Yes, civilian deaths will be the result.
But as I've explained previously in detail that is a direct consequence of Hamas abusing the protection given to civilians and civilian infrastructure under International Humanitarian Law. The behaviour of Hamas increases the likelihood of Israel retaliating with missiles and other measures.
Since 1945, there hasn't really been a conventional conflict between conventional forces. Ukraine and Gulf War 1991 are the very few exceptions. The majority of conflicts since 1945 have been what we call irregular conflicts, i.e. guerilla aka terrorist groups against usually conventional State forces who then have to adapt to become counter-terrorist specialists.
Terrorist groups do this in the first place because they know they cannot match a States firepower like for like. They also do it because they KNOW that first impressions often shapes how people around the world think about the conflict. Terrorist groups are usually very good at propaganda.
NATO StratCom COE identified in 2019 some measures States can take to counter Terrorist atrocities and propaganda. I've listed them here:
- Strategically, nations should prepare to publicly justify their position, and reveal their adversary’s use of civilians in combat.
- Target audiences should be thoroughly considered, including governments, NGOs, transnational organisations, colleges and universities, and general public opinion (including social media platforms and other fora). Such a plan should be an inherent part of any strategy, and should be prepared before commencing any military operation.
- Operationally, priority should be given to information activities aimed at the very civilians who are used as human shields, in order to undermine the adversary and convince civilians to actively or passively refuse to serve as human shields.
- Governments should thoroughly investigate every case in which the military is accused of committing war crimes, even if the alleged government knows the claims to be false. Governments should not ignore any claims, as this allows the adversary to control the narrative.
- Prevention: Risk and Crisis Communications - basically means avoid undermining commitment to international law.
- Mitigation: Establish Transparent Early Warning Systems & Investigative Mechanisms - basically means identify a terrorist group's attempts to use lawfare against a State.
- Rather than merely reacting to accusations of war crimes, governments should consider the use of legal instruments to actively counter adversaries who use human shields. They should direct their intelligence agencies to gain access to materials that prove the adversary’s illegal use of human shields, and publicise these materials in international tribunals.
- Integrated Communication - basically means the State should make excellent use of various communication methods such as social media in order to target an audience and tailor the message for each one appropriately in order to prevent the terrorist's narrative predominating. States should also create partnerships with local and global news outlets to ensure accurate information is disseminated.
- Strategic Planning of PsyOps Campaigns (detailed below):
"Given the demographic and geographic conditions within which Hamas operates, there is a relationship between geographic proximity and governance where Hamas uses its governance framework to control (providing or withholding) access to vital goods and services. Reliance on or rejection of ‘alternative welfare’ networks provide the
Gazan population with limited options:
(1) They can support and defend Hamas’ ideology and Hamas’ tactics (including the use of human shields) – be it out of conviction, existential necessity, fear, or due to lack of alternatives.
(2) They can support Hamas’ ideology, but reject Hamas’ tactics.
(3) They can passively or actively break with Hamas’ ideology and reject Hamas’ tactics, although in doing so they risk loss of life, livelihood, property, and collateral social and familial degradation and distancing (this can include emigrating).
Given these choices for Gazans, Israel’s use of PsyOps would not only need to capture first order repercussions for Gazans choosing to reject ideology and/or practices but it would also need to consider second and third order effects of Gazans who would prefer to stay in Gaza or cannot leave Gaza (for a variety of reasons). The likelihood of a narrative or strategic communications plan to have this penetration is unlikely. Furthermore, the inability of Israel to provide alternatives for Gazans could backfire and provide more fodder for Hamas to recruit
and retain supporters (active and passive). Should Israel or Israeli partners not be able to fill the vacuum provided by Gazans breaking with Hamas, the Gazan population could be placed in a more vulnerable and exploitable position by Hamas and foreign sympathisers who will seize upon this narrative for their own purposes.
Successful PsyOps plans should ideally move audiences along a psycho-social continuum that spans internalising messaging using critical thinking to externalising behavioural changes.
Consequently, PsyOps must:
(1) Foment dissent in targeted populations;
and
(2) Produce active and passive rejection of a worldview or set of associated practices.
Should the first pillar be achieved without the second, the operation will likely be unsuccessful. There is a limited likelihood of success in the case of Hamas’ use of lawfare and Israel’s ability to successfully counter these messages through PsyOps.
PsyOps during times of peace (or absence of conflict) is more strategic than during active military operations. PsyOps aimed at the Palestinian population, at Hamas’ leaders and militants, and at the Western public (and
maybe even the Muslim/Arab world) all require different narrative streams: targeting each audience effectively requires understanding how each audience consumes information as well as aligning that with the effects that Israel is seeking to achieve. Furthermore, the level of sub-group targeting will also impact both the structure,
content, and desired outcome. While the chances of generating substantial influence during inter-conflict periods is relatively low due to the reasons already listed, an operational or tactical approach during a military operation can find varying levels of success."