https://xcancel.com/tobiaschneider/status/1933923314306609534#m
Some impression based on my conversations with a number of old friends and acquaintances in Tehran, Mashhad, Kashan, Isfahan, Qom over the last two days: On the moderate-to-opposition side of the spectrum, nobody is shedding a tear for the regime figures targeted. One old acquaintance who was involved in protests that ended in a horrid massacre in 2023 only expressed frustration that they wouldn't get to string the guys up themselves. What anger there is over innocent lives lost is mainly directed at the regime itself. One of my friends from Tehran shared a meme about how the blown-out apartments were mostly penthouses in fancy high-rises. The strikes are not seen as particularly indiscriminate, though one contact asked why they couldn't just blow them up at their offices instead? Another sheepishly suggested it might wake some middle-class people to the situation the country is in, but when pressed, was unsure which way most normal residents would swing. Most of my old networks are in Tehran's art scene, which despises the regime but isn't overly politicized on a day-to-day basis. They seem to see it primarily as symptomatic of the pointless wars through which the regime has squandered the country's wealth and reputation, coming home to roost. One is an avid Iranian nationalist, angry that the Pasdaran had spent decades gobbling up the country's resources -- and for what?! The same (older) acquaintance worried that Israel would try to use minorities to fracture the country (unity being the one positive he attributed to the IRI). Among the moderates-conservatives, there was a lot of uncertainty about the future of the regime. One expressed worries about the character of the upcoming generation of Pasdaran leaders, in particular. In general, the total failure of the country's security services over the last 18 months is seen as symptomatic of a deep-seated rot, widespread tacit disloyalties, and petty corruption, among other issues. None seemed very worried about a major war - civil or foreign - but pondered whether the IRI would be able to rebuild its domestic legitimacy needed to keep the show on the road. All agreed that the military enterprises in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria were wasted, only drawing unneeded ire. Instead, one suggested Pasdaran should focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, leaving the rest to the diplomats. Nobody I have talked to on either end of the spectrum cared about the nuclear talks at all, which are seen as pointless theater ("if they wanted to solve it they just would"). My one genuinely zealous Hezbollah source in Qom expressed mostly anger that the military leadership had allowed the resistance to get picked off one by one. Everything had gone downhill since the killing of Soleimani and Muhandis. He thought the services needed a purge and that the regime should take the fight to the Americans.
(This is not a representative sample, just a bunch of people I have loosely kept in touch with over the years. My last personal visit was in 2016 after which entering the country got too dangerous. Almost all are well-educated urbanites of one stripe or another. Mixed religiosity. No regime insiders or hardcore underground oppositionists cited here. Thought it would be interesting.)