Ukraine and Russia: Answering common questions and issues

[WhatsGoingOn2022]

Hi, I am starting this thread due to the amount of misinformation and speculation I have seen on the boards around what is happening with Russia's war on Ukraine.

While I am by no means a leading specialist, I have a master's degree focusing on the defence and economics aspect of international relations, I work today in politics and have a lot of links in the area. Anything I can't answer I can at least point you to the people who can-- I naturally follow this incredibly closely.

I thought it might be helpful if myself and others with specific knowledge in this area could help to answer any questions you have, on anything from the war, to sanctions, to Russia's actions, to the fallout.

There is also a subset in British commentary (mainly on the right) who make a living on taking the 'contrarion' position.

Yes, but whether or not I agree it is possible to join the dots and understand how or why somebody might be anti-west, and the roots of nationalist or independence movements, and why being contrarian can be a profitable angle to take.

What I don’t understand is why anyone at this point who isn’t subject to propaganda and cut off from other sources of information would be pro-Putin or even respect him or regard him as a reliable ally.

That is a big contrast to even a couple of months ago, when contrarian speakers were happy to speak on RT, and even people who thought he was a gangster thought of him as a very successful gangster.

@Aristalese

I am on board with the MIG training (and they are popular in the region as they're former Soviet design, yes). But it still leaves me with discomfort in more ways than one as to the potential replacement and the interpretation of such a move.

Yes I completely understand. It's a genuinely very difficult one.

Russia has been sabre rattling over fighter jets, they really do not want NATO to supply these. This is in part due to the weakness of the Russian forces in this area (if you check out RUSI, there are multiple articles). AND the logistics of fighter jets make them much harder to supply without any sort of direct intervention. Both getting them over the border and ensuring you have the specialist care teams in place. So there is no easy answer.

To be honest I don't think they are as big of an issue (in terms of being a help to Ukraine) as people are making out: the Turkish Bayraktar drones are doing great work, and the majority of the damage that Russia are doing right now is heavy artillery. The planes would be useful to help take some of this out, but one solution would be a whole load more drones, and a whole load more surface to air missiles.

Due to where Poland is geographically, it also is completely legitimate for them to have a strong feeling of discomfort on this. Frankly they also need all the defences of their own that they can get (although the US is making moves to help on this behind the scenes).

It's a judgment call really. And a damn difficult one. I wouldn't want to be making it.

@Merrymouse

There is also a subset in British commentary (mainly on the right) who make a living on taking the 'contrarion' position.

Yes, but whether or not I agree it is possible to join the dots and understand how or why somebody might be anti-west, and the roots of nationalist or independence movements, and why being contrarian can be a profitable angle to take.

What I don’t understand is why anyone at this point who isn’t subject to propaganda and cut off from other sources of information would be pro-Putin or even respect him or regard him as a reliable ally.

That is a big contrast to even a couple of months ago, when contrarian speakers were happy to speak on RT, and even people who thought he was a gangster thought of him as a very successful gangster.

Yes I have to agree entirely with this. I genuinely cannot understand how anybody could take this position.

I think we can safely say: "facts have an anti-Putin bias." Anybody who looks at the facts and comes away backing Putin either (a) has a screw loose or (b) is openly just a Russian imperialist who sees this as a massive game of chess.

In terms of allies: there were some excellent links upthread on China. Beijing sees Putin as a valuable ally, they have created a network of authoritarian and ililberal dictatorships across the world. While China is not exactly loving the bad PR they are yet to see real blowback. They should. Longer term China is the biggest danger to Europe.

@workisnotawolf

What can other European countries and the US do to temporarily help Germany with gas? Is this realistic that they would share in some way?

Have pasted some links below.

In short, there are no easy answers. Germany are right that it would hit them hard and there is no guarantee of exactly how long they would be left like that. To put it very bluntly, it comes down to a calculation of how much you weigh Ukrainian lives against the German economy. There are some alternatives that are being explored but they all take time, some more than others.

Very well meaning and ordinarily helpful moves to restrict the use of fossil fuels in the west now makes a nightmare for anyone trying to increase energy security. A lot of environmental groups are getting very upset over pushback on this, which will I do understand, I simply cannot share their views. The problem is in part a lack of trust: they believe (no doubt rightly) that the western fossil fuel producers would try to put this on a permanent basis afterwards. So it's not easy.

Environmental activists are (again, broadly I believe meaning well) suggesting moving to green energy. Which feels a bit like banging your head against a wall, because we need solutions that can be implemented very very swiftly and anyone who has looked into the logistics of e.g. solar power will tell you this is complex.

www.dw.com/en/european-leaders-wary-of-cutting-off-russian-oil-and-gas/a-61045570

www.politico.eu/article/germany-putin-oil-gas/

Just saw this on Bloomberg: “The EU plans to jointly issue bonds to finance energy and defense spending as the bloc copes with the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine”

OP, just wanted to thank you for taking the time to share your knowledge and insights on this thread. I have learnt a lot!

@workisnotawolf

Regarding the demands of Russia/Putin on the following: “recognising the separatist republics of Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states”? en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donetsk_People%27s_Republic

What precisely is Putin asking for here? Is he asking for those states to be part of Russia vs proper recognised countries with recognised neutrality? The trouble seems to be that he is asking for them to be in Russia’s sphere of influence with a puppet government which essentially continues to threaten the remaining part of Ukraine’s borders especially immediate neighbouring states?

Even if the remainder of Ukraine were to have the option of joining NATO and or EU in the future, would both organisations not require those two states in immediate vicinity to either be fully Russian territory or stable, recognised countries, ideally neutral, whatever that really means?

And what do those regions actually want? What about Crimea? Can these regions even be countries of their own?
Apologies in advance for my ignorance…

Workisnotawolf said:

What precisely is Putin asking for here? Is he asking for those states to be part of Russia vs proper recognised countries with recognised neutrality? The trouble seems to be that he is asking for them to be in Russia’s sphere of influence with a puppet government which essentially continues to threaten the remaining part of Ukraine’s borders especially immediate neighbouring states?

Good question!

Fortunately for us, Putin has given us a pretty good insight into how he thinks about Ukraine in relation to Russia.

His 2021 essay, "On The Historical Unity Of Ukrainians And Russians" is most instructive on this.

Putin's argument, flawed as it is, is encapsulated here:

"Intheanti-Russia project, there is no place either forasovereign Ukraine orforthepolitical forces that are trying todefend its real independence."

From the beginning, he portrays Ukraine as being anti-Russia and, whilst he does admit Russians made mistakes with Ukrainians earlier I'm history, he essentially blames countries such as Poland and Lithuania as well as various NATO members for the mental wall between Russians and Ukrainians.

Putin's Russia does NOT want Ukraine to be an independent, sovereign country IF it won't do what Russia wants.

What is revealing in his essay is this section:

"Iam confident that true sovereignty ofUkraine is possible only inpartnership with Russia."

Putin's goal is to keep Ukraine firmly within the Russian sphere of influence and, therefore, deny Ukrainians the sovereign right to decide what they want to do.

In his mind, Russia and Ukraine is one historic country that was unjustly partitioned by other European states.

As Putin asserted in his essay at one point:

"We can disagree about minor details, background and logics behind certain decisions. One fact is crystal clear: Russia was robbed, indeed."

If you're from the UK, you may well have heard the same kind of rhetoric spouted by Irish Republicanism in relation to Northern Ireland.

Such thinking and rhetoric is not legitimate or deserving of respect.

Yes, Putin does claim to "respect Ukrainians' desire tosee their country free, safe andprosperous."

But this is heavily qualified by Russian demands that Ukraine stays within Moscow's sphere of influence.

After all, Putin sees that "Moscow became the center of reunification, continuing the tradition of ancient Russian statehood. Moscow princes – the descendants of Prince Alexander Nevsky – cast off the foreign yoke and began gathering the Russian lands."

He wants Novorossiya aka New Russia. Ukraine is part of Malorussia in his eyes - that is, Little Russia.

There is no room for negotiation with an overtly Nationalist view such as this. Other regions of the world are testament to that fact.

Workisnotawolf said:

Even if the remainder of Ukraine were to have the option of joining NATO and or EU in the future, would both organisations not require those two states in immediate vicinity to either be fully Russian territory or stable, recognised countries, ideally neutral, whatever that really means?

Neither NATO or the EU require Ukraine in any manifestation to be fully Russian. They don't even require any state to be neutral - that's a decision for any sovereign state to make as far as they're concerned.

But NATO and the EU do require members to be stable states. I mentioned this before in a post related to Ukraine's desire to join NATO and the conditions they must satisfy first.

In summary, Ukraine must have no external territorial border dispute and must implement a wide range of democratic reforms.

These reforms have been implemented, but is incomplete and remains a barrier to acceptance as an EU member state. As for the border, invasions into Ukraine is one way for Russia to prevent Ukraine joining NATO.

One can see motivation for Putin to do what he currently is.

@WhatsGoingOn2022 Thanks for sharing your opinion. For what it's worth, I agree and especially now you've made this point as well:

One of the biggest points for doing this sooner rather than later: there is a serious risk of Russia doing this to us when it gets to winter. Which would see civilian deaths in the west, due to lack of heating. So we have our own deadline looming, we need to know we have energy security by then.

It will be interesting to see what Germany does on this, and maybe a first test of them putting strong foreign/ defence policy before trade (the reversal of Merkel's stance)??

Is the answer rationing then?

To achieve the balance with the environmentalists who rightly point out that going back to fossil is a very bad idea, given we are already behind the clock on climate change.

Whereas if we all accept a degree of rationing we can get through it. When I think of what people accepted in terms of Covid restrictions it doesn't seem unreasonable.

Just wanted to add my thanks for this thread. I have found it calm and informative. I have just finished watching the Putin documentary mentioned on here which was very interesting.

Hi everyone, just wanted to share something I read today that I thought was spot on. If you're on Twitter please do follow him:

twitter.com/SamRamani2/status/1501178540900982790

So the below is from Samuel Ramani, an expert in this area:

I completed my doctoral thesis at Oxford last year on Russia's military interventions in Ukraine and Syria.

Based on that research, I am sharing some thoughts on why Russia invaded Ukraine and what Putin might do next /1

Russian military interventions are often explained by geopolitical opportunism or regime insecurity

It is intriguing that Russia would invade Ukraine when its great power status was rising and there was no immediate threat to Putin's regime /2

Geopolitical opportunism has been chronically overplayed. Russia's annexation of Crimea and Black Sea foothold was not rationally worth the cost of Western sanctions.

Even in Syria, Russia embarked on a potentially high-risk, uncertain reward mission that ended up succeeding /3

Regime insecurity has also been exaggerated as a driver of Russian aggression.

The 2011-12 protests might have influenced Russian alarmism about Euro-Maidan and the Arab Spring, but there was no serious threat of unrest diffusing from Kyiv and Cairo to Moscow /4

Putin has instead used military interventions as a tool of legacy-building and identity construction. He is focused on the long-term legitimacy of his regime and Russia's political system

Hence, he is willing to take excessive short-term risks and incur geopolitical costs /5

Putin's legacy hinges on satisfying domestic great power status aspirations

This means having a sphere of influence, effectively challenging the US-led legal order, and having a superpower-style global reach

The image of greatness matters even if Russia is actually isolated /6

Putin has also deftly framed his military interventions as a triumph against long-standing perceived internal threats

Fascism, uncontrolled unrest, Western expansionism, Islamic extremism- these narratives date back to Hungary 1956, and endured through the Soviet collapse /7

Putin has also effectively rationalized the costs of military interventions to the Russian people

Highlighting Russia's capacity for self-sacrifice as a contrast to perceived Western decadence is crucial. Hence the continuous World War II Great Patriotic War references /8

The war in Ukraine allows Putin to showcase Moscow's control over its sphere of influence, willingness to combat socially accepted threats and feeds into popular conceptions of "Russian strength"

It is an identity construction and authoritarian consolidation project /9

There are two differences between Russia's current and past actions:

The first is the extent of Russia's willingness to take risks in support of these goals

The second is Putin's reading of public opinion- he is appealing to a core base rather than the public writ large /10

Putin's conduct suggests that he will continue the war in Ukraine until he achieves a success that he frame as a legacy or identity construction win

Given his framing of the war, that likely means he will continue pursuing regime change, but not necessarily an occupation /11

Given this calculus, sanctions are unlikely to deter Putin, and diplomacy is unlikely to change his mind

Only an intra-elite schism, which poses an immediate threat to his regime, might cause him to recalibrate, and even then, most likely only temporarily /12

Thanks again for all your information.
What do you think about the Russian warships doing drills recently just outside Irish waters? What were/are they up to?

@workisnotawolf

What can other European countries and the US do to temporarily help Germany with gas? Is this realistic that they would share in some way?

The US is ramping up LNG shipments to Europe. Unfortunately, Germany lacks a terminal to receive them. They have announced plans to fast-track two or three such facilities.

www.nytimes.com/2022/02/03/business/natural-gas-europe-us.html

Highlighting Russia's capacity for self-sacrifice as a contrast to perceived Western decadence is crucial.

Bearing in mind partygate and it’s impact on Johnson, how does that work? Are Russians not aware of who is benefitting from their oil and gas reserves?

@Merrymouse

Highlighting Russia's capacity for self-sacrifice as a contrast to perceived Western decadence is crucial.

Bearing in mind partygate and it’s impact on Johnson, how does that work? Are Russians not aware of who is benefitting from their oil and gas reserves?

Basically: what this is saying is that Putin presents the west as decadent and wasteful, and Russia as stern iron men. So the partygate vibes very much support the messaging under which the west is deeply unserious, decadent and unable to self sacrifice for their own future

@Thereisnolight

Thanks again for all your information. What do you think about the Russian warships doing drills recently just outside Irish waters? What were/are they up to?

According to the ROI Government, the Russian Navy was in the waters off the coast where Cork is quite a distance away, but within their economic sea territory. These exercises were legal.

After protests from Irish fishermen who are dependent on the same area of sea as where the Russians were about to conduct exercises, the Russians simply moved on to somewhere else.

But military analysts view the skies and seas belonging to the Republic of Ireland as a weakness for the whole arrangement of European security.

For this reason, the UK's RAF protects ROI airspace and the sea. The Royal Navy also helps protect ROI sea waters.

Nations only maintain proper sovereignty if they are able to use military might in the modern world if they are capable. The Republic of Ireland is not capable of doing this, so relies on countries such as the UK which is more than capable.

www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/britain-s-raf-increases-activity-off-ireland-ahead-of-russian-naval-drills-1.4790289

Hi, OP, could I ask you for your opinion on this (alarming and seemingly rather dogmatic) piece? And do you know of this Chivvas dude and what his agenda/background is?

www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/08/russia-ukraine-war-possible-trajectories

[quote theDudesmummy]Hi, OP, could I ask you for your opinion on this (alarming and seemingly rather dogmatic) piece? And do you know of this Chivvas dude and what his agenda/background is?

www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/08/russia-ukraine-war-possible-trajectories[/quote]
Chivvas used to be the US national intelligence officer for Europe. In my view, he doesn't seem to have considered the possibility of Russia razing important areas of Ukraine to the ground and taking a smaller chunk of it into the Russian Federation (Ukrainian partition) which is what he did with Crimea.

I expanded on this in some detail in one of my posts this page or previous.

@DownNative
Thanks for this. As I recall though the Irish govt and nato were alarmed at the time according to the Irish times - though maybe this was because they already knew what was coming in Ukraine so were more tense than usual.

Reading with intrigue

@YetAnotherBeckyMumsnet

Hi all. We received a few reports from users concerned about this thread and the potential for misinformation. Obviously, we can't ever vouch for anyone's credentials but we've no concerns that the OP isn't genuine.

These days with some people , if the information does not fit with their own preference, suddenly it's misinformation etc.

[quote theDudesmummy]Hi, OP, could I ask you for your opinion on this (alarming and seemingly rather dogmatic) piece? And do you know of this Chivvas dude and what his agenda/background is?

www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/08/russia-ukraine-war-possible-trajectories[/quote]
I can't say I've read it before now, just had a quick scan.

I don't really agree with his overwhelming narrative TBH.

First of all: little to no consideration of the actual impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy. The likely direction of which have expanded further in the last few hours.

Secondly: his assumption of the ability to remove the government and install a puppet regime. Yes he will be able to kill Zelensky, most likely. I find this highly questionable: Russia does not have the troops to occupy Ukraine, nor will it have the finances after these sanctions to keep it under the level of suppression needed to have such a regime in force. It's a bit of an imperialistic, 'divide things up on the map' kind of viewpoint that accepts things can simply be DONE to Ukraine without significant resistance.

Thirdly: I don't entirely get his point about Russia being likely to make added little side attacks at NATO and them leading to escalation. He has done these for decades. Yes they may increase. Why that would cause a direct confrontation and escalation, I don't really understand the link. He should speak to Estonia, this is a very American perspective.

Fourthly: he seems to believe that if Ukraine does gain the upper hand they will then seek to attack Russia and Belarus. Again: why? Why does he assume constantly that the west MUST in these circumstances react to Russian provocation and make things worse? All evidence suggests they repeatedly do the opposite. I have not seen one person suggest invading Russia as an actual plan here.

Fifthly: I really don't agree with his frequent underlying view that Russia would reach for nuclear weaponry first, and would do so without similar concerns to us. It's a bit just constantly setting yourself up to lose a game of chicken. If you put this in context of the Cold War and the various nuclear worries we have had, this is not actually up there (in my view).

SIXTHLY: he is looking at this very much through the lens of a US-Russia standoff and with virtually zero consideration for the actual wider area and the politics of the region. I don't think this gives the most accurate portrayal. I don't get the sense that he has considered the position of NATO members like Poland or Estonia, or the small states on Russia's borders. There's an underlying assumption that if the Russian danger is lessened for the US, that would not come with any corresponding issue in states neighbouring Ukraine.

HOWEVER I think he is very right in the context he gives to nuclear options: while he doesn't want them to happen he is clear that he is talking tactical nukes not strategic. Strategic are what you would classically in the public mind think of as ACTUAL nuclear weapons.

Overall: I would say he is right about the need for off ramps. I think his perspective is very US and very classic Cold War power games, without much of an understanding of Eastern Europe.

[quote Thereisnolight]@DownNative
Thanks for this. As I recall though the Irish govt and nato were alarmed at the time according to the Irish times - though maybe this was because they already knew what was coming in Ukraine so were more tense than usual.[/quote]
As a bit of background to this-ireland is not a NATO member, although it has involvement with NATO. They take a generally pacifist-neutral stance on things on paper, so are not sending weaponry to Ukraine (they also don't spend much on defence). They do a lot on the humanitarian side instead.

However domestically they have been quite violently anti-Russia in the period leading up to/during the war: for example a priest defaced the embassy with red paint on live radio, and yesterday a priests' supplier intentionally smashed a truck through the embassy gates.

Irish fisherman were deeply annoyed by the Russian military in their waters and ultimately after pressuring the ambassador had them agree to move them. It was actually quite strongly fisherman rather than diplomatic led.

The Russian ambassador is not very pleased with Ireland at the moment, check out this letter from yesterday:
twitter.com/lewis_goodall/status/1501130739202596865

@WhatsGoingOn2022 that is extremely helpful, thank you for taking the time to explain all that. I don't have any direct experience or knowledge of eastern Europe, but my one daughter lives in Poland, and has a Polish partner, and my other daughter lives in Bugaria, and both are well-educated and politically-aware university students so I do get their perspective. I did get the feeling from the Chivvas article (which was very scary of course) that he was taking a specific angle, which of course he is entitled to do, but it needs to be taken with a wider understanding that he may not be considering all the other angles.