www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/reexamining-putins-military-interventions-in-the-middle-east
Reëxamining Putin’s Military Interventions in the Middle East
Can Russia’s conduct in Syria and Libya predict what’s in store for Ukraine?
Interview with Anand Gopal, a contributing writer at The New Yorker, who has written extensively about the Syrian civil war
Some interesting extracts from the above article.
What else do you now see as their actual goals?
Well, it was clear that their first goal was to shore up the Assad regime, and shoring it up against what they viewed, I think, was the gravest threat to the regime, which wasn’t the jihadists but that democratic opposition. That’s why they directed the vast majority of their firepower against the democratic opposition. Since then, I think the aim was to end the war and then, two, to take advantage of the postwar environment. In particular, they were hoping to secure reconstruction contracts. So one of the things that Russia has wanted is to end the sanctions regime against Syria, and it was hoping to attract Western reconstruction money, which Russian companies would be in a favorable position to capitalize on.
In terms of the way the Russians fought the war, my sense of it is that they were effective fairly quickly in turning the tide of the war. Is that your sense, too? What was the sense on the ground in Syria of the quality of the Russian military operation?
Yeah, it was clear very quickly that it was a game changer. First, it was primarily because of Russia that the regime was able to retake all of Aleppo and then also was able to retake areas in the Damascus countryside that had been opposition strongholds. And they did this primarily through overwhelming air power. So their campaign in Syria was largely an air campaign. We think there were, and still are, thousands of Russian soldiers on the ground, but they weren’t really leading the fight. It was the Syrian regime conscripts that were leading the fight on the ground, but it was Russian air power that really changed the game. And they wielded their air power both in a more technologically sophisticated way than the Syrian regime and in a devastating way, where they were targeting not just rebel positions but markets, hospitals, schools, with, in many cases, huge civilian casualties in their attacks.
And
So it was part of the Russian strategy—to attack hospitals. And that was, I think, partly to break the morale of not just the rebel movement but the population. And also, of course, if you are fighting a war against an enemy and you destroy their health centers, then you make it difficult for them to reproduce themselves on the battlefield. So it got to a point where people in Idlib had to put their clinics literally underground. I saw hospitals that were underground because the Russians would target anything that looked like a humanitarian center or a hospital
How much do you think the success of Russia was connected to its brutality? Was the reason that it was able to be successful partly that it was willing to do these things and had air power? Or was there something else about the Russian intervention that you think made it kind of strategically valuable?
I think it really did come down to air power, and overwhelming air power. They had more than twenty thousand air strikes. This is an overwhelming amount of firepower that’s being brought to bear. And they’re not unique in this. This is the reason the United States was able to defeat isis, as well. The U.S. strategy and the Russian strategy are very similar: they are heavily reliant on air power with a small number of troops on the ground. And, in both cases, they were able to turn the tide against their respective enemies. It’s important to say that they were up against irregular forces, untrained forces, guerillas. It’s a very different question if we’re talking about facing a professional army equipped with anti-aircraft weaponry and an air force.
And
Circumstances are quite different here with Ukraine. You have a state that has air power. It has anti-aircraft weaponry, which is something the Syrians never had. Its war chest is much fuller than anything the Syrian rebels ever had. It’s almost a difference in kind in terms of the type of enemy that they’re facing now. So, I think, that probably accounts for the difference more than anything else.
And
And Russian-Iranian rivalry is increasing, because there’s a kind of scramble for the spoils after the war in terms of postwar reconstruction, in terms of contracts to exploit mineral resources, et cetera. Russia is supporting Rami Makhlouf, who is the richest man in Syria. He’s a magnate of the telecom industry. He used to be very close to Assad and has recently been pushed aside. And that’s seen by a lot of observers as the Iranians trying to move against some of the big businessmen of the regime to try to push their own guys in.
And
Russia intervened in Libya, as well, and was effectively arrayed against Turkish-backed forces, and they didn’t acquit themselves well on the battlefield there. So it seems to me that the Russians are not in as strong of a position as they would’ve hoped going into these interventions.
Few things for me here:
They are already somewhat tied up in Syria still - and also have rivalry with Iran over post war influence and economics there. (Nuclear Deal with Iran relevancy here)
Whilst West haven't gone for a no fly zone (part of the argument for this is they actually have had questionable effectiveness and don't address the problem of rockets/missiles. This is more of an issue if you can launch these from Belarus or Russia themselves. Discussions about No fly zones ignore this issue) they have certainly focused on trying to take out air attacks and the Russian haven't got air supremacy. The weapons the British have deployed have focused on this issue.
I think you have to ask a lot of questions about air supremacy still.
And again there is the point about deliberate targetting of humanitarian needs as a strategy. That is going to make any relief or humanitarian efforts nearly impossible.