Our sense of/ awareness of being male or female is what is referred to as our gender identity. It’s got nothing to do with stereotypes. You say you have no gender identity, but if you are aware/ know your sex to be female , then you do.
That is a claim made by Tandora on the other thread, and I just want to respond to it.
Discussions relating to the conception of knowledge as an inner mental state (in this case a 'gender identity') have been a core feature of philosophy over the centuries. It is a conception associated with philosophical scepticism. In simple terms, it leaves room for all the old-chestnut questions such as "How do I know that the world exists, i.e. that there is anything beyond the mental states that constitute my knowledge of the world?", "How can I know that Jane sees the same thing that I see when she says 'that post box is red'?", etc.
The 'solutions' to scepticism include Wittgenstein's discussions of belief and of 'private languages'. In particular he gives the example of a 'private sensation' that he calls S. This is a sensation which is radically unknowable by anyone other than the person experiencing it. There can be no meaningful language to express such a sensation, Wittgenstein's argument goes, because there would be no objective criteria for determining whether language relating to it is being used correctly. Even the person experiencing the sensation would have no confidence that his/her account of it 'meant' the same thing from one instance to the next.
To avoid the pitfalls of radical scepticism philosophers such as Wittgenstein have evolved accounts of meaning, truth and knowledge that are irreducibly public. (Famously, for Wittgenstein, this is his 'meaning is use' approach which places meaning, knowledge and truth squarely in the linguistic interactions of speakers.)
Tandora's claim that your knowledge that you are female inheres in the particular mental state referred to as a 'gender identity' flies in the face of three hundred years of philosophy.
That's not to deny that some people do experience themselves as having a gender identity. But it is to deny the infuriating claim that we all have such a sense just in virtue of observing and knowing what our sex is.
It also undermines the claim that, for those people who do have a sense of gender identity, that self-experience provides a meaningful unfalsifiable account of what sex they are.