Page 38 | Sandie Peggie: Employment Tribunal, associated legal claims, and related matters - thread #67

CohensDiamondTeeth · 05/10/2026 21:04

Lacksie · 05/10/2026 20:48

I'm not the only poster responsible for this discussion. I'm just the only person who doesn't agree with the party line.

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I agree you aren't the only person having this discussion, and that you are the only one who is of the opinion that your interpretation of the law is correct.

I doubt you are going to change anyone's mind.

A lot of posters wanted you to take the discussion to another thread because it became a derailment, and has now taken up almost the entirety of the thread. A thread was even set up for you for that very purpose.

You could start one now. That would leave the last few pages for any actually relevant updates, should they happen.

I don't think that you will. Of course pages 2-36 weren't quite sufficient, but 37 is more than enough. Of course there's nothing left to say, and really there's just not enough time in the day, is there? What with you know life and all.

So we'll probably see you next thread for groundhog day then.

JamesKirkupReviewWritersFund · 05/10/2026 21:07

Tell you what @Lacksie why don't you crowd fund for money to set up an establishment to test out your bold theory, you may even get funding from this board - always interested in legal precedents. If we need to fly you in from down under you may need to extend the fundraising window a wee bit.

OldCrone · 05/10/2026 21:24

Lacksie · 05/10/2026 19:55

Paragraph 61 specifically considers an arrangement where trans women are permitted to use a facility labelled “female”/“women”, while other males are excluded.

If simply labelling that facility “women” were itself unlawful, it would be rather odd for the judge to go on to consider whether that very arrangement amounted to unlawful sex discrimination without mentioning that more basic problem!

And of course I think signage should be clear. But “clear” doesn’t simply mean conforming to your preferred meaning of the sign.

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Paragraph 61 specifically considers an arrangement where trans women are permitted to use a facility labelled “female”/“women”, while other males are excluded.

The problem with this is that there is no difference between 'transwomen' and other men. So if 'transwomen' are permitted to use it, so are all other men.

There are no categorical features to distinguish a 'transwoman' from any other man.

YourWatermelonship · 05/10/2026 21:24

Is it true that on the MN app you can hide all of a poster's posts? Asking for a friend

Peregrina · 05/10/2026 21:28

You remind me of the last Japanese soldier, valiantly but fruitlessly trying to go on fighting WW2 in 1949.

I thought it was much later than that - some time like 1975. Maybe Lacksie will be banging on about this in thirty years time?

potpourree · 05/10/2026 21:30

Is this still the poster who can't differentiate between sex and gender identity? Yet somehow expects to be able to contribute to a discussion about them? Great stuff.

CassOle · 05/10/2026 21:33

Peregrina · 05/10/2026 21:28

You remind me of the last Japanese soldier, valiantly but fruitlessly trying to go on fighting WW2 in 1949.

I thought it was much later than that - some time like 1975. Maybe Lacksie will be banging on about this in thirty years time?

Hiroo Onoda. He surrendered in 1974.

https://www.warhistoryonline.com/instant-articles/never-surrender-lieutenant.html

“Never Surrender" The Japanese Soldier who Kept Fighting 30 Years After WW2 Ended | War History Online

His home country welcomed him as a celebrity, but the old Japan that he had known and fought for was long gone. His name was Hiroo Onoda and December 26,

https://www.warhistoryonline.com/instant-articles/never-surrender-lieutenant.html

Rollingpinofdoom · 05/10/2026 21:43

spannasaurus · 05/10/2026 18:52

@Lacksie do you have any legal qualifications or experience, have you received any training in the interpretation and application of legislation and case law?

Probably binge watched silks once….

PachacutisBadAuntie · 05/10/2026 21:53

Gosh are you all still playing the game?

Round And Round Carousel GIF by Paul McCartney

ProudWomanXX · 05/10/2026 21:54

Lacksie · 05/10/2026 16:36

Absolute rubbish. It’s not “mislabelled”. The Supreme Court interpreted what “woman” means for the purposes of the Equality Act. It did not prescribe what the word means more generally (they were VERY clear about that), how it must be used or how facilities must be labelled.

Saying that a facility admitting women and trans women is “mixed-sex” for Equality Act purposes means that for the purposes of understanding legal rules, it does not qualify as "single-sex" provision, as that language is used in the EA.

That is completely different from saying the facility is “mislabelled”.

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I find it quite frankly astonishing that you can argue with a British Barrister about all this stuff.

How very entitled of you.

Very familiar behaviour for a certain category of person!

prh47bridge · 05/10/2026 21:58

Lacksie · 05/10/2026 20:22

But the Building Regulations still don’t establish your broader proposition, even in relation to toilets.

And paragraph 61 specifically contemplates a facility labelled “women”/“female”!! So signage plainly forms part of the factual scenario the judge was considering, even if the legality of the sign itself wasn’t a separate issue he had to determine.

If that signage were simply and obviously unlawful in its own right, it would be very odd for the judge to analyse whether the arrangement was unlawful in a different way, without mentioning that more basic problem. 😆

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As I say, I am not going to go through and quote all the regulations. No doubt you will come up with reasons why you think they don't apply even when they clearly do.

Paragraph 61 specifically considers whether a man excluded from a single sex female toilet that admits trans identifying men would have a claim for unlawful discrimination. That's it. It does not consider whether such an arrangement is lawful in and of itself because that was not argued. That is the way the courts work. It is not odd that the judge did not mention the more basic problem (beyond hinting at it by pointing out that what the sign said did not match what the Equality Act said). It is perfectly normal. If he had mentioned the problem and ruled on that basis, GLP would have had an easy appeal as he would have found against them on a point that they had not had any chance to argue.

As I say, you clearly have no idea how the UK courts operate.

Lacksie · 05/10/2026 22:13

prh47bridge · 05/10/2026 21:58

As I say, I am not going to go through and quote all the regulations. No doubt you will come up with reasons why you think they don't apply even when they clearly do.

Paragraph 61 specifically considers whether a man excluded from a single sex female toilet that admits trans identifying men would have a claim for unlawful discrimination. That's it. It does not consider whether such an arrangement is lawful in and of itself because that was not argued. That is the way the courts work. It is not odd that the judge did not mention the more basic problem (beyond hinting at it by pointing out that what the sign said did not match what the Equality Act said). It is perfectly normal. If he had mentioned the problem and ruled on that basis, GLP would have had an easy appeal as he would have found against them on a point that they had not had any chance to argue.

As I say, you clearly have no idea how the UK courts operate.

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You’re misrepresenting what I said.

I didn’t say Swift was required to determine some completely separate signage claim that wasn’t before him. I said that, given he was expressly considering this factual scenario — a lavatory which is mixed-sex for Equality Act purposes but remains labelled “women” — it would be very odd if that very arrangement were obviously necessarily unlawful in itself under some other regulation and he simply proceeded to analyse its discrimination consequences without mentioning that fairly fundamental problem.

That is particularly so because he expressly draws attention to the discrepancy in the parenthesis. He doesn’t say “although of course such labelling would itself be unlawful”; he says that for EA purposes the lavatory would be mixed-sex, while for the purposes of the claimants’ submission it would still be labelled “women”, and then continues to analyse whether excluding other men could amount to less favourable treatment.

Of course a court generally decides the issues put before it. But that doesn’t mean a judge has to pretend an obvious legal defect in the very hypothetical he is analysing doesn’t exist! It would be extremely odd for him to do so. He could perfectly well flag it without deciding the case on that basis.

So no, paragraph 61 doesn’t prove that the signage is lawful under every conceivable regulatory regime. But it provides remarkably little support for your much stronger assertion that such signage is "mislabelled" according to the law/ unlawful. If that is your case, you still need to identify the regulation that actually establishes it, instead of just repeating that I understand nothing about how the law works. 🙄

CohensDiamondTeeth · 05/10/2026 22:23

I see groundhog day came early.

Why be reasonable and start another thread when you could just give the merry go round another push right @Lacksie?

NotAtMyAge · 05/10/2026 22:24

Peregrina · 05/10/2026 21:28

You remind me of the last Japanese soldier, valiantly but fruitlessly trying to go on fighting WW2 in 1949.

I thought it was much later than that - some time like 1975. Maybe Lacksie will be banging on about this in thirty years time?

Heaven forbid! 😮😬 You could well be right about the date. For some reason 1949 was in the back of my mind.

MyAmpleSheep · 05/10/2026 22:27

Lacksie · 05/10/2026 22:13

You’re misrepresenting what I said.

I didn’t say Swift was required to determine some completely separate signage claim that wasn’t before him. I said that, given he was expressly considering this factual scenario — a lavatory which is mixed-sex for Equality Act purposes but remains labelled “women” — it would be very odd if that very arrangement were obviously necessarily unlawful in itself under some other regulation and he simply proceeded to analyse its discrimination consequences without mentioning that fairly fundamental problem.

That is particularly so because he expressly draws attention to the discrepancy in the parenthesis. He doesn’t say “although of course such labelling would itself be unlawful”; he says that for EA purposes the lavatory would be mixed-sex, while for the purposes of the claimants’ submission it would still be labelled “women”, and then continues to analyse whether excluding other men could amount to less favourable treatment.

Of course a court generally decides the issues put before it. But that doesn’t mean a judge has to pretend an obvious legal defect in the very hypothetical he is analysing doesn’t exist! It would be extremely odd for him to do so. He could perfectly well flag it without deciding the case on that basis.

So no, paragraph 61 doesn’t prove that the signage is lawful under every conceivable regulatory regime. But it provides remarkably little support for your much stronger assertion that such signage is "mislabelled" according to the law/ unlawful. If that is your case, you still need to identify the regulation that actually establishes it, instead of just repeating that I understand nothing about how the law works. 🙄

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it would be very odd if that very arrangement were obviously necessarily unlawful in itself under some other regulation and he simply proceeded to analyse its discrimination consequences without mentioning that fairly fundamental problem.

Judges aren't detail experts in all areas of law; they have barristers to tell them what the law means in any particular circumstance and they direct their attention to the merits of the arguments in front of them.

I think you're reading a lot - too much - into Swift not knowing or not saying a trans-inclusive toilet facility was unlawful under some other legislation or for some other reason under EA2010. And as @prh47bridge points out, he actually can't go further than the arguments put before him. If nobody makes the point about some other law he's not allowed to raise it himself.

NotAtMyAge · 05/10/2026 22:32

Off to bed now, but as this is the thread which never sleeps (thanks to Lacksie) I'll post the new thread link once again for luck.

https://www.mumsnet.com/talk/womens_rights/5585414-sandie-peggie-employment-tribunal-associated-legal-claims-and-related-matters-thread-68

Sandie Peggie: Employment Tribunal, associated legal claims, and related matters - thread #68 | Mumsnet

Sandie Peggie, a nurse at Victoria Hospital in Kirkcaldy (VH), brought claims in the employment tribunal against her employer; Fife Health Board (the...

https://www.mumsnet.com/talk/womens_rights/5585414-sandie-peggie-employment-tribunal-associated-legal-claims-and-related-matters-thread-68

WaterThyme · 05/10/2026 22:40

I’m struggling to catch up while quietly boggling at what the labels on the doors for all these categories might be. They’re confusing enough in words, how would they look in pictograms? You know, we currently have the stick man, the stick woman with skirt, and the stick person with half a skirt and one trouser leg. What would represent Women (including the men who would like to be treated as women)? An aubergine with a skirt on?

prh47bridge · 05/10/2026 22:44

Lacksie · 05/10/2026 22:13

You’re misrepresenting what I said.

I didn’t say Swift was required to determine some completely separate signage claim that wasn’t before him. I said that, given he was expressly considering this factual scenario — a lavatory which is mixed-sex for Equality Act purposes but remains labelled “women” — it would be very odd if that very arrangement were obviously necessarily unlawful in itself under some other regulation and he simply proceeded to analyse its discrimination consequences without mentioning that fairly fundamental problem.

That is particularly so because he expressly draws attention to the discrepancy in the parenthesis. He doesn’t say “although of course such labelling would itself be unlawful”; he says that for EA purposes the lavatory would be mixed-sex, while for the purposes of the claimants’ submission it would still be labelled “women”, and then continues to analyse whether excluding other men could amount to less favourable treatment.

Of course a court generally decides the issues put before it. But that doesn’t mean a judge has to pretend an obvious legal defect in the very hypothetical he is analysing doesn’t exist! It would be extremely odd for him to do so. He could perfectly well flag it without deciding the case on that basis.

So no, paragraph 61 doesn’t prove that the signage is lawful under every conceivable regulatory regime. But it provides remarkably little support for your much stronger assertion that such signage is "mislabelled" according to the law/ unlawful. If that is your case, you still need to identify the regulation that actually establishes it, instead of just repeating that I understand nothing about how the law works. 🙄

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I didn't say you said he had to determine it. However, you said

it would be very odd if that very arrangement were obviously necessarily unlawful in itself under some other regulation and he simply proceeded to analyse its discrimination consequences without mentioning that fairly fundamental problem.

As I said, that is not how the courts work. They analyse the point that has been argued before them.

The question was whether such an arrangement would be unlawful discrimination against biological men. That is what Swift answered. As I said, it is not in the slightest bit odd that he did not consider whether the arrangement was itself unlawful. That was not argued. And if he had said it was unlawful, that would have required him to find against GLP on that point and would have given them an easy appeal. Instead, he dealt only with the point that was argued by the parties, which is exactly what he should have done.

It is analogous to a case I had some involvement with a number of years ago where, without giving away any detail, the losing party was clearly in breach of Disney's copyright and would have lost on that basis if it had been argued. However, since the copyright issue was not mentioned in court by either party, it was not mentioned in the judgment.

WaterThyme · 05/10/2026 22:52

Ah, just saw that KTSS explained standardisation about 5 pages back, after I wrote the above. I can still boggle though

Lacksie · 05/10/2026 23:02

prh47bridge · 05/10/2026 22:44

I didn't say you said he had to determine it. However, you said

it would be very odd if that very arrangement were obviously necessarily unlawful in itself under some other regulation and he simply proceeded to analyse its discrimination consequences without mentioning that fairly fundamental problem.

As I said, that is not how the courts work. They analyse the point that has been argued before them.

The question was whether such an arrangement would be unlawful discrimination against biological men. That is what Swift answered. As I said, it is not in the slightest bit odd that he did not consider whether the arrangement was itself unlawful. That was not argued. And if he had said it was unlawful, that would have required him to find against GLP on that point and would have given them an easy appeal. Instead, he dealt only with the point that was argued by the parties, which is exactly what he should have done.

It is analogous to a case I had some involvement with a number of years ago where, without giving away any detail, the losing party was clearly in breach of Disney's copyright and would have lost on that basis if it had been argued. However, since the copyright issue was not mentioned in court by either party, it was not mentioned in the judgment.

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No — that still does not answer the point I made.

I did not say Swift was required to decide a separate signage issue. I said that if the very arrangement he was analysing were obviously unlawful in itself, it would be very odd for him to construct that exact scenario, expressly note that the lavatory would still be labelled “women”, and then analyse the discrimination consequences of the arrangement without saying a word about the supposedly more basic illegality.

That is not the same thing as asking him to determine an unargued claim.

Your answer amounts to saying that a judge can expressly analyse the legal consequences of a factual arrangement while completely ignoring an obvious legal defect inherent in that same arrangement simply because nobody pleaded it. That may explain why he would not rule on the separate point, but it does not make his total silence about it meaningless.

And in this case the supposed problem is not some remote copyright issue sitting in the background. It concerns the very thing he expressly identifies: a lavatory that is mixed-sex for Equality Act purposes but still labelled “women”.

So if your position is that this labelling was plainly unlawful under other regulations, Swift’s treatment of the scenario is very difficult to square with the idea that this was an obvious and fundamental defect. It certainly does not support your suggestion that he was “hinting” that the signage was unlawful.

And, more fundamentally, you still haven’t actually substantiated your claim that the toilets were “legally mislabelled”. You have repeatedly said that you are “not going to cite every regulation”, but you haven’t identified a regulation that actually establishes that general proposition.

You need to show the legal route from “this toilet is mixed-sex for Equality Act purposes” to “it is therefore legally mislabelled if the door says ‘women’”.

Keeptoiletssafe · 05/10/2026 23:06

😂

Lougle · 05/10/2026 23:07

13.130 If a service provider (or a person providing a service in the exercise of public functions) admits trans people to a service intended for the opposite sex, then it can no longer rely on the exceptions set out at paragraphs 13.99 to 13.111. This means that if a service is provided only to women and trans women or only to men and trans men, it is not a separate-sex or single-sex service under the Equality Act 2010.

13.131 A service like this is very likely to amount to unlawful sex discrimination against the people of the opposite sex who are not allowed to use it. A service which is provided to women and trans women could also be unlawful sex discrimination or lead to unlawful harassment against women who use the service. Similar considerations would apply to a service provided for men and trans men.

It is possible to offer a mixed-sex service alongside a single-sex service. A mixed-sex service must be open to all service users.

https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/guidance/codes-practice/code-practice-services-public-functions-and-associations/chapter-thirteen

prh47bridge · 05/10/2026 23:15

I did not say Swift was required to decide a separate signage issue. I said that if the very arrangement he was analysing were obviously unlawful in itself, it would be very odd for him to construct that exact scenario, expressly note that the lavatory would still be labelled “women”, and then analyse the discrimination consequences of the arrangement without saying a word about the supposedly more basic illegality.

And that is exactly the point I've answered. EHRC were saying that it would be unlawful discrimination if a biological man was refused entry to such a facility, GLP were saying it would not. That, therefore, is the point Swift answered. He did not talk about whether such an arrangement was inherently unlawful as that was not argued.

Your answer amounts to saying that a judge can expressly analyse the legal consequences of a factual arrangement while completely ignoring an obvious legal defect inherent in that same arrangement simply because nobody pleaded it. That may explain why he would not rule on the separate point, but it does not make his total silence about it meaningless.

No, that is a full explanation. If a judge wants to raise an argument or legal angle that was not made by either side in court, they must first give both parties a chance to argue the point. His total silence is because it was not argued, not for any other reason.

And in this case the supposed problem is not some remote copyright issue sitting in the background. It concerns the very thing he expressly identifies: a lavatory that is mixed-sex for Equality Act purposes but still labelled “women”.

Actually, in the case I mentioned, copyright was not some remote issue sitting in the background. It should have been central but both parties missed it. The judge didn't, but he couldn't mention it in his judgment because it hadn't been argued.

You need to show the legal route from “this toilet is mixed-sex for Equality Act purposes” to “it is therefore legally mislabelled if the door says ‘women’”.

The problem is not that I have not done so. I have. You don't want to accept that the law is what it clearly is. If you want to argue further, try arguing it before a judge. You would lose.

Ereshkigalangcleg · 05/10/2026 23:19

YourWatermelonship · 05/10/2026 21:24

Is it true that on the MN app you can hide all of a poster's posts? Asking for a friend

No, not as far as I know, sadly.

DustyWindowsills · 05/10/2026 23:30

Londonmummy66 · 05/10/2026 19:53

At the end of the day our friend from down under is clearly a man who thinks they are a woman. Once you've deceived yourself to that extent that what is fact and what is wishful thinking you don't really stand a chance of distinguishing between what the law actually says and what you want it to say - with an added dose of what Jolyon would also like it to say....

Maybe we should not engage with the poor deluded soul?

our friend from down under is clearly a man who thinks they are a woman

I'm not even sure it's a human. It reads like AI slop.