Gems from the Trans Legal Project response to EHRC consultation

[MyAmpleSheep]

The Trans Legal Project's response to the open EHRC consultation is available here:
https://www.translegalproject.org/blog-1

I was going to write a more detailed critique of it, but realized that working through what seem to me to be all of the legal errors contained in it would about a weeks's work.

If this is tldr for you, then don't worry - you have nothing to fear from this organisation's response.

Here are some gems though (TLP text in bold, my comments underneath.)

Use of the term biological sex is confusing.
Uh, no, no it isn't.

What happens if the individual refuses to confirm their birth sex?
Then you don't have to let them in; same as if they refuse to tell you their name or age, if those are relevant and required to provide the service.

What happens if an individual does not know their birth sex (e.g. they are intersex)?
People with DSD's know their biological sex, even if they later turn out to be mistaken. An honest mistake as to one's biological sex is exculpatory for using the wrong service. If any person is not sure, then they can take the trouble to find out.

How does a service provider determine the individual has answered objectively falsely if the individual has made a full medical and legal transition?
There's no such thing as a "full" medical transition, but if someone lies about their biological sex then they're just lying liars who lie. Just like someone who lies about their age, or other relevant condition of entry. Just because some people are lying liars, it doesn't invalidate the idea of responsibly confirming that your service is being used by the correct people.

What about trans people who “pass”? Based on this example those trans people who “pass” are permitted to use single-sex services
No, they're really not. If a "passing" trans person sneaks into a service for someone not of their biological sex, they're lying liars who lie, and shouldn't be there. No further consequences flow. See my previous point.

Following FWS, anyone who experiences sexual attraction is now bisexual.
This is too stupid to comment on further.

There needs to be a new example showing that trans women who breastfeed are protected by the pregnancy and maternity protections on the basis of case law.
Trans women can't breastfeed in the correct sense of the term.

First, a women’s group can choose to admit cisgender and transgender women. It is not direct sex discrimination as individuals of both legal sexes are admitted.
It is direct sex discrimination. A group that allows in all white people and only black people who shave their heads is still directly discriminating on the grounds of race, even though some black people are admitted. Similarly, a single token Irish person in your service is not a failsafe talisman to prove you're incapable of unlawful discrimination against Irish people (nationality).

Third, although single legal sex women’s organisations are possible in law, they are impossible in practice. The reason is that if the association does not check the birth sex of everyone who joins, they risk allowing a trans woman to join and losing the protection of the single-characteristic exception.
No, they're really not impossible in practice. If an organization confirms prior to membership with an applicant that their biological sex is female, and takes reasonable steps to confirm this, then its protection against a claim for unlawful discrimination is not diminished by the fraudulent membership of lying people who lie.

There should also be an example that it is unlawful when a single-sex women’s association tries to restrict membership to only same-sex attracted people as only single-sex characteristic associations are allowed. There seems to be a belief that lesbian only associations are lawful under the EA 2010; they are not.
Explicitly, associations for members who share more than one protected characteristic are permitted. That someone in authority could write that lesbian-only associations are unlawful under the EA2010 is quite ... surprising.

Many trans men take testosterone and pound for pound are as strong as cisgender men. Concerns about the safety of trans men taking part are misfounded and transphobic.
If a sporting body is unworried about the safety of women entering men's sport, they can permit them to do so, and it would be called a mixed category. Nobody is suggesting that's unlawful.

Trans women who play women’s sport these days tend to have to meet strict eligibility requirements. They are unlikely to have a significant advantage. If they do, it will be almost impossible to prove they have the advantage because they are trans.
They have a significant advantage not because they are trans but because they are men.

A domestic violence support group set up separately for men and women under sched. 3 para. 26(2). is being setup on the basis of bio-segregation. But trans men and women would not be able to attend the group for their lived sex due to the operation of the law and it would be completely inappropriate in practice for them to attend the group matching their birth sex. Indeed, if they were permitted to attend groups matching their birth sex the rational for separate sex groups would be undermined and para. 26 would not apply. As a result, trans people would be completely excluded from the service. Completely excluding trans people from the service would not be proportionate so para. 26 could not apply.

Completely excluding trans people from a service could absolutely be proportionate, if to include them in the service provided for either sex would make that service insufficiently effective, and providing a separate service for trans people is impractical (such as insufficient numbers for a group service.) For the same reason that a women's refuge service is not also obliged to provide a parallel men's refuge service. Schedule 3 para 28 explicitly permits a service provider to discriminate against gender-reassigned people in the context of single- and seperate-sex services, if a proportionate means to a legitimate purpose.

Trans women have been placed in women’s hospitals wards for over 50 years without issue. Further, every year thousands of cisgender men are placed in women’s wards due to pressure on the NHS. As a result, excluding all trans women from a women’s ward is not proportionate and the sched. 3 para. 27 exception cannot be used.
Excluding all "trans women" from a women's ward is explicit in the meaning of a women's ward. Historical failure correctly to place patients in single-sex wards doesn't excuse the practice.

The example should explain that a bio-segregated hospital ward is unlawful and instead a trans inclusive women’s ward should be operated instead.
I make no further comment on the claim that a single-sex ward is illegal.

. Gyms, changing rooms and hospital wards are not examples where a bio-segregated service is lawful.
Again, no further comment from me on the proposition that single-sex changing rooms are illegal.

First, this example stereotypes all Muslim women as being hostile to trans women and as such is racist. There are many varied Muslim communities, only some of which have transphobic views.
Objecting to a male person in a female changing room is not demonstrating hostility. To suggest that "only some" Muslim communities have transphobic views appears to be engaging in the same racism the author imagines in the EHRC text.

Imagine a trans man who has fully transitioned and is every inch a man.
Except the inches that count, eh? Nudge nudge, wink wink...

There's a lot more on the single-sex services section which mostly consists of repeating the same points (not unreasonably, given the way the consultation is structured) but I don't feel like typing out the comments again and again, and this post is already too long.

As I said, I don't think we have too much to worry about from this organisation's submission.

There’s no such thing as “gender identity” in the Equality Act. Men who identify as women and have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment are transsexual men.

It is sex discrimination against men. They are being treated less favourably than women. As only some men are admitted. And the single sex exemption cannot be claimed, 'cos it's not.

I don’t think you can say categorically that other men don’t have a discrimination claim @PlanetJanette- it’s your opinion, and some legal commentators disagree, while others agree with you.

PlanetJanette So even if you were correct that if the sign on the door says 'women', that must mean only biological women, the way that venues can operate trans inclusive facilities or services, if they choose to, is by being clear that they are open to women based on gender identity, rather than women based on biological sex.

Surely the way that venues can operate trans inclusive facilities or services, if they choose to, is simply by providing additional facilities or services that are not designated as 'women's' or 'men's', if they choose to?

To take the example of toilets: a women's toilet, reserved for biological women; a men's toilet, reserved for biological men; a third accessible toilet, reserved for people with disabilities; a fourth, a building-regs-compliant 'universal' toilet, open to anybody, of either sex, however they identify.

That seems straightforward enough - what's gender got to do with it?
[there's your Tina Turner earworm of the day, folks]

I think the general common law principle is for inclusion at all times for everyone. I think someone running a madey uppy pretend single sex space based on madey uppy legally incorrect definition of that sex, especially when the presence of the opposite sex (as legally defined) will likely be experienced as harassment by the legitimate users of the space, is on dodgy ground, personally. It will not be seen as a single sex space in law, because it isn’t one. And it isn’t a fully mixed sex space. So on what legal basis can it opt out of inclusion of everyone?

The only way to avoid sex discrimination is to make the test the same for both sexes. But if the test is GI, discrimination against transmen is unavoidable. And illegal.

Yes. That would be one approach venues would be legally free to take.

As would the approach I've set out.

You don't need a legal basis to exclude people based on things that aren't protected characteristics. There is no 'common law principle for inclusion at all times for everyone'.

Hang on, so you're now claiming that it's trans men that are going to be challenging trans inclusive facilities and services based on discrimination?

That's nonsense.

>Someone who has not undergone Gender Reassignment cannot claim discrimination on the basis of lack of gender reassignment.

Actually they can. The EA2010 doesn't permit positive discrimination on a protected ground (except disability), either. Shock horror! It's unlawful to discriminate against "cis people" too. Why would you think otherwise?

This is very clear in the EA2010 definition of direct discrimination:
section 13 "person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others."

It doesn't say B has to be the one to have (or be thought to have) the protected characteristic.

Note especially that 13(3) explicitly permits positive discrimination only on the grounds of disabliity:
"If the protected characteristic is disability, and B is not a disabled person, A does not discriminate against B only because A treats or would treat disabled persons more favourably than A treats B."

Two further points:

Even if blue dot person (the non GR male) couldn't argue discrimination on the grounds of GR, he can still argue discrimination by sex.

And yellow dot person (not shown on the diagram) who is a GR female ("trans woman") can also sue for GR discrimination.

So in summary you're wrong, and even if you're right, single gender services are still not lawful.

Funny. I was told there was by quite a legally expert TRA. Anyway, I don’t set any great store by your personal opinion about anything and I’m not particularly convinced by your reasoning so we’ll have to agree to disagree.

Exactly, as @MyAmpleSheep says they would be onto an even more sticky wicket excluding biological females who identify as men from their pretend women only space.

I think we’re moving into “the Equality Act is only words on paper and doesn’t apply anywhere in real life so we can safely ignore it and anything the Supreme Court says about the meanings of those words” territory.

That’s the impression I’m getting, anyway.

Agree @borntobequiet

There is no such thing as a 'cisgender man' in any law. Sex is biological in meaning, whether you identify as a 'different gender' or not.

The vast majority of large organisations or venues already have single sex facilities regardless of the age of the building.

Nope. It is not in the presentation of the Ruling by Lord Hodge and I cannot find anything about doors or symbols or dresses in the Ruling. It might be in there somewhere but alluded to rather than directly stated.

Transcript - For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16

16 April 2025

https://youtubetotranscript.com/transcript?v=XxHtbTragtg&current_language_code=en

Court officer: Judgment in the matter of For Women Scotland v The Scottish Ministers.

Lord Reed: When we announce our decision in this case in a moment, some people here will be pleased and others will be disappointed.

Whatever your feelings may be, please respect the dignity of these proceedings by remaining silent until the Court has adjourned.

Lord Hodge will explain the decision of the Court.

Lord Hodge: The principal issues raised on this appeal are questions of statutory interpretation.

The two United Kingdom statutes which we are interpreting are the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the Equality Act 2010. The Court is well aware of the strength of feeling on all sides, which lies behind this appeal.

On the one hand, women who make up one half of our population have campaigned for over 150 years to have equality with men and to combat discrimination based on their sex. That work still continues.

On the other hand, a vulnerable and often harassed minority, the trans community, struggle against discrimination and prejudice as they seek to live their lives with dignity.

Lesbian women who have historically suffered marginalisation because of their sexual orientation have entered the debate.

It is not the task of this Court to make policy on how the interests of these groups should be protected. Our role is to ascertain the meaning of the legislation which Parliament has enacted to that end.

The central question on this appeal is the meaning of the terms woman and sex in the Equality Act 2010.

Do those terms refer to biological women or biological sex?

Or is a woman to be interpreted as extending to a trans woman with a gender recognition certificate? By that, I mean a person born male, who now possesses a gender recognition certificate amending her gender to female. And sex to be interpreted as including what I will refer to as certificated sex.

The unanimous decision of this Court is that the terms woman and sex in the Equality Act 2010 refer to a biological woman and biological sex.

But we counsel against reading this judgment as a triumph of one or more groups in our society at the expense of another. It is not.

As I shall explain later in this hand down speech, the Equality Act 2010 gives transgender people protection, not only against discrimination, through the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, but also against direct discrimination, indirect discrimination and harassment in substance in their acquired gender. This is the application of the principle of discrimination by association. Those statutory protections are available to transgender people, whether or not they possess a gender recognition certificate.

The questions which this Court addresses have arisen in this way. The Scottish Parliament has sought to increase the representation of women on the boardsof public bodies by enacting the [Gender Representation on] Public Boards (Scotland) Act 2018. I will refer to that Act as 'the 2018 Act'.

The current challenge relates to the statutory guidance which the Scottish Government issued in 2022, following a successful legal challenge to the statutory definition of a woman in the 2018 Act and to the original statutory guidance. In the revised guidance, the Scottish Government, relying on its interpretation of the Equality Act 2010, asserts that woman, for the purposes of the 2018 Act, includes a trans woman who possesses a full gender recognition certificate, acknowledging her acquired sex as that of a woman.

The campaigning charity, For Women Scotland, challenge the legality of that statutory guidance and submit that it is both wrong in law and beyond the competency of the Scottish Government.

This challenge was rejected by both the Outer House and the Inner House of the Court of Session in Edinburgh. The courts held that section 9(1) of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which I'll now refer to as 'the GRA', had the effect that a person with a gender recognition certificate was entitled to be treated in law as having his or her acquired gender for all purposes. They addressed section 9(3) of the GRA, which provides that the rule in section 9(1) is, and I quote, "subject to provision made by this Act or any other enactment or any subordinate legislation".

The courts held that section 9(3) has effect only if the terms and context of the subsequent enactment require it to be interpreted as disapplying the section 9(1) rule. They held that the Equality Act 2010, which I'll now refer to as 'the EA', did not require such an interpretation except possibly in the provisions relating to pregnancy and maternity.

For Women Scotland, appeal to this Court. Their appeal is opposed by the Scottish Ministers.

We have also had the benefit of submissions from four interveners.

First, there is Sex Matters, a campaigning charity, which argued cogently for the biological interpretation of the words woman and sex in the EA.

Secondly, the Lesbian Project and the LGB Alliance, which are also campaigning charities, pointed out the anomalies, which would adversely affect lesbians if those terms were interpreted as certificated sex rather than biological sex.

Thirdly, we had submissions from the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which I'll refer to as 'the EHRC', a British public body, which has advised the Scottish Government on the interpretation of the EA. The EHRC supported the Scottish Government's interpretation of the EA, but expressed concerns about anomalies in the operation of that Act and concluded that the EA needed to be amended by Parliament.

Fourthly, Amnesty International UK provided submissions on human rights issues relevant to the appeal.

We are grateful to all the interveners for their assistance.

In a judgment written by Lady Rose, Lady Simler and me, with whom Lord Reed and Lord Lloyd Jones agree, we unanimously allow the appeal.

It's a long judgment as the Court analyses the GRA and the EA in considerable detail. In a hand-down address, I can only give a brief description of the reasoning.

The Court explains the principles which apply to statutory interpretation, including the need to give a coherent meaning to an Act of Parliament.

By way of historical background, we point out that the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, which is the relevant statutory predecessor of the EA, adopted a biological interpretation of the terms man and woman.

The Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999, which I'll call 'the 1999 Regulations', introduced a new protected characteristic of gender reassignment, which protects those who intend to undergo, are undergoing, or have undergone a process of gender reassignment. The 1999 Regulations did not alter the definitions of man or woman in the Sex Discrimination Act.

The judgment then addresses two central questions.

The first is the meaning of the GRA. As I have said, the Scottish courts applied the rule in section 9(1) of the GRA to the definition of woman in the EA as they didn't interpret the EA as qualifying that rule.

So the first question is therefore, what is the meaning and effect of section 9(3) of the GRA? The Court rejects the submission that for section 9(3) to operate, it is necessary to find an express statutory provision disapplying section 9(1) or that the other statute by necessarily implication, disapplies the section 9(1) rule. We hold that all that is required is that the words of the other legislation, when interpreted carefully in their context and having regard to their purpose, are found to be inconsistent with that rule.

That conclusion leads on to the second central question, which is whether the provisions of the EA are inconsistent with the rule in section 9(1) of the GRA. Answering that question involves a painstaking analysis of those provisions. Having conducted that analysis, which takes up the majority of our judgment, the Court has concluded that the provisions of the EA are inconsistent with the rule in section 9(1) of the GRA. We have summarised our reasoning in paragraph 265 of the judgment.

The principal elements of our reasoning can be summarised in the following nine points.

First, the EA enacts group-based protections against discrimination on the grounds, among others, of sex and gender reassignment and imposes duties of positive action on employers and others.

Secondly, the EA must be interpreted in a clear and consistent way so that those on whom the Act imposes obligations can identify the groups which share a protected characteristic.

Thirdly, interpreting sex as certificated sex would cut across the definitions of man and woman in the EA and thus the protected characteristic of sex in an incoherent way. It would create heterogeneous groupings.

Fourthly, as a matter of ordinary language, the provisions relating to sex discrimination, and especially those relating to pregnancy and maternity, and to protection from risks specifically affecting women, can only be interpreted as referring to biological sex.

Fifthly, we reject the suggestion that these words can bear a variable meaning so that in the provisions relating to pregnancy and maternity, the EA is referring to biological sex only while elsewhere, it refers to certificated sex as well. This undermines the coherence of the statute.

Sixthly, the interpretation favoured by the EHRC and the Scottish Ministers would create two subgroups within those who share the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, giving trans persons who possess a gender recognition certificate greater rights than those who do not. Those seeking to perform their obligations under the Act would have no obvious means of distinguishing between the two subgroups to whom different duties were owed, particularly since they could not ask persons whether they had obtained a gender recognition certificate as that information is private.

Seventhly, the certificated sex interpretation would also seriously weaken the protections given to those with the protected characteristic of sexual orientation, for example, by interfering with their ability to have lesbian-only spaces and associations.

Eighthly, other provisions will function properly only if sex is interpreted as biological sex. Those provisions include separate spaces and single-sex services, including changing rooms, hostels, and medical services, and communal accommodation.

And ninthly, similar incoherence and impracticability arise in the operation of provisions relating to single-sex characteristic associations and charities, women's fair participation in sport, the operation of the Public Sector Equality Duty, and the armed forces.

Standing back, we note that the EHRC has advised the United Kingdom Government of problems created by the certificated sex interpretation of the EA. Those problems include several matters in the nine points which we have described.

In our view, the absence of coherence within the statute, and the practical problems which arise, demonstrate that that interpretation is not correct.

It follows that the interpretation of woman in the Scottish Government guidance on the 2018 Act is incorrect, and the challenge to that guidance succeeds.

It also follows that the 2018 Act, correctly interpreted, is within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.

Finally, as I flagged up earlier, the correct interpretation of the EA as referring to biological sex does not cause disadvantage to trans people, whether or not they possess a gender recognition certificate. Trans people have the rights which attach to the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.

In addition, as we explain between paragraphs 248 and 263 of the judgment, they have protection against direct discrimination, harassment and indirect discrimination by association with members of the sex with which they identify.

A trans woman can bring a claim alleging sex discrimination because she is perceived to be a woman or by her association with women. It is now well-established that direct discrimination because of a protected characteristic encompasses not only cases where the complainant affected by discrimination has the protected characteristic in question, but also where the discriminator perceives that the claimant has the characteristic, or in some way associates the complainant with the protected characteristic.

A trans woman is similarly protected against harassment under section 26 of the Equality Act.

Further, the principle of discrimination by association remains part of our law. See section 19A of the EA, and protects transgender people against indirect discrimination, regardless of whether they possess gender recognition certificates. A certified sex reading is not required to achieve any relevant purpose in relation to indirect discrimination.

For these reasons, the Court allows the appeal.

Lord Reed: The Court will now adjourn.

=======

NOTE: "particularly since they could not ask persons whether they had obtained a gender recognition certificate as that information is private."

This is incorrect.

"a minor error: the Court says that the duty-bearer cannot ask whether someone has a GRC. That is a widespread belief, but one which has no foundation in law."
Naomi Cunningham
15 May 2025
https://www.strath.ac.uk/humanities/lawschool/blog/genderdoesntmatter/

As long as the same admission rules are applied to the sexes equally.

Which in the case of your Genderclub means:

All men and women wanting to come in are asked if they identify as Femme on the inside

Or

All men and women wanting to come in are to assumed identify as Femme on the inside

Note no reliance here on the PC of "gender reassignment" nor on being a "woman" It's specifcally "do you feel like a Femme on the inside". An analogy would be a Furry club, both sexes welcome but the Furry test applies the same way to both.

All organisations have to provide toilet facilities. 'Gender Identity' is meaningless when it comes to biological function. Organisations provide facilities for people to go to the toilet, and to attend to other biological and bodily functions.

Toilets are provided based on biological reality and need, not on a concept that most people neither understand nor relate to. What would be the point in that - other than in trying to make a political comment and show tribal credentials. If an organisation wants to have a facility that is mixed sex and inclusive to all...then it will need to be compliant.

The problem with claiming "you can discriminate on the grounds of gender identity because it isn't a PC" is that a) gender identity is not legally defined and b) it's SO CLOSE to gender reassignment:
Billy is a man who says his gender identity is that of a woman. He is allowed to go to the women's book club.
Fred is a man who has no gender identity. He claims he's been discriminated against on the grounds of gender reassignment because Billy can go to the women's book group and he can't.
but but but GI isn't a PC so Fred hasn't been discriminated against on the grounds of not having the PC of gender reassignment.
However, since Billy is/is proposing to undergo "reassignment" while Fred isn't/is not proposing, it's irrelevant whether Billy and Fred share or don't share GI.
Everyone thinks Billy has the PC of GR (even if Billy just says he's a woman and has decided to do nothing about it) and everyone thinks Fred doesn't.
So Fred has been discriminated against on the grounds of a perceived PC.

It would be the same as saying "you can come to this book group if you believe in the Flying Spaghetti Monster" when that's basically saying "you can come to this book group if you are an atheist" because although belief in the FSM is not WORIADS everyone knows (or even just thinks) it's shorthand for "not believing in sky fairies".
If you JUST had a book group for atheists you could probably get away with it (especially if you said we want to discuss theology books without the baggage of a belief in God), but if you said "all women, and atheist men" you couldn't. The other men are being discriminated against on the grounds of belief.

Incidentally, I'm deliberately avoiding the word Woman to label this gender identity because I think you could well find yourself on the wrong end of an indirect discrimination suit there given that Woman is typically going to be used for facilities that are true single sex, so men could well have a case that "yes but I meant Woman in a non-everyday sense that didn't exclude them, they only had to ask" is not a good faith inclusive stance but is in fact just disguised discouragement of men outside a select insider group who knows the rules.

So to recap, Self ID Mixed Sex Femme Genderclub is totally fine as long as you don't try to pretend it's got anything to do with Women.

I think everyone, genuinely, can get behind that and good luck to you! Frankly it's exactly the sort of truly inclusive, truly progressive thing TRAs could have been promoting all along if you hadn't all got yourselves all obsessed with taking over women's spaces 😘

Apologies if this has already been posted.

Michael Foran, whose opinion is cited by the SC in their judgement so he is probably worth listening to, says this:

"the Code should include some examples of where providing a mixed-sex service will amount to unlawful sex discrimination, particularly against women. It should be made clear, using examples not just the text of the Code, where a trans inclusive policy could be unlawful.

Example:

A gym has two large rooms for communal changing. It has signs on the door to each room labelled “women” and “men” respectively but has a policy of allowing service users to use whichever changing room they feel most comfortable with. This is not a single- or separate-sex service for the purpose of Schedule 3 EqA. Several female users of the gym complain that they have not been provided with adequate changing facilities and that this puts them at a detriment compared to men because a mixed-sex changing facility exposes them to heightened risks of safety and privacy interference. This will very likely be unlawful sex discrimination."

EHRC Consultation Response
23 June 2025
https://knowingius.org/p/ehrc-consultation-response

"Once you put a sign on the door that the toilet is male or female, then a person of that sex could “reasonably object to the presence of a person of the opposite sex”.

Signs that say “male” or “female”, “men” or “women”, or use symbols meaning men and women communicate that this is a single-sex service, lawful under the Equality Act, and thus provided on the basis of biological sex. Individuals of the opposite sex should respect those rules, which lawfully exclude them"

Employers and service providers that do not provide single-sex toilets or that provide them in an ambiguous way (suggesting they can be used based on gender identity) are exposing themselves tothe risk of legal action.

While the Supreme Court did not expressly address the question of the Workplace Health and Safety Regulations, the same rationale would clearly apply, and therefore where the regulations refer to men and women, this is a reference to biological sex.

https://sex-matters.org/posts/single-sex-services/the-truth-about-toilets/#:~:text=Signs%20that%20say%20“male”%20or,rules%2C%20which%20lawfully%20exclude%20them.

I agree, I have no problem with the existence of Genderclub as long as Genderclub isn’t the single only club in town.

Self ID Mixed Sex Femme Genderclub is likely to have a practical problem though. Initially it will have a healthy population of women, including handmaids, with the femme GI. However, it is inevitable that the men with a very strong sexual fetish (eg some cross dressers, transbians, AGPs, voyeurs, exhibitionists, sissys) will simply self-declare a femme GI to get in. After a few weeks of that, I imagine a lot of the handmaids will be washing their hair as an alternative to Genderclub.
Men will destroy Femme Genderclub.

"I have pointed out that the obligation to have single sex facilities under the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 have not been interpreted one way or another as to whether they mean biological sex or not."

😂 🤣 😂

I pray that there is a court case to decide this, preferably financed by the Fox Killer's Crowdfunding efforts, in which our favourite trans-identifying lawyers represent the claimants and are required to explain and produce evidence of the existence of all known "gender identities".

This list is woefully lacking: no Moon Gender!!

https://helpfulprofessor.com/types-of-genders-list/

Hard pushed to select a favourite from that lot but in the running are:

30. Gender Apathetic
A person who is gender apathetic is someone who does not strongly lean towards identifying with one gender or another. Furthermore, they are often apathetic (or non-commital) about their attraction to one specific gender, meaning they are often bisexual.

54. Novigender
Novigender can be used to describe people who find it difficult to describe or understand how they experience gender. Novigender people may feel like their gender is ever-changing or hard to pin down.

74. Trigender
Trigender is a gender identity that refers to people who experience three genders: male, female, and something else that is neither of those two. This third gender can be a combination of both male and female, somewhere in between the two, or something entirely different. Trigender people may identify as any combination of genders, including but not limited to: agender, bigender, genderfluid, or pangender. Not all trigender people experience the same three genders in the same way.