I don't think the firebombing of Germany at the end of WW2 was too clever either
There's an insightful analysis of it in RV Jones' memoirs.
At the start of the war, the RAF couldn't hit targets to within five miles. The intention was to hit strategic military targets, but with the navigation and aiming technology of 1940 they just couldn't do it. So they switched to area bombing of cities, dressed up with a lot of rather unconvincing theory about morale and manufacturing capacity, just because it was the only sort of bombing the RAF could actually do.
Over the course of the war, a whole host of technologies first meant that planes flying at night could find the rough area of the target reliably (Gee) and later could bomb, even blind bomb, to very high precision (Oboe). New organisational techniques (Pathfinder Force, master bombers, Leonard Chesire and others from 5 Group's low-level marking with borrowed fighter aircraft) meant that the thousand or more tonnes dropped in a single raid by Bomber Command main force could be concentrated into a small area. German radar, which never managed to be centimetric, was jammed to uselessness. Lancasters fitted with more powerful engines could haul six and later ten tonne bomb loads, and Mosquitoes were modified to carry two tonnes of bombs while still being faster than anything the Germans could put up at night (and, by accident, being rather stealthy against radar).
And by day, after catastrophic losses earlier in the war, the US air force really could do precision daylight bombing with Norden sights and long-range fighter escorts. Germany really had no defence, and even the late arrival of the Me262 jet fighter didn't make a strategic difference.
But because of the experience of 1941, this was mostly used to just to urban "dehousing" more effectively, and ended up in the militarily completely pointless raids on Dresden and elsewhere in 1945.
The point Jones makes - and he was at the heart of the air intelligence work - was that given the technology, organisation and air superiority the allies had by late 1944, they should have switched from area bombing to precision bombing of military targets, which they could now actually do. 617 squadron and other 5 group squadrons had been doing something of the sort (the bombings of the V1 and V2 facilities, the Kiel Canal, various bridges) but not on a large scale. Had people realised just how "good" the RAF had got at precision bombing, they would have done some precision bombing. But as it had crept up on commanders over four years, they hadn't realised what the RAF could have done.
Dresden is shocking because of the scale of the damage, but also the speed (the whole bombload of main force was dropped in a couple of minutes after the target was marked) and the low loss rate of the allies (a couple of planes were lost because bombs were dropped on them by planes flying higher, plus a couple that strayed from the main stream were intercepted by nightfighters on the way to or from, but I think the loss rate was below 1%). It was completely militarily and strategically futile, but executed (I use the word advisedly) with astounding capability and efficiency. That was a complete failure of military analysis: the war would have ended six months earlier had that capacity been used on fuel, ammunition and transport targets.