Mike Mazarr AT MMazarr
Very struck by recent analysis + reporting that highlights a riskhighly uncertain but not so far widely discussedof a significant escalation of the Ukraine war in coming weeks. What it means, and what it implies for US policy, are not at all clear
twitter.com/MMazarr/status/1519160808172888067
Thread on escalation.
It got this simple response which sums things up:
Edward Hunter Christie AT EHunterChristie
1/5 I keep on feeling underwhelmed by commentary which puts great stress on fear and on escalation risks without clarity on concrete scenarios and concrete alternatives. It's simple: if Russia attacks NATO, the Alliance goes to war against Russia. There is no dilemma.
The #Kremlin forced the current war upon the world. For NATO nations to do nothing to help Ukraine would be not only unconscionable, but also strategically blind, in terms of deterring future wars, and in terms of upholding international norms of the highest value to us.
As a result we are compelled to assist Ukraine materially. It is an important Western interest to massively raise Ukraine's chances of survival and Russia's probability of defeat. However we refrain from outright intervention as we aim not to expand the scope of the war.
So now the fear: what if RUS attacks a NATO Ally? We will have no choice, we will fight back. We would then be just like the Ukrainians: there is no bargaining with an aggressor who razes your cities and murders your civilians. There is only subjugation or defiance.
So, there is no dilemma and the trajectory is already clear. We will not attack Russia. The choice of escalation is entirely with Moscow. And if they make that choice, our response will be devastating. Keep calm and arm Ukraine. And don't watch Russian TV.
And then that reply got this response:
Phillips P. OBrien AT PhillipsPOBrien
This is a point worth examining. We have lots of stress on what if Russia goes for societal mobilization now (normally by the way by those who argued that Russia would conquer Ukraine quickly). However, societal mobilization is not easy under the best of conditions.
Still voices speak (without evidence) that Russia is some large military power that can almost dictate terms in Ukraine. This article in AT guardian
might be the worst. No evidence given on Russian strength, but an assumption Russia can fight a long war.
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/apr/27/ukraine-war-end-putin-russia-talks?utm_term=Autofeed&CMP=twt_gu&utm_medium&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1651068194
(RTB - the above article is written by former BBC journalist Angus Roxburgh - who then got work working for the Kremlin!)
Phillips P. OBrien AT PhillipsPOBrien
People seem to be forgetting that societal mobilization and long war has enormous political, economic and military risks for Russia. Its not just about calling soldiers to the ranks--its about training them and equipping them. Russia is not in the best position to do this at all.
Russia has no training system to handle some mass infusion of untrained personnel. They already have called up this year's normal conscript soldiers (Only 135k because of Russia's demographic crisis) and they are right now being trained.
If they want to train more--they need to set up a training system first to handle more soldiers. This normally takes many months in an efficient system. Only once you have the training system, can you start actually creating your new army.
Just as an example, it takes the US in WWII, even with preparations under way. more than 6 months to start expanding significantly its pool of trained personnel. and its not til more than a year that the numbers really take off.
So the Russians need to train the trainers, then train the new soldiers. According to this AT ISW report, Russian training takes somewhere between 3-6 months.
So under exceptionally efficient systems, you might expect a large army expansion with well trained soldiers in 9 months. Could RUssia do that--doubtful. Probably poorly trained, unmotivated conscripts could be produced, but thats it.
Then you have to equip them. Again, all this blase talk about Russia going to full mobilization misses the fact that Russia is economically weak and now operating under sanctions.
The Russians are already suffering shortfalls in replenishment. It would again take a very efficient and well planned economy to ramp up production under these sanctions. SO arming the new mass army with new weapons will be hard.
Sure, they can get all their oodles of equipment that has been sitting around in storage for years, not being maintained, etc. Their front line stuff has already shown weaknesses. Imagine what the second-line stuff is like
So Russian mobilization requires the establishment of a training system that doesnt exist and the growth of arms production that is being crippled. It would also require an admission by the Russian government that they are losing the war. Thats a political risk.
Is interesting to note that when they called up this year's conscripts, they said they would not be sent to Ukraine. There are stories of RUssian army recruitment stations being burned too. Will people actually want to fight and die in this war? Questionable.
And while the Russians are assembling this force of hastily untrained, not well equipped, and politically questionable conscripts to fight in a war that they have been calling a great success--the Ukrainians will be getting more and better equipment from NATO.
Ukraine is already upgrading its training and will beat the Russians to the punch by getting better prepared soldiers to the front lines months earlier--and thats if Russia acts now.
So understand Russian societal mobilization is not something that can be simply bandied about. It requires action and preparation that the Russian government is clearly reluctant to do. Stop talking about it like its easy and Russia is some large power. Neither is true.
And Russia has to start now. Waiting till May 9 is even too late. Ukraine has already started its societal mobilisation in training and equipment.