If Macron gets his way we have less than a week. And he seems pretty gung ho - convincing Spain and Belgium, when his veto, alone, would be enough
^Everyone talking about the flextensionschlong extension needs to listen to Macron. If he has his way - it's not happening.
Icantreachthepretzels
What has Macron actually said though and what does he actually believe in?
Just after the first extension was given, Macron said that if nothing changed before the 12th that DID NOT necessarily mean no deal ON the 12th itself. He said it could be on a day of the EU's choosing. It was a hint at a stay of execution at least.
In the last 24 hours or so, the noises have been that France favours no deal but wants two weeks for the markets to prepare. That's consistent with Macron's previous comments.
So I think it's fairly reasonable to take this as your baseline minimum. That would put us exiting on around 26th. I don't think we can refuse this minimum simply because we need every possible day we can get.
Indeed Macron apparently said at the last EU summit that he was in favour of an unconditional offer to stay in until 7th May but Merkel disagree not wanting us to exit the day before the EU's day of unity (9th).
So I think its reasonable that staying in until the 7th is very possible, but if Merkel is unhappy for symbolic reasons I think shift to the following week would be a reasonable compromise to Macron. Or it could make the 26th more likely.
Now the question is just how wedded Macron is to a Hardline approach? We know its Tusk and Merkel pushing Flextension because they lived in Eastern Europe at they have personal reasons over it. We know that Merkel only ever raised her voice to Cameron once over a conversation involving putting up borders with free movement. It's her big thing. And for Macron domestically he's made loud noises about the UK going sooner rather than later. He did a big uturn on his initial comments in agreeing to the 12th / 22nd. So there is something of a collision course here one way or another. Someone has to back down. Who will it be?
My suspicion is that privately whilst Macron knows he has to be tough and favours a sharp exit for domestic reasons he also respects Merkel. How he values his relationship with Merkel might be a big consideration as to how far he is prepared to compromise as well as how many others share France's reservations. I think it notable that whilst France has the power of veto, it seems to be trying to get the support of some of the other 26 too. I think it unlikely France would go for a veto if it were in a minority of one simply because that wouldn't be great for EU unity if others think it a high risk to go for only a short extension. So how easy it is to change the minds of others is perhaps more important than France’s position alone. Whilst throwing his weight around might look attractive and tempting to getting a more French centred leading of the EU post Merkel and whilst he might want to crack on with a much more integrated EU, he's not going to starting from a good place if France is resented for its hardline over Brexit. I'd argue that realistically France needs to work with the other 26 to get any reforms and leadership it wants.
Thus any concessions given won't be because Macron has sympathy for the UK, but because it suits his long term agenda in the EU.
Its worth remembering the conclusions of the last summit, in this context, were also of the opinion that we were more or less incapable of looking after ourselves and almost a failed state that needed baby sitting. They clearly think May is incapable. They may well favour a long extension purely on this basis to let Tories, Tory because no deal and a government collapse at the same time might be something they consider to be exceptionally bad and destabilising. And therefore pose something of a security risk to the EU. (France would, perhaps, be most exposed to this in theory). Indeed Alberto Nardelli of BuzzFeed reported yesterday that many felt a short extension was very risky to the EU. That suggests Macron is somewhat on the back foot.
There is also the observation that transition under the WA isn't a whole lot different to an extension. The real only stumbling block is the EP. The term Flextension really only hides this. And No Deal will merely lead to the WA at some point
No Deal just has a dangerous chaos section in the middle.
The French are certainly not convinced of a long extension though (and Tusk has acknowledged this in his push for a long extension. He is taking the French position seriously and is seeking to persuade rather than dismissing as posturing). On the other hand, its also taken seriously by hardline Tories looking to drive a wedge. Jacob Rees-Mogg's tweet about being obstructive in the EU parliament was very firmly aimed at influencing Macron. Arguably this might well have the opposite affect as it goes, as Macron will be smart enough to see it for what it is.
The other consideration in all this is the make up of the European Parliament itself. There are 14 countries who get extra seats. I can't find the full list, but here's nine of them: Denmark, Croatia, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, France and Spain. Having more seats is an important thing. And might be influential on what happens.
In Ireland's case it's particularly difficult. Unlike the UK it DOES NOT have a list system.
Peter Foster @pmdfoster
I understand Ireland is a tricky case, because it doesn't have list system.
This means you can't elect four MEPs and then choose top 3 until UK leaves and IE takes fourth seat...becuase if you ran only a 3-seat election you would get different top 3, than if ran 4-seat
Schlong extension with guillotine is something of a practical issue that needs clarification for the Irish; it's not really viable if we aren't committed to staying in for a fixed amount of time, whatever that might be. Exiting at our time of choosing or just having elections and then never taking our seats it's going to stick. I can't see how it will. So that's the exit on 30th June ruled out. Our exit will be something the EU will want to control the date of in some way, even if there is a 'guillotine clause'.
Nick Gutteridge (Sun) thinks a long extension is the most likely option on the balance of probabilities. Peter Foster (Telegraph) is slightly more doubtful and hestitant after hearing the French line. Prior to this he stated: “No deal” risk receded (for now) soon as May indicated Monday night she was open to ‘flextension’ and EU elex. Alberto Nardelli (BuzzFeed) and Katya Adler (BBC) seem to be of a similar mind set to Foster. Gutteridge and Foster have generally been more reliable than British journalists.
The big but to all this is whether May triggers EP elections in the Privy Council before the summit to signal her commitment. If she fails to do it, thinking she can do it after the summit, she won't be taken seriously and I think there is real danger it will revert to the French line.
If nothing else, if I had £100 to bet on whether we are still in the EU next Saturday, I think I'd have to put it on yes we will be. I may be wrong, but despite EU anger and frustration there isn't much to suggest a hard and fast guillotine on the 12th itself.
Will May and the ERG except a long extension? May sounds like she already has. But this is May, and until she takes action, she can't be trusted. Gove is quoted as saying: “It does not matter what the length of the extension that may be offered is. It ends at the point we are out” which seems to be a considered moderate response. Mogg's comments read as a belligerent acceptance of a long extension rather than a total rejection of the idea completely.
So I think if we are offered a long extension, we'll go through all the usual Peter Griffin impersonations and Boris Johnson huffing and puffing that it's a bad thing but it will be sucked up.
Then theres the question of May. She said she'd stay until the next phase. But a date of the 22nd May was also touted. That's probably more what Brexiteers will have their eyes on, than an extension which they will tolerate. It gives them longer to prep for no deal after all. And that ultimately might not be against the interests of the EU either. It just continues the transfer of business to the EU after all.