so I'm going to need to understand what parts of EA are not consistent with convention rights and why the rights of trans people under Art 8 are unduly impacted.

HS can I do it this way, one of the things that is important to bear in mind, when breach of convention right and Art 14, what is the difference between the 2 arguments. Looking at Art 8 concerned with the individual how treated, Art 14 concerned with the difference in treatment

J I understand that
HS what the Art 8 case law is focusing on is the justification is for why someone who is in social terms a woman, and has been through surgery to make them a woman, is not treated them as a woman.
J you are saying the justification for not treating a TW as a woman under the EA.

HS what is the justification for not treating HH as bio woman for purposes of the EA. Art 14 is the same. Why am I being treated distinctly from a bio woman. If you accept Art 8 is engaged, then Art 14 goes out the window.
J if you tell me so its out the window
HS it's important, it links back to where the breach occurs, what is said in Semenya, a case that you may well be familiar with, intersex athlete from South Africa. Went to grand chamber but set aside on jurisdiction.

J para 123?
HS I want to go a bit further on, in that context the specific rules on female participation, the particular issue I wanted to draw attention to is para 195, it considers the

horizontal effect of discrim, reaches a conclusion that the state was obliged to prevent and provide redress for discrim acts. We've never argued that Ds are public authorities. What we do argue is that the state has to provide protection against discrimination. And that's where

you apply Art 8 & Art 14 standards and consider proportionality. Strasbourg was not applying Swiss law, it was looking at the convention, it's no answer to say we have a domestic EA and the state has to look at standard imposed by Art 8 and 14 and did the state provide proper protections.

J the court accepted that Semenya was a case of sex discrimination, for the purposes of your argument, don't we need to get the point where there's GRA discrim. Different treatment is not always discrim. I was thinking that would say that this is a breach of Art 8 & 14.

HS so I think it's not in dispute that Art 8 applies and then move on to Art 14.
J no, you need to show the discrim. Is there any authority that you need to take me to other than Semenya,

HS there are a couple of cases, is there a difference in treatment, yes a cis woman can compete TW cannot, we are within the ambit, then on to status, if we need to talk about status there's a French language case that says trans is a status.

OP posts:
Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 15:31

J the issue may come, what is the difference in the treatment and are the analogous cases on similar facts
HS there is a rule that enables cis women to compete in women only comps, it excludes tw from those comps. If you are distinguishing,
J if the case is in the ambit - any dispute on that
SC well a lot of this is new to me, I'd like to hear how the case plays out

HS the groups being compared are cis women and trans women.
J is there an aspect of the EA that treats TW worse than biological women, is that what I need to decide
HS no, back to the Semenya case, was HH treated differently and worse, under Art 8 and Art 14, and did the state provide adequate redress.

J how did Semenya work,
HS it says that what happened was contrary to Art 8 and the state's response was inadequate.
J I've told you what I want to know and you can take your course
HS how has the state responded

J through the EA
HS being a TW is a status, ML is raising the issue do we need to consider the cause, the approach of the Strasbourg court is are 2 categories being treated differently then what is the justification. In our submission, there's no dispute that there is no dispute

that the situations are relatively similar. The first thing is well established, there is an overlap between what is a relevant difference and what is a relevant similarity. Hale deals with this issue in paras 24 & 25 - pretty rare for a Strasbourg case to be decided on the

basis of being analogous but better to focus on justification. Should be hesitant to rule out cases pre-proportionality, in a very similar circumstance to female athletes, very brief, but went on to justification. We added a case, Cliff (sp) contains more analysis than most cases, 3 groups of prisoners; more than 15 years, less than 15 years and life sentences. Says groups don't need to be identical given the nature of the complaint.

J just reading 66
HS court went to say in 67, the issue was early release, a risk assessment, what was in issue was a common interest. Looking at rules intended to achieve fair competition, every competitor has an interest in fair competition. MLF says there's an obvious difference between bio women and trans women. If right then no case could ever be brought under Art 14. We say needs to see if there is an advantage. If there isn't advantage, it's not material.

J look at these issues under justification, let's start with what issues do you say they have to justify,
HS true under 8 and 14
J tell me what you say they have to justify
HS excluding a TW from a woman's comp

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Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 15:36

J that qualifies under 195.3, they don't have to justify them being excluded from any competition ever, but only those in 195.3
HS they have to justify excluding them from pool competition.

J they are not seeking to exclude from any comp, say dominoes, they are excluded from blackball snooker comp, and it was uncontested that it is a gender affected activity, so where does proportionality come in
HS this is a sport where it was decided that cis men have sufficient advantage that they segregated comps in the first place. They have to justify the inconsistency between the way HH has been treated and legal and social status.
J inconsistency between treatment and legal and social status
HS Art 14
J legally a woman, what's that
HS granted a GRC

end of afternoon part one

OP posts:
ProfPerformativeBewildermentOBE · 17/11/2026 15:51

Thanks for the TT pasting!

PP commented on the eunuch = woman argument, and here we go with it actually being put forward.

HS what the Art 8 case law is focusing on is the justification is for why someone who is in social terms a woman, and has been through surgery to make them a woman, is not treated them as a woman.
J you are saying the justification for not treating a TW as a woman under the EA.
HS what is the justification for not treating HH as bio woman for purposes of the EA. Art 14 is the same. Why am I being treated distinctly from a bio woman.

Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 15:53

From TT

Apologies missed discussion between J and HS on Art 14 when changing over. No breaks in appeals court.

SC none of this was put before the judge in the original case
J you'll have to deal with that HS.
HS it doesn't balance the issues in a HRs context, MLF says this wasn't run

HS judge in that case was no need to consider because of FWS
SC the submission that was made was for a declaration of incompatibility from the county court judge, it was explicitly made
J I may decide that I don't need to consider some of these questions but you need to make the arguments.

HS on to proportionality, was it open to the county court to consider evidence that was not before the decision maker when the decision was made. Either FWS or the scientific evidence. Did the decision maker reasonably make a decision, it's still up to the court to determine if a breach of convention rights. Need to focus on what is before the decision maker when decision is made. Page 2149,

J para?
HS a convenient place to start is reliance on reasons, a case about sanctions, is it reasonable to rely on info post decision, what the SC noted was about a case fixed in time as it was about legislation, this was not a normal public law case where it was about the reasoning of the decision maker. We accept that if you are looking at it this way, one looks at the situation at the time of a hearing, you are looking at the circumstances at the time of the decision.

J again, i'm not clear what point you're making, in this case you have an ongoing rule about who can and cannot take place in a competition
HS this is about whether there was a breach of HR at the time of the decision, the issue becomes was the decision justified

J isn't it if the rule was justified, I just want to understand what is your justification, are you submitting that the court to into account info that wasn't available when the decision was made.
HS yes

J so the only evidence that the court can take into account is what was before the decision maker at the time of the decision - that is your submission
HS because ultimately decision maker has to justify that the decision was proportionate
J I think in discrim it can include things that weren't in your mind or weren't aware of at the time.

HS it notes that but does not disqualify
J now what level of scrutiny do I need to give the decision of a county court,
HS well he said that the SC had dealt with HR issues through FWS.
J how is that difference from EA decision

HS the J said because of decision on unfair competition it was appropriate but there's no balancing act or consideration of proportionality
J as a matter of principle did that impact HH
HS its an answer judges hate - both yes and no.

The approach of the judge did not recognise is that there are very powerful Art 8 rights in play here and no indication that he considered. He reaches his finding about uncertainty as to strength advantage, that results in unfair comp, therefore full stop it is proportionate.

OP posts:
Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 16:04

J you say that did not take into account impact on HH private life
HS particularly on private life. This is the first case we are aware of that will consider proportionality, you should take a fresh approach.
J all right
HS going on to proportionality, was it a breach of Art 8, we say firstly,

J what is first
HS the burden is on Ds to demonstrate proportionality.
J and second
HS were less intrusive measures considered such as testosterone testing
J and third
HS there is a narrow MoA, a powerful justification is required. And fourthly, based on Goodwin 2 factors that are highly relevant - coherence of legal practices,

J and the incoherence arises from?
HS a person given the legal status of a woman
J by a GRC
HS but then excluded from women's sport that is a key aspect of life
J but would have be not considered to be a woman under EA

J EA would be incoherent not to consider a woman when legally a woman
HS next point is intermediate zone
J so I've got all of the incoherence point
HS the next point, closely related, is left in an intermediate zone, 2 reasons I say that is the reality is that because she is a TW

and has a GRC, has lost or abandoned, is no longer in many respects a man, does not appear to be a man, but is not fully a woman. A more general point, trans sport, if FWS is right it can prevent trans participation in sport, because sport is organised in 2 categories.

J it allows sports associations to adopt 2 categories, if it is sex discrim it is justified, slightly more nuanced than your position.
HS sec 195.2 might exclude trans people from participating in any sport at all. Another point is discord between social reality and legal reality. A very powerful justification is required.

OP posts:
Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 16:14

J you say from the defendant
HS yes, of the D, that's was the EA is seeking, giving horizontal effect. In this context what one had was certainty, the J identified 2 physical factors height or rather reach, is what judge considered.

SC I thought that there was no challenge to the findings of gender affected activity
HS if you look at the judgment
J I've told you that I'm interested in how this is argued and I may or may not say it is arguable

HS J looked at gender affected activity and then said of the two issues, and one couldn't be changed, that was reach.
J is this speaking to proportionality, is it in your skeleton, perhaps I can get it from there,
HS para 86, no, its para 92,
J can we take it all from there. If it's in your skeleton we can take it from there.

HS what we were submitting para 92, even assuming matters were up to date, problem with J's approach is that what he said was he was uncertain about degree of advantage,
SC J said he was unsure about the degree of advantage between TW and bio women, that is not the same for gender affecting activity - that is the difference between women and men.

HS looking at what J says, from 256
SC 255 really
J you're looking at a decision that the J did not need to make because you claimed GRA discrim, you're tilting at the finding of the J as defective

HS why I am engaging with this, he made a finding that there was unfair competition, that's the only place. Our basic point in relation to proportionality is that there wasn't enough to justify a finding that this was a proportionate interference with Art 8 and Art 14 rights.

HS what I was pointing out, para 92, in the context of the fairness of competition, he effectively relied on uncertainty. Doesn't assist where the burden has to be on the body interfering with the rights. That's the fundamental point we are making. Perfect equality isn't what

sport is about. MLF skeleton highlights something from IOC, more recent, about equality. Makes the point that fairness isn't the same as perfect equality. Talks about competition is fair where all share the characteristics that define the category. Implicit in any competition that people are different.

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Another2Cats · 17/11/2026 16:29

J you've made that point
HS MLF refers to the animal rights line of case law, need to take account of bright lines, no one is saying there shouldn't be a rule, before this rule there was testosterone testing. When you adopt a women's only category.

you have to have a rule. Has the rule been struck in the right place. It means that all TW are prohibited from the women's category, and at the time of making the testosterone rule there was no evidence to support by the time the J looked at it, he said uncertain. So that's why we say breach of art 8 and 14.

J let's now go back to the EA, the ratio is that sex equal biological sex under the EA, let's have a look at sec 23. How do you say sec 23 should be read?
HS Sec 23, provision that determines who you are comparing, does that by using the phrase, no material difference. In that context, needs to be read as meaning when a claim is brought forward under EA GRA, legislation has to be understood as no material difference between claimant and comparator.

J at the moment you haven't said anything more than what it says
J how should it be read, to support your argument, you are saying section 23 should be read differently,
HS sorry if I'm being unclear, it isn't a case where you need to read words into the legislation it's what does 'material difference' mean. If you are in a context where the convention will require the state to compare two groups and those groups being TW and cis women, there is no material difference between those groups

J if I understand it should be read as there is no material difference between TW and cis women - I'm just going to make a note
HS when convention rights are engaged, you only need to read it that way when convention rights are engaged
J have you thought about the impact on indirect discrim claims
HS first in indirect discrim cases, it is open to the defendants to rely on justification

J in these cases section 23 applies to both direct and indirect discrim, so what is the impact of saying that TW are same as bio women have on indirect discrim
HS only when convention is engaged
J so two versions of the EA, you could have exactly the same case, one with convention rights and one where it is not raised, but two different legal analysis.

HS we did raise convention rights and one of the reasons this arises is because of the horizontal rights. Suppose I'm wrong about the convention rights, you don't have to read it that way.
J it doesn't matter whether it raised or not, the court needs to consider it.

HS nobody disputes that Art 8 & 14 are high standard but because of proportionality it can be defended
J so if Sec 23 is read so that there is no material difference between TW and bio women,
HS you could say that you should read the words 'in accordance with convention rights' into sec 23.

J did you say you wanted to address me on sec 195
HS I think I've done that, but can I leave me subs open until tomorrow formally
J that's fine. Any need to start at 10 tomorrow
SC no, I don't think so.

Court rises

OP posts:
MyAmpleSheep · 17/11/2026 16:29

...and has a GRC, has lost or abandoned, is no longer in many respects a man, does not appear to be a man, but is not fully a woman.

That this could be a ground for appeal is clearly at odds with the fashionable idea that non-binary people are neither male nor female, or perhaps partly both. Cakeism.

nicepotoftea · 17/11/2026 16:39

I'm confused.

It's as though they are attempting to re-litigate The SC decision, but as though the GRA never happened and there is some magical point where a man becomes a woman?

nicepotoftea · 17/11/2026 16:40

If you are in a context where the convention will require the state to compare two groups and those groups being TW and cis women, there is no material difference between those groups

Huh?

Seagulldancing · 17/11/2026 16:41

If this won, wouldn't it endanger the ban in the GRA on inheritance of titles (Lord, Duke etc) and religious roles not being available to trans men? That would also be unfair surely.
Its such a mess of a bit of legislation.

MyAmpleSheep · 17/11/2026 16:43

nicepotoftea · 17/11/2026 16:39

I'm confused.

It's as though they are attempting to re-litigate The SC decision, but as though the GRA never happened and there is some magical point where a man becomes a woman?

Edited

That's one argument they're making, yes. There's a lot of talk about having "finished" a transition. The judge didn't question what that means, except that HH's transition is "complete".

I suspect that will be something raised by the defendants' counsel.

ItsAllGoingToBeFine · 17/11/2026 16:43

I don't understand why they have dropped the claim that pool isn't a gender-affected sport, but then they seem to be relying on that argument throughout the case?

MrsOvertonsWindow · 17/11/2026 16:46

Not being a lawyer this sounds like many of the arguments the desperate blokes who mansplain on here use - throw everything at the wall and hope that something sticks and sounds convincing?

Looking forward to hearing what the legal folk think of all this.

nicepotoftea · 17/11/2026 16:50

ItsAllGoingToBeFine · 17/11/2026 16:43

I don't understand why they have dropped the claim that pool isn't a gender-affected sport, but then they seem to be relying on that argument throughout the case?

So confusing. If it's accepted that this is a gender affected sport, then what is their argument - that the GRA is wrong?

MyAmpleSheep · 17/11/2026 16:53

MrsOvertonsWindow · 17/11/2026 16:46

Not being a lawyer this sounds like many of the arguments the desperate blokes who mansplain on here use - throw everything at the wall and hope that something sticks and sounds convincing?

Looking forward to hearing what the legal folk think of all this.

That's actually the correct legal strategy (if you have plenty of money) - make as many legal arguments as you can, even ones that contradict each other, and see what the judge agrees with. A High Court Judge can't make his own argument, as this one pointed out, he has to hear an argument presented by one side or the other before he can say that's the right way to interpret the law.

I don't think it works with facts though: you can't say under oath "I wasn't there that day, alternatively, if you find I was there, then actually I was in the blue car and not the red one."

nicepotoftea · 17/11/2026 16:57

MyAmpleSheep · 17/11/2026 16:53

That's actually the correct legal strategy (if you have plenty of money) - make as many legal arguments as you can, even ones that contradict each other, and see what the judge agrees with. A High Court Judge can't make his own argument, as this one pointed out, he has to hear an argument presented by one side or the other before he can say that's the right way to interpret the law.

I don't think it works with facts though: you can't say under oath "I wasn't there that day, alternatively, if you find I was there, then actually I was in the blue car and not the red one."

Is this 'arguing in the alternative'? I think Michael Foran discussed this re: the Sandie Peggie case.

Wishesandhorses · 17/11/2026 17:03

nicepotoftea · 17/11/2026 16:39

I'm confused.

It's as though they are attempting to re-litigate The SC decision, but as though the GRA never happened and there is some magical point where a man becomes a woman?

Edited

They will try to relitigate the SC over and over and over again in the desperate hope that one may eventually go their way.

MyAmpleSheep · 17/11/2026 17:27

nicepotoftea · 17/11/2026 16:57

Is this 'arguing in the alternative'? I think Michael Foran discussed this re: the Sandie Peggie case.

Yes - "additionally" and, if the point you want to make is contrary to some other point, "... and in the alternative ..."

Retiredfromthere · 17/11/2026 17:27

Some things just leap out from this transcript.

HS Goodwin is relevant because marking someone out as trans, marks them out as less of woman.

Duh?

MrsOvertonsWindow · 17/11/2026 17:29

Retiredfromthere · 17/11/2026 17:27

Some things just leap out from this transcript.

HS Goodwin is relevant because marking someone out as trans, marks them out as less of woman.

Duh?

😂😂
i know. Despite the SC judgment they're determined their private fantasies must be enshrined in law.

MyAmpleSheep · 17/11/2026 17:36

Retiredfromthere · 17/11/2026 17:27

Some things just leap out from this transcript.

HS Goodwin is relevant because marking someone out as trans, marks them out as less of woman.

Duh?

(Sings) you're once, twice, three times a laydee....

Hoardasurass · 17/11/2026 17:37

nicepotoftea · 17/11/2026 16:50

So confusing. If it's accepted that this is a gender affected sport, then what is their argument - that the GRA is wrong?

No, its seems to be that the equality act saying that men are men, even when they have a grc saying otherwise when it comes to sex segregation/discrimination is incompatible with articles 8&14 of the human rights act but only when the man has a grc because hes finished his transition and now is a women because there no discernible difference between biological women and transwomen post transition.
So basically he wants a 2 tier system for transwomen who have a grc compared to those without and women have no right to anything without men so yes regashing the fws case again