Below is a summary of the law in this type of case, taken from the Edinburgh Uni website. Sorry if it's a bit dry and academic and long, thought it might be of interest to some though:-
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Edin. L.R. IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS AGAIN
Lord Hope of Craighead cites Professor Ken Mason’s article, “Wrongful pregnancy, wrongful birth and wrongful terminology” (2002) 6 Edinburgh Law Review 46-66 in his dissenting speech in the House of Lords’ decision in Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust, 16 October 2003, [2003] UKHL 52, at paras 56 and 57. Rees is the latest development in the saga unfolding since the House of Lords decided in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 SC (HL) 1 that parents could not recover damages for the cost of bringing up a healthy and normal child born to the wife following negligent advice on the effect of a vasectomy performed on the husband, apart from an award to cover the pain experienced by the mother in pregnancy and child-birth (see No 73). In the English case of Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2002] QB 266, strongly endorsed by Professor Mason, the Court of Appeal distinguished McFarlane in a case where the child was born with severe disabilities, and allowed recovery of additional costs incurred so far as attributable to the disabilities. Rees was a case of a disabled mother, who underwent a sterilisation operation because she felt unable to discharge the responsibilities of parenthood, but later bore a healthy and normal child, the sterilisation operation having been negligently performed. The Court of Appeal (Waller LJ dissenting) held that this was another exception to McFarlane ([2003] QB 20). By a majority of 4-3 (exceptionally, the case was heard by seven Law Lords), the House of Lords has overturned the judgment of the Court of Appeal. None of the judges was prepared to over-rule McFarlane, despite the contrary view taken on the point by the High Court of Australia in Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38 in June (see No 237), as well as by the Hoge Raad in the Netherlands and the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Germany, and despite what may be hints in a number of even the majority speeches at dissatisfaction with the decision. The majority appears to accept that Parkinson was rightly decided, but that the disabled parent is a different kind of case, in that it would be anomalous to relate liability to a disability which the negligence did not cause. Despite the decision not to allow recovery of the full costs, the majority does allow what some call a “gloss” on McFarlane’s award of damages for pain and suffering, viz that what is called a “conventional [i.e. non-compensatory] award” of £15,000 should be made, marking that a legal wrong had been committed and that the parent had suffered a loss through the denial to her of the opportunity to live her life in the way she wished and planned. The minority, consisting of Lords Steyn, Hope and Hutton, dissents principally on the basis that a further exception to McFarlane should be recognised, and that the “conventional award” has no basis in legal principle. Lord Steyn also refers to Professor Joe Thomson’s critique of McFarlane, “Abandoning the law of delict?”, 2000 SLT (News) 43 (para 33). It appears, however, that by the narrowest of majorities, the opportunity to retreat from McFarlane, as proposed by Professor Mason, is not to be taken. Perhaps that will have to await the day, as also observed by Professor Mason, when the House of Lords (or a Supreme Court), has a female member or members.