@Igotjelly
This is where I’m a bit confused, there is talk of the US/UK and/or others providing security guarantees to Ukraine as part of any deal. In what way is that better for Russia than Ukraine being in NATO?
I've got to say, Im beginning to read a split within EU / NATO about how far each country is prepared to go.
The Czech, Slovak and Polish PMs went to Kiev. They have one important thing in common and empathise with Ukraine in ways others can not.
The Polish wanted to give the MIGs. And were trying to persuade others before the US said No.
Meanwhile the British trained up the Ukrainians are were in Ukraine prior to the war in some capacity. We've also been some of the most hawkish in terms of the military equipment we've supplied.
Meanwhile the Germans are pretty silent and only reluctantly have agreed to many of the sanctions.
The French havent exactly gone much further and Macron seems to be having a bromace with Putin on speed dial.
The Latvians, Lithuanians, Finns and Sweden are thinking about their own borders and are more worried than others.
The US have been harsh and pushing on the sanctions and diplomacy but seem reluctant on the military side of things.
Theres now talk of the UK being the one to support the Ukrainians with a military alliance (note Putin got most pissy with the UK)
And then Ive seen this thread today which starts to give some incite into the differences economically.
Mujtaba Rahman @mij_europe
Senior EU officials have an incredibly dire assessment about likely trajectory of Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine over next few weeks. But there is no appetite among member states - bar Poland & Baltics - for energy import bans against Russia coal, oil & certainly not gas 1/
Some reasons: 1) we've done a lot & need to digest/assess impact; 2) first need to see details of @EU_Commission plan in May on Russia energy decoupling (Versailles statement); 3) wariness about implications of further oil price spikes for developing economies reeling from Covid 2/
4) Need to hold some sanctions in reserve; 5) need ability to sustain those in place over time as > costs hit EU populations/economies; 6) lots else EU can still do eg blocking Russian shippers access to EU ports; oligarch listings/assets; expanding SWIFT; trade restrictions etc 3/
There is also growing annoyance viz Poland in EU capitals/Brussels who believe Warsaw's constant agitating for oil and gas sanctions minimises the significance of the measures that have already been taken and the costs to member states these will entail 4/
Warsaw's tactics to get EU capitals to move on oil/gas are also counter-productive: initially opposing a deal on carbon taxes (CBAM); on OECD minimum-tax; holding last week's Versailles meeting hostage by demanding a carve-out for coal from its energy/climate transition etc.. 5/
Biological/chemical weapons or the targeted, limited use of nuclear weapons would be a clear red line. Otherwise, the expectation of most senior officials in Bxl/EU capitals is that for now, the EU will escalate only the quantity - not quality - of sanctions 6/
But the transmission mechanism - whether President @ZelenskyyUa can keep mobilising global public opinion, in turn forcing EU leaders to move much further on sanctions policy than they would like, will be key 7/
Then, the devastation of more Ukrainian cities including Kyiv, Russian attacks on humanitarian corridors, mass killings of civilians, an "accidental" missile strike in a NATO member could all serve as poss triggers for EU leaders = quicker movement on coal, oil - & as a last resort, gas 8/
A phased approach is also under consideration - "a coalition of the willing" - so member states with less dependence on Russian coal & oil would move first in response to any of the above, while those whom are more dependent would keep using Russian energy in the short term 9/
But overall, the very clear mood among member states is to pause & expand incrementally. The threshold for energy import bans is very high. Reinforced by the fact the Versailles discussion staged by France on more common fiscal borrowing/support ended badly (more on this later)
ENDS
So basically it sounds like France, Germany and rest Western EU are a lot more softer touch on both military and economic options.
The US is hard on the economics but lighter on the military. And going harder on the other international diplomacy.
The UK is a mixed bag. It was slow on some sanctions but is increasing and keen to keep watertight legally but doesn't go far enough on personal sanctions but is harder on broader sanctions (fuel and payments). But is one of the most hawkish.
Meanwhile Eastern European countries are much more nervous, with Poland being the most determined on all fronts.
My feeling is the UK are the only one willing / able to put anything forward in support at this time in terms of military support and capability. The US is much more reluctant to commit, whilst others are either more reliant on the US or plain Doves.
Incidentally given the UK were already training Ukrainians prior to the war, this wouldn't be a massive departure from that policy. It would be a step up, yes but not as much as it might seem on the face of it.
I also get the impression that the UK is trying to persuade others to be prepared to act alone outside Nato because they is a lack of consensus going on.
Could be wrong but thats my reading.