[quote Jisforjelly]@Tuba437
To me it doesn't seem at present that both Nato and Russia have a clear line of them not wanting us to get involved and us having no intentions of getting involve
Do you mean does here instead of doesn’t?[/quote]
I think this is a really crucial point.
NATO want to push things as far as they can, but they aren't sure where that point is firmly.
Its a question of 'just how far can I push this' on both sides.
Hence my above point about a major miscalculation by either side.
The fact that there's now noises about chemical weapons being a line for NATO is interesting. Not a full commitment but a growling.
The US backed off the MiGs too. I think for similar reasons.
The talk today about Wagner, is to take heat off Western 'Off The Books' military action. There is almost an 'understanding' that its going on, but neither party gains much from saying its a 'red line' either.
Russia KNOWS it can not take on more military action on the ground. It does not have the capacity for it. Equally the West KNOWS it can not directly engage either because it can't win a direct war with Russia. Its precisely why they've been fighting proxy wars under the radar for years. That dead lock is the thing that stops things spreading.
Putin doesn't want to take something on, which isn't on his terms in terms of preparedness. (And actually to an extent vice versa). Putin is not prepared militarily, economically or politically to escalate at present. He must consolidate first, if he intends to escalate.
The problem is that now the situation is meaning things are spreading in various ways. And nationalistic and anti-Russian extremes are going to be sensitive to those encroachments.
We know the Americans clearly have some dialogue going on through back channels at lower level which probably will help to identify red lines.
I think when the growling between the two starts its not necessarily an indicator that something will happen. The public are widely misunderstanding this growling. Its nervy and unsettling but its about establishing the others boundaries too. Its a setting out of these lines. Like the Cuban Missile Crisis.
As I said yesterday, I felt noises yesterday were about an acknowledgement of a prolonged conflict being a possible scenario, but I think they will try for a full crack at Kyiv too first as a gamble to try and avoid that. That suggests Russians are suddenly trying to work out alternative plans themselves. They are 'war gaming' possible next moves.
I do wonder if they have almost got themselves in a pickle with it after weighing it up. Its possible the calculation is that they will be able to raise Kyiv more in a scorched earth strategy but at a heavy cost and they won't be able to take it. They've got to weigh up how far they go with that, because they also can't just decide to turn around and go back either. The stuff I've seen suggests they would need pretty much their entire force they have in the whole of Ukraine to encircle Kyiv - thats not considering actively taking it. So how much are they willing to commit to Kyiv, knowing that?
They may well be putting up a trial ballon to see if chemical warfare is something they could get away with or would provoke further intervention. (My guess - if they do, those MiGs will appear and theres almost something of an understanding going on with this without an outright declaration of war likely as a next step).
Attacking hospitals is about breaking will and morale of Ukrainians. Its effective. But it also has other effects like reinforcing Western determination and resolve.
I DO worry that they will use chemical weapons. Especially if Putin is getting frustrated and the soliders have more pretty on them to be even more brutal. He has used them. So whether he would isn't in doubt. What's in doubt is whether he would see it as beneficial to him strategically... BIG difference. I worry because I wonder about Western commitment and whether Putin does see he could gain an overall advantage from chemical weapons. The problem for the West is that every escalculation has to be justifiable and be proportionate and in line with public opinion in the West.
'The fear' is a power in its own right and how its used is very relevant here. The whole cold war and nuclear deterrent is based on this idea of 'the fear' rather than actual military usefulness. In this era of warfare this applies not just to nukes though and its probably worth looking through that lens. Threats make the public fear. Democracies are beholden to fear of public opinion. Totalitarian regimes are well practised in using fear itself as a weapon of control.
(I'm probably wittering a bit now, but I hope that makes some sense).