Outraged, no.
These days realistically there is no way you can know every single sub-system/widget, cog and wire on an airliner…you get taught what you need to know in your working day..
I do know there would not have been MCAS hidden on the aircraft I was flying at the time because the one I flew was Fly By Wire ( FBW), no need for it.
Personally I can actually sort of understand why Boeing went the way they did with the Max initially and the thinking behind MCAS system - to understand this it’s really important to remember with all this talk of software problems is that MCAS actually was introduced as a result of a decision to avoid computerizing the 737 flight control system - Boeing didn’t want to FBW the 737.
As I understand it the thinking then was in normal use the system would be invisible to the crew (so why teach it?). If it had gone wrong Boeing thought the problem would manifest itself in the same way as a Stabilisor Trim Runaway, for which there was already a crew procedure…so why teach it again?
On the engineering side the problem was the execution was ***. Crappy system logic and only being two AOA sensors was asking for trouble, to my mind that was the big issue, not Boeing hiding something.
How it actually manifested itself in the way it did on the accident flights, and how it was handled is covered in the accident reports, if you really want more detail.
What has happened since is the system logic is changed, sensors changed and the system is I believe taught on the training for the varient …so I agree with those above who say it looks like the early MAX issue with MCAS have been resolved.
The more recent grumbles over some build quality and management ethos…yes, I agree with those.