Almost entirely, but not quite.
Right at the very end of the judgment the judge dealt with the article 8 rights of non-trans-identifying (ie normal) people, albeit very briefly.
At para [100] he said that even if not having a trans-inclusive toilet was capable of being an interference with a trans-identifying man's article 8 rights, then not having such a toilet can still be justified by taking into account the article 8 rights of women.
[100] ... Even if there is a relevant prohibition on provision by a service provider or an employer of a trans-inclusive lavatory, and a consequent interference with article 8 rights, that interference would be capable of being justified taking into account the rights and freedoms of others. Justification would depend on the facts of any particular situation. Nevertheless, the fact that justification is possible and on many scenarios highly likely to be present, is sufficient to dispose of this ground of challenge.
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Apart from that, the judge simply said that the EHCR were correct to say that the absence of single-sex female toilets could amount to indirect sex discrimination. He went on to say:
[52] ...The success or failure of such a claim would be fact-dependent, for example on how the matters referred to at section 19(1)(b) (disadvantage), and (d) (proportionality) fell to be assessed. To this extent the point made was accurately made.
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And, of course, he also very clearly agreed with the EHCR statement that:
"(v) Single-sex lavatories provided will cease to be single-sex if transsexual persons are permitted to use them other than in accordance with their biological sex"
He said:
[53] Point (v) is also accurate; it is an inevitable consequence of the conclusion of the Supreme Court in For Women Scotland that in the EA 2010 “man” means a biological man and “woman” means a biological woman