56/ Moreover, Mueller knows what the NYT reported today establishes Papadopoulos as the linchpin of Trump's sometimes private, sometimes public—always illegal and collusive—sanctions-for-aid negotiation and deal with the Russians. Papadopoulos can and has established collusion.
57/ With all that established, let's return to the NYT story inexplicably billed as no more than a retort to the millionth lie Trump has told on his ties to Russia and the Steele Dossier. We knew in November Papadopoulos helped edit the Mayflower Speech:
58/ Readers of this feed knew in September—and readers of major media by November—that Trump had lied about Papadopoulos being a low-level volunteer Trump campaign staff hardly knew, given the trips he took abroad as a Trump rep to meet foreign officials:
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59/ We even knew, 3 weeks ago, that Papadopoulos had had contacts with Flynn (Trump's top foreign policy/NatSec advisor) and Bannon (Trump's top domestic advisor) Trump hid, and that his trips (e.g. Greece) were pre-authorized by the campaign—a key fact.
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60/ We know the early bits of the Dossier went to the FBI—not CIA—in July 2016, as did (that same month) news of an Australian diplomat's run-in with Papadopoulos. But it was the CIA—who we now know had Kislyak bugged—who raised the alarm in August 2016.
61/ We know when Brennan raised an alarm in mid-2016 he knew of "multiple" Trump camp-Russia contacts, and we know from other reports multiple European intel agencies offered the CIA such intel. So the idea it was all the Dossier the FBI had is nonsense.
62/ So if the "It wasn't the Dossier that started the Russia probe, Mr. Trump!" angle the NYT took isn't actually a scoop, and if much else in today's NYT article was already known as of last month, why is this article such a big, breaking-news deal? Well, here's why, in summary:
63/ 1. Papadopoulos' boasts were true. True when made to an Australian, and true when made to Greeks. That's now accepted. 2. At least one foreign intel agency knew of the Russia plot in April 2016—two months before Christopher Steele sent (pro bono) anything to the FBI.
64/ 3. Media is finally conceding what attorneys have been saying for months now: because stealing Clinton's emails was a federal crime, the Trump campaign was unable to reward—or negotiate any unilateral benefit with—Russia once it had that knowledge without it being collusion.
65/ 4. Media now concedes Trump himself—not merely Trump aides—lied about Papadopoulos' role with his campaign after it was revealed Papadopoulos told Mueller everything he knows. And Trump specifically lied to hide that Papadopoulos was authorized to set up high-level meetings.
66/ 5. Media now concedes what independent journalists have previously noted—Papadopoulos was switched to Trump's Russia team immediately after he told Trump he was a Kremlin intermediary, though it wasn't his area of expertise. And this was intended as a signal to Russia.
67/ 6. We now know Papadopoulos' "goal" was to set a meeting between Trump and Putin or Trump aides—like himself—and Putin aides. We know he was authorized to set up a high-level meet of the former sort and had the opportunity for the latter sort of meeting in Athens in May '16.
68/ 7. We know Papadopoulos—who had nearly no experience—somehow got an interview with Trump National Co-Chair Sam Clovis within days of his old boss Ben Carson conceding during the primary. We now know he had sufficient ties with Sergei Millian that could've facilitated this.
69/ 8. We know from this March '17 article in The Independent (UK) that Millian was not only close to Papadopoulos but told a source of Christopher Steele's that stolen Russian information was given to Papadopoulos and it was given to Donald Trump himself and it was used.
70/ 9. We know Papadopoulos was in touch with RIAC head Ivan Timofeev by April 2016, and the RIAC appears to be known to the CNI, which hosted the Mayflower Speech Papadopoulos helped write and invited Kislyak (breaching diplomatic protocol) to hear it.
71/ 10. We know the NYT inexplicably cites participants in the TIHDC meeting for the proposition that Trump "deferred" to Sessions on a meeting with Putin, though those participants the NYT trusts are known—see The Daily Beast—to have lied about what occurred during the meeting.
72/ 11. We know Sessions' claim the campaign thought Papadopoulos "too unqualified" to set up a key foreign meeting is bunk, as within 48 hours it sent him to Israel to meet important foreign leaders, then Greece, then let him set up Trump's meeting with the Egyptian President.
73/ 12. We know, from the NYT, Trump's National Co-Chair Clovis "encouraged" a known Kremlin intermediary he'd inexplicably kept on the NatSec team to go to Moscow post-hacking to negotiate sanctions with the Russians, which fact alone—if we knew nothing else—is collusion.
74/ 13. We know Trump asked multiple agents of the Russians—not just Papadopoulos but Burt—to craft the Russia policy he unveiled at the Mayflower. It seems clear the campaign orchestrated Kislyak hearing that speech and meeting Trump as a VIP before it.
75/ 14. And we know Jeff Sessions lied under oath about his contacts with both George Papadopoulos and Richard Burt, which is why I've said for months now that Sessions is a "LVL2" target for Mueller along with Kushner, Trump Jr., Manafort, and Flynn.
76/ 15. We know, from the NYT, that Stephen Miller—who helped orchestrate Comey's firing, obstructing the Russia probe—was instrumental in promoting Papadopoulos as a Russia surrogate. It's wildly implausible those two facts aren't related. Miller becomes a key Russia witness.
77/ 16. We know Papadopoulos committed a firing offense in causing an international firestorm with England entirely of his own making, and it seems Trump's staff would've wanted the young, inexperienced Papadopoulos fired right then—but someone above Clovis' level blocked it.
78/ 17. We know Papadopoulos told Greek media he thought he was temporarily thrown off the campaign—but again, critically, not fired—because of an interview he gave with Russian media in September without permission. We know he was asked back—by whom?—days before the election.
79/ 18. We know Papadopoulos was a) impervious to firing, b) the beneficiary of Trump's only "blank check" job offer and c) the one person on Team Trump who knew for certain Russia had committed crimes and was told this before the Mayflower Speech. Three related facts.
80/ 19. Papadopoulos helped edit Trump's "good deal for Russia" speech after he knew Russia had committed crimes against America. Assuming Papadopoulos passed that key information on to his boss—and every indication is he did and Trump appreciated it—that's your collusion.
81/ I want to be clear on this: Trump could not legally authorize language in the Mayflower Speech offering a "good deal for Russia" and "rewards for our friends" if Papadopoulos had told him Russia had committed federal crimes against America—to do so would be a criminal act.
82/ If Papadopoulos confirmed for Mueller what the circumstantial evidence makes clear—that he told Trump Russia had committed crimes, and told Trump this prior to Trump delivering his infamous Mayflower Speech—Mueller has evidence of the president committing a collusive crime.
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83/ 20. We know within 24 hours of learning Russia had committed crimes, Papadopoulos wrote Miller—his Trump liaison—that he had "interesting messages" from Russia. Of course he didn't say what they were over email—the "messages" were knowledge of a crime. Did they chat later?
84/ 21. Miller was at the Mayflower Speech and helped Papadopoulos write it. Does anyone believe that—while working together on the biggest speech of Trump's life, a speech in big part about Russia—Miller never asked what the "messages" were, and Papadopoulos never told him?
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85/ 22. We know—from the NYT—there was an administrative bias at the FBI with a pro-Trump effect: the FBI consciously deviated from investigative protocols to ensure its investigation of Trump didn't harm his chances of victory. Clinton got no such consideration in October 2016.
86/ 23. We know—from the NYT's worst buried lede here, given its headline—that "Steele had shown some of his findings to an FBI agent in Rome [in July 2016], but that information was not part of the justification to start an counterintelligence inquiry, American officials said."
87/ So it's not just that the Australian revelation gave the FBI other grounds to launch a probe, and it's not just that we know the Dossier wasn't enough for a FISA, and it's not just that we know the CIA had other grounds and sources—it's that US officials say Trump is wrong.
88/ If the NYT is right—Papadopoulos didn't hear from Trump pal Millian until mid-2016—he met Clovis sans introduction. So to get a job he either played his Russia chit in his Clovis interview or his Trump interview. Which gives him no reason to withhold Russia intel from either.
89/ 24. We now know, from today's NYT article, that there was a third pre-inauguration overture to Trump—from Russian agents—about building a "Trump Tower Moscow": the first, from Agalarov in 2013; the second, from IC Expert (Rozov) in 2015; now the third, by Millian, in 2016.
90/ This last NYT scoop—yet another piece of key Russia intel Papadopoulos would have tried to communicate to Trump—gives Trump yet another reason to offer Papadopoulos the reward of a "blank check" job offer and yet another reason to have clandestine one-on-one contact with him.
91/ 25. Finally, the NYT reveals Papadopoulos—a member of the public NatSec team Trump let American voters know about—did indeed have multiple contacts with the head of the "private" NatSec team Trump relied on during the campaign, whose key members were Flynn and Erik Prince.
92/ Remember that, though he began advising Trump in Summer of 2015—Trump aides lie in talking about Flynn only being with Trump for 25 days—Flynn wasn't part of Trump's first three "public" NatSec teams (March-July 2016; July 2016-Election Day; Election Day-Christie's firing).
93/ Remember, the NYT didn't see all Papadopoulos' emails—just a tiny sampler. Whoever leaked them was trying to preserve the Mueller investigation by giving America just a taste of what Mueller has. That taste is enough for experts to see that Mueller has Trump on collusion.
94/ The NYT has confirmed (or brought into higher relief) previously known or—in some cases—previously unknown Russia lies by Trump, Clovis and Sessions. And it strongly suggests that Trump did know Don was meeting in Trump Tower with Kremlin agents in June 2016—and about what.
95/ So Papadopoulos can now be seen as potentially sufficient—by himself—to establish Trump's criminal collusion (in the law we'd use the terms "Aiding and Abetting" or "Conspiracy," depending on the statute) and enough circumstantial evidence exists to strongly indicate he is.
96/ Moreover, we now have a pattern of lies from Trump, Sessions, and Clovis that specifically revolves around the very same presumed (and strongly supported) narrative of what Papadopoulos was to Trump that would explain him being a witness "sufficient" to establish collusion.
97/ The problem we have now is that the New York Times—while doing very good work here—nevertheless buried its lede, credited discredited sources, failed to contextualize its most important contributions, and altogether missed key connections with prior reporting on Papadopoulos.
98/ And the NYT article still misses verifiable independent reporting—for instance, on Papadopoulos going to Athens while Putin was there, or on how Trump campaign explanations for how the Mayflower event came together are provable lies, or on what Papadopoulos told Greek media.
99/ Given today's NYT report, claims there was no collusion between Trump and Russia need to stop—they're irresponsible and deceitful, based on the information we have. You can claim—wrongly—that collusion isn't clear yet, but no one can assert a lack of collusion is evident.
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100/ My estimation, as a legal expert, is that the chances Mueller refers an impeachable offense to DOJ in mid-2018 or thereafter are 90%+. Feel free to check back in with me on that prediction, as it's based on a year of research into all that is now known on this topic. {end}