Having read and reread this judgment, this is what I reckon as not even a pretend lawyer. Sorry it's long ...
This case was supposed to decide two issues. Issue 1 was whether Maya's belief is protected under the EA. Issue 2 was whether Maya's lack of belief in gender ideology was protected. The idea for issue 2 was that the judge would apply the Grainger test to gender ideology and if that belief was protected then so too would be Maya's lack of belief.
Tayler did not do this and I think this is the biggest weakness in this judgment.
Maya's interpretation of this belief is set out at 5.2: “Some people believe that everyone has an inner “gender”, which may be the same as or different to their sex at birth, and that gender effectively trumps sex, so that “trans men are men” and “trans women are women”. Typically such proponents believe that that “trans women are women” from the moment they identify as women (if not before)”
This is where Tayler fucks it up:
58. While the position is reasonably clear for religion and lack of religion – as they are specifically provided for in section 10(1) EqA, I consider the position is less clear for lack of belief. Section 10(2) provides that “reference to belief includes a reference to a lack of belief”. On that basis if one replaces the word “belief” with “lack of belief”, sub-section 2 could be considered to protect any “religious or philosophical lack of belief” – i.e. the lack of belief must be religious or philosophical, rather than the protection applying to anyone who does not hold a particular religious or philosophical belief. On that analysis the Granger Criteria are to be applied to the lack of belief. I consider this is a more logical analysis, at least in some cases. A person might well hold a religious or philosophical belief that murder is wrong. It would be surprising if not holding that belief was also protected, so, in effect, believing there is nothing wrong with murder is a protected characteristic. On my suggested analysis such a lack of belief in murder being wrong would not comply with the Granger Criteria and so would not be protected. Similarly, atheism would be protected because it is a philosophical lack of belief that corresponds with the Granger Criteria rather than merely because atheist are not adherents of the large number of protected religions.
He considers it less clear that a lack of a certain philosophical belief should require the philosophical belief itself to be protected.
He considers it to be a more logical analysis in some cases to apply the Grainger criteria only to the lack of belief and not to apply them to the belief itself.
The example he uses is a philosophical belief that murder is wrong. He is saying that the corresponding lack of belief that murder is wrong would not pass the Grainger test.
There are a couple of problems with his 'suggested analysis'.
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Murder is very badly illegal regardless of anybody's beliefs. There is no question of anyone being protected for manifesting their belief that murder is not wrong, because that would entail actual criminal crimes. This is such a fucking stupid example to use of a possible protected belief that it makes my head hurt.
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Tayler is inviting us to consider that TWAW just like murder is wrong. Gender ideology is not to be subjected to the Grainger test because it is self-evidently correct.
At 92. he concludes, In respect of the belief that the Claimant contends she does not hold, that everyone has a gender which may be different to their sex at birth and which effectively trumps sex so that trans men are men and transwomen are women. I consider that this is a good example of why, at least in certain circumstances, one needs to apply the Grainger criteria to the lack of belief, rather than the alternative belief. Believing that a trans woman is a woman does not conflict with the approach of the European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin, or the Gender Recognition Act, or involve harassment. It does not face the same issue of incompatibility with human dignity and fundamental rights of others as the lack of that belief does because that lack of belief necessarily involves the view that trans women are men. The lack of belief fails to meet the Grainger criteria.
But in many circumstances the absolute belief that TWAW does involve harassment of women and girls. In many cases it is incompatible with the human dignity and fundamental rights of women and girls.
This is why the protected characteristic of sex is never considered in this judgment.
This is why the unlawful harassment of women and girls, as a result of the absolute belief that TWAW, is never considered in this judgment. Because Tayler reckons that TWAW is as self-evidently correct as 'murder is wrong.'
At 84. Tayler says She goes so far as to deny the right of a person with a Gender Recognition Certificate to be the sex to which they have transitioned. I do not accept the Claimant's contention that the Gender Recognition Act produces a mere legal fiction. It provides a right, based on the assessment of the various interrelated convention rights, for a person to transition, in certain circumstances, and thereafter to be treated for all purposes as the being of the sex to which they have transitioned. In Goodwin a fundamental aspect of the reasoning of the ECHR was that a person who has transitioned should not be forced to identify their gender assigned at birth. Such a person should be entitled to live as a person of the sex to which they have transitioned. That was recognised in the Gender Recognition Act which states that the change of sex applies for “all purposes”. Therefore, if a person has transitioned from male to female and has a Gender Recognition Certificate that person is legally a woman. That is not something that the Claimant is entitled to ignore.
While it is true that GRA S.9 (1) basically says TWAW 'for all purposes', subsection (3) basically says, except for all the purposes outlined in this Act or any other purposes in other legislation.
TWAW except for sport
TWAW except for peerages and succession
TWAW except for parentage
TWAW except for occupational requirement
TWAW except for shared accommodation
TWAW except for single sex services
etc. etc.
The GRA very clearly creates a legal fiction. TWA clearly not W 'for all purposes' because look at all these purposes for which they are not.
Tayler's judgment seems to hinge on whether Maya's belief would lead her to harass someone with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.
At 30. he says it is a core component of her belief that she will refer to a person by the sex she considered appropriate even if it violates their dignity and/or creates an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. The approach is not worthy of respect in a democratic society.
However, at 27. Maya is quoted as saying, Of course in social situations I would treat any transwomen as an honourary female, and use whatever pronouns etc...I wouldn't try to hurt anyone's feelings but I don't think people should be compelled to play along with literal delusions like "transwomen are women"
At 30. Maya is quoted as saying, I would of course respect anyone’s self-definition of their gender identity in any social and professional context; I have no desire or intention to be rude to people.
And at 41. Tayler says, She would generally seek to be polite to trans persons and would usually seek to respect their choice of pronoun but would not feel bound to; mainly if a trans person who was not assigned female at birth was in a “woman’s space”, but also more generally.
(It's worth noting here that there is case law that says the use of an Equality Act exception cannot constitute harassment: www.gov.uk/employment-appeal-tribunal-decisions/the-reverend-canon-j-c-pemberton-v-the-right-reverend-richard-inwood-former-acting-bishop-of-southwell-and-nottingham-ukeat-0072-16-ba )
However rude Maya might have been about Gregor Murray there is no evidence that Maya has harassed, or would harass, anyone with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment because of her belief.
Judge Tayler's distaste for the term 'transsexual' leads him to wrongly interpret the protected characteristic of gender reassignment:
9. I will not use the term transsexual save where referring to its use in the Equality Act 2010 and case law.
60. The specific protection provide by the section to trans persons is limited and uses rather outmoded terminology.
The EA says:
(1) A person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if the person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person's sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex.
(2) A reference to a transsexual person is a reference to a person who has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.
Transsexual does not mean the same as transgender. For example non-binary is not covered. This is why the TRAs want gender reassignment changed to gender identity. See for example the discussion in the trans equality report:
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/39007.htm#_idTextAnchor245
Tayler cites P v S and Cornwall CC, and Goodwin v United Kingdom. Both of these cases are about the rights of transsexuals and in the case of Goodwin, post-operative transsexuals.
At 17.2 we learn that one of the respondent's witnesses is Clair Quentin who described themself as a “trans non-binary person”. So Quentin does not have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.
At para 25. Pips / Philip Bunce is quoted as saying “for me, being gender fluid means I am non-binary, at no fixed point on the gender expression spectrum. I personally have no desire to transition” Bunce does not have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.
Gregor Murray does not propose to undergo any sort of process, medical or otherwise. Murray has just stated that they is non-binary. Gregor Murray does not have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.
There is a thing called discrimination by perception where you can be discriminated against because someone wrongly perceives you to have a PC such as gender reassignment. This could happen to Quentin and could also possibly happen to Bunce, depending on what day of the week it was and also depending on the perpetrator knowing nothing about Bunce.
Not in a month of Sundays could this happen to Murray. Nobody sane could look at Murray and erroneously think, 'there goes a transsexual'.
There was one transsexual at the hearing - Kristina Harrison. Harrison has the PC of gender reassignment, unlike Quentin, Murray or Bunce. Yet Harrison's evidence was never mentioned in this judgment.
At paras 89-90 Tayler discusses Maya's failure to use 'they' for Murray and says:
I conclude from this, and the totality of the evidence, that the Claimant is absolutist in her view of sex and it is a core component of her belief that she will refer to a person by the sex she considered appropriate even if it violates their dignity and/or creates an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. The approach is not worthy of respect in a democratic society.
The bit that says violates their dignity ... or offensive environment is the EA definition of harassment based on a protected characteristic which Murray does not have.
Tayler is getting way ahead of the law here by interpreting gender reassignment in the EA as protecting people like Quentin, Murray and Bunce. His refusal to use the word transsexual also fails to make clear that the law does protect actual transsexuals like Kristina Harrison, albeit subject to many exceptions.