Snippets of an article linked below...
Both regular Russian armed forces—primarily naval and air—as well as Wagner troops have been present in Syria since Moscow first sent troops there in 2015. Wagner forces were also deployed to Libya in 2018 and to several other African countries, including the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, and Burkina Faso, in the years since then.
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Forcefully asserting Russian MOD control over Wagner forces operating in Syria and the rest of the Middle East might prove difficult if the latter decide to resist. Furthermore, asserting such control in Libya and elsewhere in Africa, where the Wagner presence is much greater than any regular Russian military presence, might be impossible.
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Wagner forces in these areas have many incentives to be uncooperative. Those in the Middle East and Africa might be especially resistant in order to protect the income they generate from “protecting” governments and warlords. Wagner mercenaries in both the Middle East and Africa also fear redeployment to Ukraine, where, in May, Prigozhin claimed that twenty thousand Wagner fighters died in the 2023 battle over Bakhmut alone.
And
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad might be sympathetic to any effort by Russian President Putin to assert control over the Wagner forces stationed in his country. Centralized dictatorial control is, after all, a principle he seeks to apply in his own country. Assad, though, will not want to see a conflict between regular Russian armed forces and Wagner forces, as this could encourage Assad’s many opponents to revive their opposition to his regime. Perhaps he will try to imitate Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko by attempting to mediate between rival Russian forces.
By contrast, General Khalifa Haftar in Libya and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—also known as Hemedti—in Sudan are much more reliant on support from Wagner. In April, CNN revealed that Wagner has been arming Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces in its war against Sudan’s military leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, with whom Moscow maintains good relations, through Haftar-controlled territory in neighboring Libya. Anything that weakens or diminishes Wagner’s ability to support Haftar and Hemedti would be most unwelcome, especially since they have no assurance that the Russian MOD will pick up where Wagner forces left off. Of course, since the Wagner Group may not be dependent on financing from Moscow in many places—due to local sources of income, such as some degree of control over natural resources—Wagner-protected governments or opposition leaders controlling parts of countries may be able to continue collaborating with local Wagner bosses without involving a Moscow that is distracted by issues closer to home
And
In addition, Wagner’s operations in Libya—chiefly its military support to the self-anointed Field Marshal of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, who is connected to the eastern Libyan government—has given Wagner a “bridgehead” in Libya. This allows it to maintain links with the head of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, more popularly known as Hemedti, who is embroiled in a civil war against the forces of Sudanese General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.
Complicating Factors
It is far from clear that Wagner and the Russian government were always operating from the same playbook. For example, after Haftar failed to take the Libyan capital of Tripoli by force in 2019-2020, the Russian government began to hedge its bets on this Libyan strongman and started to reach out to the Tripoli government even though Wagner remained in Haftar’s corner (and in his employ). And in Sudan’s ongoing civil war, Wagner and the Russian government may be on different sides.
And
On June 30, a Wagner military base in Libya was hit by a drone strike, though no one was killed or injured in the attack. The government in Tripoli, which has long opposed the Haftar-Wagner alliance, denied that it was involved in the strike; but one possibility is that it undertook this attack to weaken the abovementioned ties. Another possibility is that Turkish forces in Libya may have launched the drone strike at the behest of the Russian government as a warning to Wagner against taking part in any rebellion against the Kremlin. However, until more information is revealed, it remains uncertain as to who actually launched the strike and for what purpose, since there are multiple conflicts within conflicts in Libya.
Why am I posting this?
Wellllll....
OSINTdefender AT sentdefender
The Libyan Government is currently in Crisis after the Former-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Najla Mangoush met for the 1st Time in History with her Counterpart from Israel, Eli Cohen during a Summit earlier today in Italy; since this has occurred Extremists in the Libyan Government have convinced Prime Minster, Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh to Fire the Foreign Minister and place her Under Investigation for “Crimes against the Libyan People.”
Then:
OSINTdefender AT sentdefender
Rioters are currently Storming the Libyan Parliamentary and Foreign Ministry Building in the Capital of Tripoli; Security Forces have reportedly Opened Fire.
Also
OSINTdefender AT sentdefender
The Russian Ministry of Defense has reportedly told the Syrian Government recently that they must notify the Wagner PMC Group that their Services are no longer required and that they must leave the Country by October 1st.
Sounds like things are happening rapidly which may have significant implications in Libya and Syria.