It seems that Planet doesn’t have the case law to hand so I’m looking to see what I can find.
Here’s a report which provides an overview of the case law.
https://rm.coe.int/thematic-report-on-legal-gender-recognition-in-europe-2022/1680a729b3
I’ve cut and pasted that section, below…..
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European and international case-law have set out important bench- marks regarding LGR, although existing legal standards do not explicitly refer to transgender and intersex persons.
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The European Court of Human Rights (the Court) is the judicial institution that has dealt with the largest number of cases related to gender identity and transgender persons. It has embraced evolving social realities and affirmed a right to self-determined gender as an essential manifestation of the right to protection of private life (Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR). The Court has issued landmark decisions, offering minimum standards for the protection of transgender persons (see below).
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In its landmark judgment, Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (2002)23, the Court ruled for the first time that the applicant had a right to gender recog- nition and established the corresponding obligation for the State to secure that right.
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This was the first of a series of judgments in which the Court has further reviewed the means employed by States to comply with their obligation to provide for Legal Gender Recognition (LGR). The following paragraphs detail the requirements for LGR which the Court considered to be in breach of Article 8 of the ECHR on the right to respect for private and family life.
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For the Court, any requirements of irreversible changes in the individual’s metabolism would amount to a violation of the right to private life (Article 8 ECHR): this includes medical intervention, or sterilisation requirements.[ …] ECRI recommends that “relevant legislation is amended to allow gender changes in personal documents, without the requirement for completion of full medical gender reassignment proce- dures, particularly surgery”. […] In its most recent judgment, X. and Y. v. Romania (2021), the Court moved towards greater recognition of self-determination to transgender persons: it established that conditioning LGR to gender affirming surgery in a case where the applicants refused such surgery on the ground of the invasiveness of the medical procedure itself (regardless of its impact on fertility) violates Article 8 of the ECHR.
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The Court acknowledged that the requirement for married transgender applicants to get divorced before having access to LGR leads to daily situations in which a transgender person faces “inconveniences”. When in the case Hämäläinen v. Finland (2015) the Court found that a divorce requirement was not disproportionate, it was due to the availability for the applicant of a genuine option that provides legal protection for same-sex couples almost identical to that of marriage: “if the applicant wishes both to obtain legal recognition of her new gender and to have her relationship with her wife legally protected, Finnish legislation provides for the possibility to convert their marriage into a registered partnership, with the consent of the applicant’s wife”. (§ 77).29 I
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In its jurisprudence, the Court reviewed the time span between apply- ing for and being granted LGR and found that a transgender person’s right to privacy had been violated due to the excessive duration of the proceed- ings. The Court highlighted that rigid and long judicial LGR procedures leave transgender individuals vulnerable and are contrary to the aims of the ECHR31, and that protracted examination of a claim has long-term negative consequences for mental health.
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In several cases, the Court addressed issues of legal clarity both in terms of language and responsible authorities and concluded that the lack of clarity of the legal framework on LGR amounted to a violation of Article 8. It did reach such a conclusion for example when noting that national courts reached very varying conclusions about the conditions and procedure for LGR33, or when it observed that any conclusion on the applicants’ request would be “precariously close to speculation” hence creating a situation of legal uncertainty for the applicants. The Court also noted that transparency is lacking when “no provision clearly specifies the body that has jurisdic- tion to decide on a request”.
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Explicit or implicit age restrictions may obstruct the best-interest-prin- ciple for young as well as elderly transgender persons. In Schlumpf v. Switzer- land (2009), the Court held that the personal circumstances of the persons should be prioritised over a mechanical application of the law.
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In conclusion, the Court’s case law has dynamically evolved since it declared a violation of Article 8 concerning the recognition of transgender persons for the first time almost 30 years ago in the case of B. v. France in 1992.37 What was considered a breakthrough at the time needs to continu- ously evolve not only to reflect the evolution of societal norms and attitudes with regard to gender identity but to offer genuine protection to all, includ- ing transgender and intersex persons.
footnotes:
19. The Court dealt with the issue substantively for the first time in 1986 in Rees v the United Kingdom.
20. There have also been debates as to whether the Court was providing transgender persons with all necessary protections, particularly when using the concept of ‘European consensus’. See for an analysis of the Court’s case-law, including its use of the concept of ‘European consensus’ Polgari, Eszter. “European Consensus: A Conservative and a Dynamic Force in European Human Rights Jurisprudence “ ICL Journal, vol. 12, no. 1, 2018, pp. 59-84, Pieter Cannoot, The pathologisation of trans* persons in the ECtHR’s case law on legal gender recog- nition Netherlands Quartely of Human Rights,Volume 3, Issue 1, 2019, pages 14 to 35. See also the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sajó, Keller and, Lemmens drawing attention to the weakness of the majority’s argumentation on the lack of European consensus in Hämäläinen v. Finland (Application No. 37359/09, ECtHR), 16 July 2014
. The Commissioner for Human Rights had had a pioneer role in addressing issues of equality for transgender persons in its Issues papers, ECRI is also addressing the issue in its country monitoring reports. In its judgments, the Court usually refers to PACE resolutions, includ- ing Resolution 2048 (2015), as well as CM/Rec(2010)5 (paragraph 20 to 22) which inter alia recommends to member States to review prior requirements for legal recognition of gender recognition.
22. See Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights Right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, page 43, para 167. Among these: B. v. France, § 63; Burghartz v. Switzerland, § 24; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, § 41; Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom, § 36; P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom. www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_ENG.pdf.
23. Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, (Application No 28957/95, ECtHR), 11 July 2002, hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57974%22]}. Goodwin, who had undergone sex reassignment surgery, was denied an amended birth certificate showing her female legal sex marker. As a result, she was unable to access core legal and social benefits in the United Kingdom, including retirement guarantees and marriage
26 ECRI 5th cycle recommendations, available at https://rm.coe.int/5th-cycle-ecri-recommendations -on-lgbt-issues/16809e7b66.
S.V. v. Italy, 11 October 2018, (application no. 55216/08, ECtHR), paragraph 72. Following the judgment of the Court, the situation in Italy is reported to have changed substantially. 32. X v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 17 January 2019, (application no. 29683/16,
ECtHR), paragraph 70.
33. X. and Y. v. Romania, 19 January 2021 (applications no 2145/16 et 20607/16, ECtHR), para-
graph 162.
34. X. v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2019), para 69.
35. Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 9 January 2009 (application no. 29002/06, ECtHR) concerning the
applicant’s health insurers’ refusal to pay the costs of the reassignment operation on the ground that the applicant had not complied with a two years period requirement before the surgery in order for the costs of the said surgery to be reimbursed. The Court held that this was a violation of Article 8 as the waiting period had been applied mechanically without regard to the age of the applicants (67) and that this would impact the applicant’s decision to undergo surgery, see also D.Ç. v. Turkey, 7 February 2017 (decision on the admissibility) (application no. 10684/13, ECtHR): the applicant, a transgender person whose reassignment has not yet been carried out, complained of the refusal of the authorities of the Ministry of Justice to bear the cost of the reassignment despite medical evidence which was submitted, clearly showed that the applicant urgently needed treatment.