True, Hamas doesn't represent the Palestinian population as a whole.
But equally true to say Hamas has majority Palestinian support. In 2021, it was 53% in favour of Hamas v 14% in favour of Abbas' Fatah.
https://apnews.com/article/hamas-middle-east-science-32095d8e1323fc1cad819c34da08fd87
So concerning is the rise in support for Hamas that Biden has been trying to shore up Abbas for the last two years. Doesn't seem to be working.
"The Biden administration and the international community are meanwhile looking to bolster Abbas. Hamas drove his forces out of Gaza in 2007, confining his Palestinian Authority to parts of the Israeli-occupied West Bank."
Hamas will likely increase Palestinian support for themselves after yesterday. It might be only a matter of time until Hamas have 70% Palestinian support.
And that would be catastrophic. Would certainly kill off any attempt to revive the peace process with Abbas and Palestinian Authority.
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) stated in 2014 the following:
"Local Gazans are not necessarily ideologically linked with Hamas’ struggles, but rather are facing existential crises, e.g. loss of life, livelihood, property, and controlled access to basic necessities (e.g. food/
water/medicines), and this level of duress causes Gazans to choose the closer, more tangible support
system, i.e. Hamas.
Given the demographic and geographic conditions within which Hamas operates, there is a relationship between
geographic proximity and governance where Hamas uses its governance framework to control (providing or with-
holding) access to vital goods and services.
Reliance on or rejection of ‘alternative welfare’ networks provide the
Gazan population with limited options:
(1) They can support and defend Hamas’ ideology and Hamas’ tactics (including the use of human
shields) – be it out of conviction, existential necessity, fear, or due to lack of alternatives.
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(2) They can support Hamas’ ideology, but reject Hamas’ tactics.
(3) They can passively or actively break with Hamas’ ideology and reject Hamas’ tactics, although in
doing so they risk loss of life, livelihood, property, and collateral social and familial degradation
and distancing (this can include emigrating).
Given these choices for Gazans, Israel’s use of PsyOps would not only need to capture first order repercussions
for Gazans choosing to reject ideology and/or practices but it would also need to consider second and third
order effects of Gazans who would prefer to stay in Gaza or cannot leave Gaza (for a variety of reasons). The
likelihood of a narrative or strategic communications plan to have this penetration is unlikely.
Furthermore, the
inability of Israel to provide alternatives for Gazans could backfire and provide more fodder for Hamas to recruit
and retain supporters (active and passive). Should Israel or Israeli partners not be able to fill the vacuum provided by Gazans breaking with Hamas, the Gazan population could be placed in a more vulnerable and exploitable
position by Hamas and foreign sympathisers who will seize upon this narrative for their own purposes.
Successful PsyOps plans should ideally move audiences along a psycho-social continuum that spans internal-
ising messaging using critical thinking to externalising behavioural changes.
Consequently, PsyOps must:
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(1) Foment dissent in targeted populations; and
(2) Produce active and passive rejection of a worldview or set of associated practices.
Should the first pillar be achieved without the second, the operation will likely be unsuccessful. There is a limit-
ed likelihood of success in the case of Hamas’ use of lawfare and Israel’s ability to successfully counter these
messages through PsyOps."
Given the near complete control Hamas has of Gaza and increasing support in the West Bank, how is it possible for Israel’s PsyOps to change the security situation for Palestinians?
Remove the threat and you remove the security checkpoints along with everything else which would be a start towards better relations.
But Hamas' autocratic control AND support from a majority of Palestinians makes this nigh on impossible.
It also makes it MORE likely that Hamas will grow support to the point where you cannot say they don't reflect the population they draw from.
Of the three options NATO StratCom COE identify as available to Palestinians, 1 & 2 are far more likely than 3. Even 2 is problematic because all terrorist groups draw oxygen from their ideology. Its not enough to condemn terrorist tactics if you're supporting their ideology. Doing so is likely to eventually grow support for Hamas.
I cannot see Gazans rising up against Hamas who are really the reason for all the security checkpoints, emergency legislation, presence of Israeli soldiers, restrictions on leaving Gaza, lack or absence of Foreign Direct Investment for jobs, etc.
Israel may not be able to foment a dissent population there either. Yet they're constrained internationally from taking Hamas apart. Hamas' abuse of civilians and civilian infrastructure is another obstacle to the Isreaelis wiping Hamas out.