Blimey!
Meanwhile, in the real world, the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), an independent think-tank based in The Hague, sounded a note of extreme caution amid growing concern that 7 Oct could be just the start of a broader operation:
...the activities between Israel and Hamas, which are also impacting both Israeli and Palestinian civilians, could spur violence outside of the region. This is particularly acute as Hamas’ former chief recently called for mobilization of citizens in countries in the region, and stated “To all scholars who teach jihad… to all who teach and learn, this is a moment for the application (of theories).”
The ICCT article makes this comment about the Arras school stabbings on 13 Oct 2023, which were prompted by Hamas calling for a "global day of protest":
There is ... concern about a large number of radicalized persons in France who have not been sufficiently addressed, and the lull of attacks since the fall of ISIS so-called caliphate has perhaps given France a false sense of security vis-à-vis Islamist terrorism. While the 13 October attacker appears to have reacted independently of this call to jihad, there are many individuals considered at risk who may not differentiate between the underlying ideologies of unique organisations. Hamas and ISIS are both part of the militant jihadi movement, but their ideological or organizational differences distinguish them. However, to an individual that engaged in the militant Salafi-jihadi movement during the 2014-2019 period, a period in which ideological differences were not always clear to engaged individuals, a call to jihad may transcend organisational affiliation. Consider the Charlie Hebdo attacks of January 2015: Saïd and Chérif Kouachi identified themselves as belonging to Al-Qaeda in Yemen, while Amedy Coulibaly pledged allegiance to ISIS. At this time, ISIS and al-Qaeda were enemies in Syria and elsewhere – and still are. Yet in France, members that pledged allegiance to these competing organisations had joined forces under a broader jihadist banner as the call to avenge the Prophet Mohammed transcended ideologies of individual militant jihadi organisations and resonated across the militant jihadi movements and actors.
Jihadist groups themselves appear to be capitalizing on this. A week after the 13 October attack, ISIS published an editorial on the war in Israel entitled: “Practical steps to fight the Jews”, wherein ISIS expanded the call to target Israel, Jewish people and symbols, and allies to Israel (i.e. the West) around the world. This is a clear indication that even if organisations within the militant jihadi movement have different ideologies, they can feed off (the actions) of one another and potentially capitalize on grievances and calls for action being driven by this current conflict.
It's worth reading the whole piece, including their conclusions about the threat to France and other European countries:
https://icct.nl/publication/hamas-global-jihad-impact-france
France's caution might look like an overreaction to you, but Hamas were only able to carry out so much sadistic destruction on 7 Oct because Israel got complacent. They had come to rely on the Iron Dome to them protect against the constant bombardment, and underestimated what else could happen.
Better safe than sorry...