...In 2009, as GDP declined and the hryvnia weakened, external debt stock was 91.5 percent of GDP and 191.6 percent of annual exports—clearly an unsustainable level for Ukraine. In late 2011, Ukraine’s official reserves were some $30 billion. Paying back its debt—barring a further accelerated depletion of foreign exchange reserves—will be close to impossible without fresh foreign finance, preferably in the form of disbursements from the IMF.
A two-year IMF stand-by arrangement, put in place in 2008, provided exceptional access to financing that was crucial in helping Ukraine through the Great Recession. In particular, it helped to prevent a banking crisis. In many respects, however, Ukraine reneged on its commitments, and the program went off-track very soon, as a 2011 IMF evaluation concludes. This holds for fiscal, exchange rate, and monetary policies, but in particular for the energy sector.
In 2008, Ukraine committed itself to phasing out all gas subsidies in three years, but little was done on that front. For some specific industries, gas prices were actually decreased in 2009. Ukrainian households still pay traditionally extremely little for the gas their everyday life depends on. At end of the year, gas prices for households accounted for about one-fifth and those for utilities for one-third of import prices. Following this, there was little left of Ukraine’s credibility as a policy program partner.
Yet, another stand-by arrangement amounting to $15.3 billion was somewhat surprisingly approved by the IMF on July 28, 2010. The IMF disbursed $3.4 billion by December 2010, and in August 2011 a second arrangement review was postponed to November of that year. But the IMF mission arrived and departed without reaching common understanding with the Kiev authorities. Though Ukraine must also show how it intends to remedy the built-in fiscal dilemmas of a large shadow economy and huge pension commitments, the main issue of contention was, once again, the domestic gas price for households and utilities.
Officially the low gas prices are justified as poverty alleviation, but it is difficult to imagine a less effective and less equitable pro-poor policy. The gas price subsidy is widely viewed as a way to line the pockets of oligarchs, not help the poor. The practice is also a key hindrance to improved energy efficiency, which is badly needed in Ukraine. Oligarch-owned industries are the biggest sources of inefficiency, having survived and even succeeded for decades due to hugely underpriced energy. Inefficient industries have not lived in a real market environment: as gas prices to industries have been raised, subsidies have been channeled through the budget and the financial system. On top of that, raising prices before the 2012 and 2013 parliamentary and presidential elections is not a particularly good strategy for winning votes in a country accustomed to populist policies.'