I haven't heard anything about whether Fife will appeal on the harassment finding. If they don't, I wonder whether this has created a weak spot via which to break the whole thing apart.
If SP's repudiation of Upton's presence in the CR had truly been equivalent to objecting to the presence of a black woman, or had been manifested objectionably, Fife would not have been found to have harassed her (though they could still have been found to have bullied her through their process failures).
Instead, both Kelly and Peggie lead to a worldview in which the protected characteristics of gender reassignment/GI belief and GC belief respectively are of equal weight and must both be taken into account.
The facts in Kelly were unusual in that there were few female employees and many transwomen employees (and unisex toilets), so Sutherland J could in good conscience say that the claimant's needs were more-or-less met.
In Peggie, Kemp J didn't have to say what the respondents should have done, only that they shouldn't have done what they did do.
So are we primed for a decision, that both GR and GC belief call for reasonable adjustment, and that this call is not answered either by forcing trans people to use same-sex facilities or by forcing GC believers to share facilities with the opposite sex? This would fit with Sutherland J's 'moral propriety' idea.
The beauty of this approach is that it does not require us to interpret WR1992, or prove that a penis in a women's CR always = sexual harassment, or that women are more disadvantaged than men by mixed-sex provision. It comes right down to whether GC believers are disadvantaged relative to GI believers by a failure to provide sufficient single-sex facilities (and works for both sexes).
Sutherland and Kemp are true believers and probably think that most right-thinking people are too. Maybe they are right. But if people are allowed to demand single-sex facilities then we will all find out.