Here's an interesting opinion piece that ran in the WSJ. The author is a former CIA officer and is now a university professor.
Putin Wouldn’t Win a War of Attrition in Ukraine - He wants the West to think that’s his goal, but the longer the conflict drags on, the worse things get for Moscow.
By Douglas London
March 24, 2023 6:50 pm ET
Vladimir Putin seeks to prevail in Ukraine through an exhausting war of attrition in which he outlasts his opponents, or so the expert consensus has it. The U.S. is supplying weapons to Ukraine at a remarkably slow pace, perhaps for fear of provoking a calamitous Russian escalation. It seems as if Washington is playing right into Mr. Putin’s hands.But maybe not everything is as it seems. If I learned anything from decades as a Russian-speaking Central Intelligence Agency operations officer working against the Kremlin’s intelligence services, it was to be wary of anything they show you. This looks to me too convenient a narrative for Moscow, and one that’s belied by the facts.
Mr. Putin acts as if he doesn’t believe he can survive if he quits this conflict. But in reality, the war is existential only for the Ukrainian side. Ukrainians would suffer cultural genocide and war crimes if they gave in. Russia can walk away without serious consequences beyond its borders, and Mr. Putin knows it. He can ill afford for the Russian people to realize that they could not only overcome defeat, but never had to fight in the first place. But it’s not clear that the solution the Kremlin really wants is a war of attrition.
Can anyone, even Mr. Putin, imagine the Ukrainians quitting? If they lose external support, they still face an existential threat. It seems probable Ukraine would dig in and fight as long as it possibly could, even if the conflict devolved to guerrilla warfare in occupied streets.
Mr. Putin has to be accounting for this. He gambled wrong a year ago when he expected Ukrainian resolve to collapse quickly as Russian forces rolled in. Though he projects an inflexible image, Mr. Putin seems to still think like an intelligence officer. They rarely make the same mistake twice, particularly when they’ve been embarrassed. Were he really as reckless and blind to reality as he’s sometimes depicted, Russian forces wouldn’t have withdrawn from Kyiv’s outskirts a year ago. Mr. Putin has shown that he will bend when faced with serious consequences.
And that’s what a long war would entail. Mr. Putin might not grieve his heavy casualties, but they are embarrassing to the Kremlin and undermine his narrative of strength and military prowess. As Russian lines thin, he will feel increased pressure to expand mobilization beyond the rural and ethnic communities he has targeted to insulate his urban political base from the war’s consequences.
While some scoff at the effectiveness of Western economic sanctions, Moscow is furiously working to strengthen the ruble and find alternative consumers for the energy exports most of Europe has forsaken. But this still means lower profit, as Russia lures clients with increasingly discounted oil and gas. As the war endures, Mr. Putin will meet increasingly difficult choices between funding the conflict and improving the economy. And whatever military supplies Russia seeks from China, Iran and North Korea are hardly charitable donations—there’s no dictator’s discount. Even ruble remittances from new trade partners won’t help Mr. Putin pay off foreign debt held in U.S. dollars. And less income leaves less resources to dispense to those domestic political allies Mr. Putin needs to maintain control.
All this suggests that the longer the war endures, the worse things get for Moscow. Time allows Ukraine to deploy the sophisticated weapons now en route and the freshly trained Ukrainian operators returning from the West. More time will also enable the increased productivity of ammunition supply chains the U.S. is building. Add it all up, and Ukraine will likely have what’s needed for its much-anticipated counteroffensive. Mr. Putin may repulse those forces, but betting everything that he can is an immensely risky gamble. If Ukraine prevails, could he survive losing Crimea and having his forces violently pushed back across Russian borders?
Mr. Putin likely doesn’t hope for a war of attrition but wants the world to think he does. His disinformation campaigns have been designed to depict himself, and Russia, as stronger than they are. If he faces an unwinnable war, the best outcome he can hope for is to mask that weakness and intimidate his foes into blinking first. Ukraine may not want to give up, but if an outside power can broker a peace deal, that is Mr. Putin’s best option by a long shot. His openness to China’s lopsided peace proposal suggests that he is eager to fold with gains still in hand.
What he likely most fears is the U.S. and its allies slamming the accelerator. Pushing the Russian leader isn’t without risk, but validating his narrative is more likely to weaken Western resolve and escalate the conflict by inviting him to test its thresholds. It’s imperative that Washington instead work to make the war too costly to Mr. Putin to remove any doubt of Western resolve. Be wary of whatever cards he chooses to show.
Mr. London, a former CIA operations officer, is author of “The Recruiter: Spying and the Lost Art of American Intelligence.” He teaches intelligence studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and is a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute.