Velina Tchakarova on the relationship between Russia and China:
‼️ The #DragonBear 🇨🇳🇷🇺 is neither an alliance or an entente nor a “marriage of convenience”, but a temporary asymmetrical relationship, in which China predominantly sets the tone but remains dependent on Russia in many ways.
While China enjoys trade, economic, and financial dominance, Russia continues to rely on its defence and, in many respects, diplomatic complex networks through its regional power projection and various military operations around the globe. China is still reluctant to consider boots on the ground in protection of its geoeconomic interests.
The unequal collaboration is cemented by the shared geopolitical interest in creating a credible counterweight to US global influence in international affairs based on a systemic coordination of a wide range of policies, partnerships and actions.
Moreover, the ‘DragonBear’ is intensifying due to the common goal of responding collectively to major turbulences in the global economy, finance, and trade; but both countries keep in mind the rapidly changing strategic alliances and partnerships amidst the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). They assume that the global order is undergoing a systemic transformation (I call it the Bifurcation of the Global System), the outcome of which is unpredictable, but likely with a variety of unforeseen implications for Russian and Chinese interests.
Thus, the ‘DragonBear’ is not a classic alliance according to Western ideas and concepts. Rather, China and Russia have tactically entered into a comprehensive geopolitical rapprochement to manage the uncertain transitional phase of the bifurcation without the need to announce a strategic alliance, let alone a military one. They may have indeed signed a secret defence pact ahead of Russia‘s war on Ukraine and China‘s penetration of Taiwan.
China is evidently the stronger partner economically and financially, but it treats Russia as an equal rather than a subordinate counterpart. Mutual respect plays an exceedingly important role in this bilateral relationship, in which Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have met more than 40 times now. The relationship reached its culmination during the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games on 4 February 2022 in Beijing when the two leaders signed a “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development.”
China and Russia have also settled their long-standing territorial disputes and amicably demilitarised their common border.
In the energy sector, their interests are complementary, as Russia is the world’s largest combined supplier of oil and gas, while China remains the largest energy consumer.
The main common denominator is not only the goal of demonstrating a credible counterweight to US global power. It is also about creating a significant Arctic and Eurasian connectivity in response to US maritime dominance in the Indo-Pacific region, ensuring security of supply in the event of future sea lane blockages.
Russia and China openly share the objective of reducing US and European influence in Eurasia. Moscow is emerging as a global security provider that could act on behalf of China’s geoeconomic interests in Eurasia and other parts of the world. The ‘DragonBear’ may have discovered a successful formula of task-sharing—Russia is the security provider, and China is the financial and economic provider—that can be applied in other parts of the world.
Russia is emerging as a major free rider in the global power competition between two systemic rivals, the US and China. With the show of force in Ukraine, Russia wants to demonstrate its unique geopolitical weight as an indispensable player, without which neither the US nor China can win the competition against each other in the future.
For the US, a modus vivendi between China and Russia and, thus, a two-front scenario against it, will be extraordinarily threatening.