"Security in the area around Rafah is also of concern to Egypt because Sinai has been the site of an Islamist insurgency that flared a decade ago. Hamas, which has run the Gaza Strip since 2007, shares the Islamist ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement outlawed in Egypt."
And:
"Hamas' deadly attack on southern Israel six days ago - unprecedented for the group in its planning and scale - was a devastating demonstration of the military expertise it has gained since seizing control of Gaza in 2007....
Necessity is the mother of invention," said Ali Baraka, a senior Hamas official, adding that the group had long drawn on money and training from Iran and Iranian regional proxies like Lebanon's Hezbollah, while bolstering its own forces in Gaza.
Difficulties in importing weapons meant that over the past nine years "we developed our capabilities and are able to manufacture locally", said Baraka, who is based in Lebanon....
In the 2008 Gaza war, Hamas rockets had a maximum range of 40 km (25 miles), but that had risen to 230 km by the 2021 conflict, he added.
After the most recent Gaza war in 2021, Hamas and an affiliated group called Palestinian Islamic Jihad managed to retain 40% of their missile inventories, a key target of the Israelis, according to the U.S. based non-profit Jewish Institute for National Security of America, keeping roughly 11,750 missiles compared with 23,000 before the conflict."
www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/bombardments-hit-area-gaza-sinai-border-crossing-gaza-officials-2023-10-10/
So, as a result of Israel Defense Force pulling out of Gaza in 2005, Hamas ended up in power just two years later. And increasingly improved their weapons capabilities whilst increasing their total membership from 10,000 in 1990 to 40,000 in 2023.
It's quite clear that Israeli withdrawal from Gaza made things worse from a National Security perspective.
Not better.
"Hamas was probably more successful than it thought it would be, but also more successful than it should have been for its own good.....Hamas aimed to penetrate Israel in a way that would give it centrality and relevance for decades to come, but by killing hundreds of Israelis and taking 150 hostages in the first days, Hamas has put itself in an impossible position. Israel is united in its determination to change the status quo ante and completely push Hamas from power. It is hard to imagine that Hamas will be able to retain power in Gaza when the dust settles. There may be hope for the Palestinian national cause, but there’s very little hope for Hamas."
And:
"Since Hamas took power in 2007, the Israeli military periodically would go into Gaza, fight with Hamas, and destroy some of its infrastructure. Hamas would rebuild for a few years, and then the cycle would repeat itself. Israelis called this “mowing the grass,” an unpleasant but necessary repetitive task. This cycle is no longer going to be acceptable to the Israeli public or political leadership. Now, the question is what kind of government will emerge in Gaza after the war. It might entail greater control for the Palestinian National Authority based in Ramallah, some sort of new local governance, governance under the tutelage of the Israeli military, or perhaps a coalition of Arab states. There are a lot of possibilities, but it is hard to imagine that Hamas can remain in power."
Link: www.csis.org/analysis/hamas-and-israel-current-situation-and-looking-ahead
No State would allow a territory as hostile as Gaza to continue on as it has from 2005 to 2023 where a terrorist group grew larger, improved their weapons capabilities and became more capable of very significant attacks.