Status of Iran’s nuclear programme (June 2025)
Since 2019, Iran is considered to have been incrementally violating the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, commonly referred to as the ‘Iran nuclear deal’), which was agreed between Iran, the UK, China, France, Russia, the US, and Germany in 2015.
Under the terms of that deal, Iran accepted limits on its nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief.
Iran is currently enriching uranium to 60%, which is significantly beyond the 3.67% permitted under the JCPOA and far beyond enrichments levels considered necessary for civilian purposes.
Weapons-grade uranium is enriched to 90%. Iran’s overall stockpile of enriched uranium (at varying degrees of enrichment) is currently more than 40 times that permitted under the JCPOA, and it continues to expand its enrichment
capabilities with the installation of additional, more advanced, centrifuges.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) noted in May 2025 that while enrichment is not forbidden in and of itself, “the fact that Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State in the world that is producing and accumulating uranium enriched to 60% remains a matter of serious concern” (PDF).
Iran’s nuclear ‘breakout’ time (the time taken to develop enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon) is estimated to be almost zero (PDF).
The IAEA considers Iran to have enough nuclear material for nine nuclear weapons if further enrichment to 90% is achieved. However, ‘breakout’ time does not account for the technological capability and time required to successfully construct a deliverable nuclear weapon (weaponisation).
Nuclear experts widely agree that Iran has not, to date, moved towards weaponisation. It is considered that such a step would take several months, or even years.
In June 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution which, for the first time since 2005, formally found Iran to be non-compliant with its nuclear safeguards obligations (PDF).
In response to the IAEA resolution, which Iran said was politically motivated, it announced a number of measures intended to accelerate its nuclear programme.
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10284/