Retired US General Mark Kimmett has an opinion piece in the WSJ about expectations for the counter-offensive. I don't know what's behind his assessment that the actions is months away, but I do agree that one critical objective is to deliver a lot of very bad news to the Russian public that can't be dismissed by the propagandists. Getting into indirect fire range of Crimea will be huge psychologically and strategically.
What Ukraine Can Achieve in Its 2023 Counteroffensive - It wonβt take Crimea, but it needs to defeat Russian forces, seize key areas and seize momentum.
By Mark T. Kimmitt
April 26, 2023 12:36 pm ET
At Ramstein Air Base last week, the U.S. and its allies met and pledged more equipment and training for Ukraine. With the 2023 counteroffensive months off, analysts are discussing tactics, logistics, troop numbers and the effect of the βTeixeira leakβ on the critical element of surprise. They talked about timing of tank deployments and possible kickoff dates but not the most important question: What would a successful counteroffensive achieve?
President Volodymyr Zelenskyβs ultimate goalsβremoving Russian forces from Ukraine and restoring sovereignty over the whole of Ukraine, including Crimeaβare unlikely to be achieved in 2023. Instead, military operations in coming months should be seen as the first in a series of campaigns to reach Mr. Zelenskyβs objectives.
The Allied invasion of Europe in World War II required a series of campaigns to bring Germany to its knees. The Normandy landing was essential, but follow-on campaigns that broke through the German encirclement in France, the key 1945 battles known as the βrace to the Rhine,β and the fall of Berlin were needed to end the war. The counteroffensive in Ukraine should be seen in a similar mannerβnot as the final battle but an intermediate campaign in that direction.
In the 2023 counteroffensive, success can be measured by meeting three conditions. Russian forces must be decisively defeated, key terrain must be seized, and Ukrainians must have the momentum and support for follow-on campaigns.
While Vladimir Putinβs forces must be dealt a significant defeat, the purpose isnβt merely to reduce the size and strength of his military. The counteroffensive must also send a message to the people of Russia, its military, elites and Mr. Putinβs inner circle, that the war is unwinnable. Russia can bring to bear more forces and resources, but mass conscription and continued sanctions resulting from a significant military defeat will diminish public support.
Second, critical cities and ground must be retakenβwhat the military labels βseizing key terrain.β In contrast to Bakhmut, where no critical advantage to either side will be achieved by hoisting a flag over city hall, the counteroffensive must regain lands that are critical to the Russians and put Ukrainians in a stronger position for future operations. The most obvious are the lands east of Kherson and the cities of Melitopol, Berdiansk and Henichesk. If Ukrainian forces seize and control the routes to those cities, the land bridge from Crimea will be cut, Ukraine will again have access to the Azov Sea, and its troops, rockets and artillery will be able to attack targets south into Crimea and north into the Russian logistics lines. Further, this terrain is ideal for initiating more offensives.
A successful campaign will also reinvigorate allied support. Despite public pronouncements of βas long as it takes,β enthusiasm for the war is waning. The West wants to see a return on its investment and lately there has been little. That is due largely to months of perceived stalemate, an impasse at Bakhmut, and scant progress on the ground. The carnage on the front lines from artillery bombardments, the attacks on infrastructure and the lack of momentum may seed doubt about the utility of the war. But as the September 2022 offensives showed, a successful counteroffensive can generate enthusiasm, support and patience.
Well into the second year of fighting, the front lines look little different from the preinvasion lines set by the 2015 Minsk II Agreement. Time is on the side of the patient, and Mr. Putin shows no signs of haste. The allies recognize that a counteroffensive is necessary, but its objectives should be carefully considered.
This campaign alone wonβt end the war, but at a minimum it must inflict a massive defeat on Russian forces, in full view of the Russian people. It must take key terrain necessary for prosecuting follow-on campaigns. It must show the allies that Ukraine is a winnable war that wonβt drag on for years, and one worth continued investment to achieve Mr. Zelenskyβs aims. The coming counteroffensive will be a bloody, brutal series of battles, likely the largest to date, but its success will change the course of the war.
Mr. Kimmitt, a retired U.S. Army brigadier general, served as assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, 2008-09.