From the judgment:
However, in oral submissions made by senior counsel for the respondents, the focus came to be very much more on Article 2 and the need to protect against the risk of suicide.... it was the respondents’ position that the court ought to be concentrating on suicide risk, and, to reinforce that point, it was said that, even if it served to protect only one trans prisoner, a policy with some degree of flexibility would be necessary.....
(if only the 'if it serves to protect only one' bit was EVER extended to women, eh?)
[124] There are, of course, means of protecting trans prisoners’ rights which do not involve accommodation in a prison for the opposite biological sex. I have referred already, at paragraphs [7] and [112], to the various forms of special provision set out in the Prisons Guidance. In this context, it can be understood that there are arrangements made allowing a trans prisoner to “live in their affirmed gender” and that, with those measures in place, the respondents respect that trans prisoner’s Article 8 right to a private life. It is beyond the scope of this judgment to canvass the circumstances in which, for a hypothetical individual, a third space may be required, separate from both the men’s estate and the women’s estate, but that is an option in principle. The practical feasibility of that must be a matter for the first respondents.
[125] A trans prisoner may consider that these measures, even taken at their most extensive, are insufficient to allow for life, to use Baroness Hale’s words, “as fully a man or as fully a woman as the case may be” but there is no case to support an argument that Article 8 entails a right for a trans woman to live in the same place as and in the company of women. It is precisely because of the impact of mixed sex accommodation provision on the privacy and dignity of the would-be fellow prisoners that the restriction in rule 126 exists and that immediately shows that, even if Article 8 rights are engaged, the interference is justified under Article 8(2). Sex segregation is necessary for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights or freedoms of other prisoners. As all parties, and interveners, recognised, the Convention rights, under Articles 2, 3 and 8, of female prisoners are engaged in circumstances in which the respondents operate a process for allocating trans women prisoners to the women’s prison estate. (my bolding)
A trans prisoner cannot live in his or her transgender identity in the abstract. Accommodating a trans woman prisoner in the women’s estate necessarily involves association with women, and their [in context, this refers to women in the women's estate when imprisoned) circumstances are such that they cannot opt out. [seems somewhat at odds with the judge's earlier comment that introducing a man into a women's single sex environment was not necessarily harassment]
[133] It is necessary to recognise the Article 8 rights of female prisoners in the women’s estate, a point emphasised by the SHRC in their submissions.
Long discussion on article 2 - linked to submissions from EHRC and other sources, that provisions in the male estate for transgender prisoners is extensive, that the women's estate holds prisoners equally vulnerable with mental health needs as rife as the male estate and it is reasonable to expect the male estate to manage risk and needs. And again a return to mentioning the possibility of third spaces.
Women got a lot more consideration in the judgment than the short news reported bit shows at all.