natcen.ac.uk/media/1319222/natcen_brexplanations-report-final-web2.pdf
New report out on 'understanding the leave vote'.
Key points (i'll try and keep this to ones which are not as well know/publicised:
Turnout favoured Leave Turnout played a potentially decisive role.
Those who said they leant towards Remain in the runup to the Referendum were more likely to not vote (19% vs. 11% of Leave supporters). If turnout among supporters of both sides had been equal the vote would have been closer still.
Leave brought together a broad coalition of voters
The Leave campaign’s success was underpinned by a broad-based coalition of voters which is much more wide-ranging than the ‘left behind’. This included three main groups; affluent Eurosceptics, the older working class and a smaller group of economically disadvantaged, anti Immigration voters.
Further to this, is this breakdown of the population into various groups:
Middle class liberals (25% of population): 8% Leave
Younger, working class Labour voters 25% of population: 39% Leave
Affluent Eurosceptics 23% of population: 75% Leave
Older working classes 16% of population: 73% Leave
Economically deprived, anti-immigration 12% of population: 95% Leave
(Thirty four per cent of this last group did not vote in the 2015 General Election but did in the EU Referendum - the highest figure for all these groups.)
We also identify two other groups of Leave voters – one is similar in characteristics to the Economically Deprived Anti-Immigration but are much older and have less strong views about immigration and the positive economic impact of leaving the EU. Politically speaking they are much less likely to support UKIP or no political party, and identify strongly as British. We call this group Older Working Class.
The final group likely to vote Leave are more middle class, Conservative voters with anti-welfare views, who we call Affluent Eurosceptics. (This group are 37% anti-welfare)
My guess though is that there will be a lot in this group are more likely to want the single market than the other two previous groups as their focus is not immigration but other issues (eg sovereignty). The point about being anti-welfare is worth noting - you can't please this group and the 1st group at the same time over welfare. A lot of what May is doing panders to this group but she's trying to push the immigration thing at the same time. It ultimately won't work as its the same problem that is levelled at Labour - the voter base is too wide.
The final group are the Younger Working Class Labour Voters – they are more undecided on the impact of leaving than the other groups, and most likely to be Labour voters and identify as working class.
If you look at how these voted its difficult to see how UKIP or the conservatives could take votes from this group. They are more likely to simply not vote if they don't vote Labour.
Identity politics played a role
The Leave victory was not about objective demographics alone. Matters of identity were equally, if not more strongly, associated with the Leave vote – particularly feelings of national identity and sense of change over time.
Those most likely to vote Leave were:
• Those with no formal education qualifications (78%) or whose highest qualifications are CSEs or O-levels (61%)
• Those with an income of less than £1,200 per month (66%)
• Those in social housing provided by a local authority (70%) or housing association (68%)
A more detailed geographical analysis by the Resolution Foundation shows that the vote was more highly polarised at Local Authority (LA) level; the Leave vote was over 70% in eight LAs, and higher than 60% in 102.
These groups, again are highly unlikely to switch to a Conservative vote even if they are Leavers if the Conservative go for this anti-welfare approach.
The groups most likely to vote Leave were:
• Those finding it difficult to manage financially (70%) or just about getting by (60%)
• Those who believed Britain has got a lot worse in the last ten years (73%)
• Those who think things have got worse for them rather than other people (76%)
• Those who perceive themselves as working class (59%)
• Those who see themselves as English rather than British (74%) or more English than British (62%)
It is clear that the Leave vote was most concentrated amongst those with least economic resources. However, in order to win the Referendum, the Leave vote mobilised a broader base of supporters. Almost half of those who said they were ‘doing alright’ financially voted Leave, as well as almost 40% of those describing themselves as middle class.
Significant that the working class did NOT vote leave as much as been hammed up in the press. 59% is a majority, but its not as much as has been pushed. Equally 40% of middle class voters is also higher than you might have been lead to believe. By their very nature they will NOT be ill educated.
The papers with the highest proportion of Leave votes were the Sun and Express (both 70%), the Mail (66%) and the Star (65%).
The other newspaper where the majority of the readership voted Leave was the Telegraph, though the proportion was lower (at 55%).
Perhaps the surprise here is the percentage of those readers who voted Remain!
More people were sure that leaving the EU would lead to a fall in immigration than were sure that the economy would be worse off (66% and 43% respectively). Whilst the Leave vote was low amongst those who felt the economy would be worse off (17%), it was high amongst those who though there wouldn’t be much difference (68%) as well as those who thought it would be better off (84%). This supports the argument that the Remain campaign failed to persuade enough people that there would be a significant economic downside of leaving the EU
Significant. If economy heads south there will be political repercussions somehow simply because expectation does not match the reality.
Those who voted Remain were significantly more likely to select education, poverty and inequality, and the economy as their concerns. Those who voted Leave were significantly more likely to select immigration. The biggest single distinguishing factor in terms of general priorities for government is immigration (47% of Leave voters compared to 16% Remain voters). This confirms that the issues that were most important in the EU Referendum – immigration and the economy – broadly matched voters’ wider policy concerns.
It is also worth noting that Europe and the EU was significantly less likely to be selected overall than every issue other than unemployment, and less likely to be selected than education, the NHS, and immigration for those who voted Leave. This suggests that people were more focused on the domestic issues, rather than the detailed arguments about European relations.
In other words, remainers far from being ignorant of inequality and 'out of touch' were much more likely to consider it a priority and be concerned about it. And people made a vote about the EU based on domestic issues and not the EU! And they were not terribly interested in the EU's role. That's a pretty incredible point. It show the degree to which BOTH leavers and remainers were ignorant.
We looked at the relationship between how people voted and what they thought the UK’s long-term EU policy should be. This shows that a significant majority of those who think the UK’s long-term policy should be to stay in the EU and reduce its powers voted Remain in the Referendum. However, at the same time, around one in five, even though their underlying preference was to stay in the EU, voted Leave.
Well there's a big fallacy busted.
People identified as ‘authoritarian’ were significantly more likely to vote Leave than those identified as ‘libertarian’, 66% compared with 18% respectively. However, there was no significant variation by whether people identified as left or right leaning, and much less than in usual elections. Those identified as anti-welfare were significantly more likely to vote Leave than those who were pro-welfare
Again welfare a big issue.
(Leave vote by welfarism: anti-welfare - 75%, neither - 54% and pro-welfare - 30%)
Older people were significantly more likely to vote than younger groups – we found that 93% of those aged over 65 voted compared with 70% of those aged 18-34.
And we've already covered how people who didn't vote were more likely to, had they bothered.
Leave vote by agreement with statement: ‘politicians do not listen to people like me’
Agree - 58%, neither - 36%, disagree - 37%.
May onto a loser on this as well.
But on the other hand, very obvious that there is a ceiling to how much of the vote share UKIP can attract and they still need to get those particular people to the polls for the next General Election (and By-Elections).
Which does make tomorrow's by-election in Sleaford and North Hykenham (sic) very interesting. Perhaps much more interesting than Richmond Park. What type of Conservatives / Leavers are there, and can UKIP motivate people to start voting? And what will Labour / Remain voters do? Will they show up, and will the Lib Dems see an increase, even though this a heavily leave constituency.
The idea that there could be a huge Leave backlash given how the Leave vote was split.
If you look at housing ownership Sleaford and North Hykeham comes in with just 8% in local authority housing and 2% in housing association. Indeed quite the opposite its 31% Owned and 45% Owned/Mortgaged This does not smell of that Economically deprived, anti-immigration group that most identify with UKIP as mentioned above.
Its much more the Older Leave voter group and the more Affluent Leave group. 20% of the population are retired. This is particularly high. (I think its actually one of the highest in the country) 64% are in work which is above average and ownership of detached houses is particularly high.
So the test is perhaps whether UKIP can persuade the older voters and get their core vote out who normally don't vote and whether the affluent voters decide to vote Conservative in a show of support or stay home
Or switch to Lib Dems completely.
I think its more interesting that last week on that basis.
It will be a Conservative hold, but what happens here is more telling to my mind, as the Older Voter and Affluent groups are the two leave groups which are now less predictable in party allegiance than the Low Income, Anti-immigration group (where turnout rather than party loyalty is perhaps the bigger unknown). I am not expecting UKIP to increase the number of votes they get. I am expecting Conservative turnout out to be down. I am expecting Lib Dem share to be up. But by how much?