The post office scandal

[Bringonthesun24]

Not sure if there is a thread. There probably is. I've just watched this video and I'm utterly in shock!

It seems that there could be potential for people at fujitsi to have altered the post masters accounts which could have been ordered by the top at the post office.

Why did they get rid of only that 1 vistor book. Why did they pay that guy a visit the day after he went to fujitsu.

There is so much more to this than meets the eye. I've watched some of videos and clips of other post masters and it breaks my heart to see how broken they are. How their lives were ripped from them and the shame they had to bear whilst knowing they were innocent. I actuay feel so angry for them.

Why is something only being done now after a bloody drama on TV. Why were the public not as aware of this scandal?

https://vm.tiktok.com/ZGejPxjAx/

(ex POL employee here) One of the issues that I can see was that there was a routine process for administering 'Transaction Corrections' (TC) - that is, where a genuine error was made in the branch that needed to be corrected. These were administered within POL and the TC was sent to the subpostmaster who then had to accept the TC (I believe there was an option to 'skip' accepting a TC but I'm unclear exactly what happened in that case). However, these TCs took quite some time to resolve and so a branch could have an outstanding misbalance for several weeks (or months) that would eventually be resolved by the TC. I think the Helpline's advice was essentially based on the assumption that the error would eventually resolve via a TC and so the subpostmaster was effectively accepting a discrepancy and then crossing fingers and hoping that a TC would emerge down the line to resolve it. However, as we saw, the discrepancies didn't always resolve in this way, and in some cases continued to grow to significant levels.

One thing that often comes up on these threads is the question of why no-one in POL thought it strange that there was a sudden uptick in criminal prosecutions that coincided with Horizon. In the paper-based days pre-Horizon there were many opportunities for fraud to be carried out in a post office. Due to the sheer volume of paper involved, offices would be audited infrequently so a fraud could go undetected for a long time. In amongst the many benefits that Horizon was expected to deliver, it was also acknowledged that it could expose fraud more quickly. So against the backdrop of fraud that we knew was going undetected, it wasn't such a surprise when more apparent fraud was being picked up after Horizon was installed.

One thing that often comes up on these threads is the question of why no-one in POL thought it strange that there was a sudden uptick in criminal prosecutions that coincided with Horizon. In the paper-based days pre-Horizon there were many opportunities for fraud to be carried out in a post office. Due to the sheer volume of paper involved, offices would be audited infrequently so a fraud could go undetected for a long time. In amongst the many benefits that Horizon was expected to deliver, it was also acknowledged that it could expose fraud more quickly. So against the backdrop of fraud that we knew was going undetected, it wasn't such a surprise when more apparent fraud was being picked up after Horizon was installed.

TL;DR is that Horizon basically supported management feelz.

against the backdrop of fraud that we knew was going undetected, it wasn't such a surprise when more apparent fraud was being picked up after Horizon was installed

If it was 'going undetected' how did people know it was happening? Was this not an assumption rather than knowledge?

https://www.theregister.com/2024/01/18/fujitsu_gets_1_billion_market/

@SerendipityJane I can't comment on what the perception ('feelz' as you characterise it) was among those whose opinions mattered. I was a relative nobody so my perception wouldn't have mattered a jot - but the narrative that the increase in apparent fraud could at least be explained meant that us relative nobodies had no reason to question the increase. In truth I don't imagine I had any appreciation of the numbers of prosecutions nor the scale of the increase. It wasn't something made widely known.

@TheLogicalSong I did consider changing my wording above as I appreciate that saying we 'knew' that fraud was 'going undetected' appears illogical. What I mean is that the fraud that we did detect had often been going on for many months without being detected. I suppose it was not possible to 'know' that there were additional fraudsters out there but we could see that where fraud did occur that it was often not identified quickly.

Oh dear. Sounds good, until you realise that there really are very few contenders in this field. This is really going to mess up a lot of outsourcing tenders. And increase their costs, of course.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-68017571

I don’t know, but Alan Bates did everything you were supposed to do and refused to make up the short fall or accept the discrepancy - and they still refused to properly investigate and ended his contract and he lost his investment which had been his life savings.

There was no way to win.

obviously you may not know this, but the thing I can’t understand is the apparent secrecy about how the Horizon balances were calculated.

I can’t understand how the sub post masters were supposed to accept balances in Horizon if they couldn’t reconcile them. It’s not unusual to have timing differences that cause discrepancies (e.g unrepresented cheques), but identifying them is a fundamental to accurate accounting.

Apparently sub post masters were advised to just hope that things would sort themselves out?

Yes, but if Horizon is anything to go by, cheaper in the long run.

I also think they need to review the purpose of Post Office Ltd. It does perform vital services that are not economically viable without government funding, and until recently ‘the post office’ was a trusted and reassuring brand.

That isn’t the case anymore.

I need somebody in the high street providing the services, but they don’t need to have a red sign outside.

I can’t understand how the sub post masters were supposed to accept balances in Horizon if they couldn’t reconcile them. I

From what I have read, it seems the system would not allow you to start a days business until you had accepted the previous days figures - no matter how fucked they were.

So postmasters had a choice to either stop serving the community, or accept (and therefore admit) the errors and hope the Post Office sorted it out.

You can bet your bottom dollar that had a caucus of trouble making postmasters tried to hold out and insist on a clear balance before opening again, then the Post Office would have swung into media overdrive and branded them as "destroying communities" in the poodle press.

It really was heads they win, tails you lose.

@GoldenMalicious I see what you're saying about the delay in detecting fraud, but how would this correlate to a vast increase in the number of fraudsters once Horizon was implemented and had been running for a year or more?

If Joe Bloggs, Jane Smith and John Doe are committing fraud and under manual balancing it takes a year to detect but under Horizon it (e.g.) takes four weeks to detect, in theory there might be a flurry of fraud being unearthed in the first couple of months, as Joe, Jane and John come to light quickly, but the increase went on for years. By your theory, the uptick would only last as long as it took to flush out the previously 'undetected' fraud, but then it would return to normal levels.

If anything, you'd foresee a downturn as postmasters would expect (erroneously as it turned out, but one would expect) Horizon to have a meticulous audit which would be a deterrent.

I understand the post masters’ actions - they didn’t have much choice.

What I don’t understand is how anybody at the post office thought it was reasonable - and I still think I might have missed something.

Apart from anything else, if the sub post masters couldn’t check the transactions behind the Horizon balances the post office would have missed errors because they had no way of knowing what had actually happened in the branch.

🤯🤯🤯

From what I can gather, Senior management were very worried about continuing problems with fraud, so they created a bonus scheme for investigators to find all this fraud. So the investigators went out and found lots and lots of fraud….

I think there was a culture of some departments ‘managing upwards’.

so they created a bonus scheme for investigators to find all this fraud. So the investigators went out and found lots and lots of fraud….

See also: "War on drugs"

From today's hearing:

"This is an email from you to Andy Dunks --

Yeah.

-- and it relates to the Lee Castleton trial.

Yeah.

That's a case that we've seen a lot of in this Inquiry:
"See you in court then, Fetters Lane is where they used to hang people out to dry. I don't suppose that type of thing happens any more though.
"That Castleton is a nasty chap and will be out to rubbish the [Fujitsu] name, it's up to you to maintain absolute strength and integrity no matter what the prosecution will throw at you. WE will all be behind you hoping you come through unscathed. Bless You."
Is that typical of your approach to the work you were doing?

No, no. I don't know why that was written. Does that help explain some of the work that -- I don't know why it was written.

-- we've seen today?
^^
I don't know why it was written. I don't remember writing it but obviously I did. But certainly don't understand it."

Such amnesia.

Betty Brown from County Durham is 91 and is the oldest ex post mistress who was a victim of this scandal.

Her husband died a year after she was pushed out, she thinks due to the stress. She spent all her savings making up the shortfall.

This story gets worse as it goes on doesn’t it?

In the paper-based days pre-Horizon there were many opportunities for fraud to be carried out in a post office.

Whereas the Horizon days created many opportunities for POL to defraud its workers and commit false accounting in their own books as they swept their stolen funds into their profits. Money laundering too along the way.

It'll be interesting to see if this is the rare case of a police investigation into an immensely powerful institution where a prosecution follows.

Can Betty be fully compensated, has she been? @Paul2023 how awful re: her husband & indeed all the stress caused.

Yes, I appreciate my logic only goes so far and if POL had previously flushed out all fraudsters, albeit slowly, then you'd be correct in your assertion. If you add in an assumption that Horizon was supposed to make fraud more difficult in general then you could argue that there should have been a reduction in fraud rather than an increase. (I don't know if fraud reduction was an explicit requirement of Horizon but I would have expected it to be a side benefit at least). In which case, perhaps we (POL employees) were all just hard of thinking. I don't know - the whole situation is so awful, and for those of us who were in POL at that time it is difficult to come to terms with what our 'most trusted' employer was up to - whether through malicious intent, ignorance, poor controls, groupthink or whatever. In my case I spent 19 years (2000-2019) being told that Horizon was 'robust' and was going to deliver so many wonderful things. Then in 2019 Justice Fraser tells us it's a crock of shit and everything we'd been led to believe was wrong. It's hard to get my head around and while I completely accept that the subpostmasters and counter clerks impacted by this scandal have been so badly wronged, I also want to believe that for most of us, we were acting in good faith.

I absolutely believe you were acting in good faith, @GoldenMalicious .

For years I've had to deal with the DWP and ATOS, etc for disability benefits, and have come across many front-line people who clearly believe they are doing the right thing and I really do think are acting in genuine good faith.

They're unaware of the malice and dishonesty going on behind the scenes.

In fact it greatly benefits conniving management to have the honest faces of yourself and your well-intentioned colleagues to hide behind. Nothing so convincing as sincerity, after all.

I can see how these revelations must be difficult for you as well.

come across many front-line people who clearly believe they are doing the right thing and I really do think are acting in genuine good faith.

They're unaware of the malice and dishonesty going on behind the scenes.

I think these two things are very important to remember. Mostly people are honest and want to do the right thing. Most people judge on themselves. "I wouldn't consider doing that so I'm sure it was an accident".

It takes a long time and a big overall picture (which very few people get) because people realise there is a bigger problem.
People say "I don't think they meant it that way" or "I'm sure it was an accident". It may only be in the context of many incidents that people think there may be more to it, and even then it's easier for people to think it doesn't matter.

Petty example:
Let's say you put a poster up in your work for activity A. You notice it's been ripped. Obviously an accident. So you replace it. Then it's ripped again, despite no others being damaged. You still think it's an accident. It keeps being the only one damaged, and you realise that it's being damaged only on Wednesday evening when person S locks up on her own who told you that activity A is rubbish and she thinks the poster shouldn't be up.
You can be pretty certain it's S damaging it. But it's not provable. She'll deny it if you ask her directly and possibly put in a complain about you. If you mention it to management you look petty.
So you laminate it, which makes it harder to damage.
Now when you come in on Thursday you find that your seat has been switched for the one you mentioned you find makes your back ache. You swap it back, thinking it's the cleaners. But it happens again and when it happens a third time, all times on a Wednesday evening, you remove the seat you find a problem into another room, so it's harder to just swap it round.
So the next thing is on Thursday morning your notepad with your to-do list on your desk has the top sheet (ie the to do notes) removed.... so when it happens again you lock it in your top drawer. Then the next thing is...

Now all these are very petty. On their own they each seem silly. But when it's written like this it looks obvious that S is getting at you personally.
It still feels too silly and petty to complain about, and there's no proof.

But you're management and it's brought to you. It looks silly. You have no more evidence that person S is doing it, than the person who says it's happening is claiming it is to make S look bad. Neither will admit to it.

What can you do? I suspect most managements go for the easy option of considering it to be non-personal little accidents that are being taking far too personally.
But if it continues, at what point do you/management say that's enough? I suspect most of the time, you just leave. Now S may turn their attentions elsewhere. They may not. But if they do, you're probably starting at the beginning again. And if someone brings it up, are they just remembering what you said and deciding they can use it to undermine S or is S really doing it.

Because mostly people want to believe the good, and it's also easier, it's very easy for things to go on.

Yes, I know this is a very petty example, but people generally want to believe the best unless they are faced with direct evidence (and sometimes even then). That's how bullying and incompetence and mismanagement can prosper and not be challenged.

come across many front-line people who clearly believe they are doing the right thing and I really do think are acting in genuine good faith.

In a different, but similar way, kind of. I'm an accountant (40 years as one) and do a couple of hundred self assessment tax returns. There are many flaws in the HMRC self assessment software. Accountants doing it for a living know what the end result should look like (I do calculations on my own spreadsheet), so I can cross check and can see when the HMRC system is wrong. There are also other things that don't affect that year's tax calculation, but involve elections, reliefs and declarations that aren't technically correct. You have to "fiddle" the data you enter, the boxes you tick, etc., to get the right result, but then the taxpayer has to sign the legal declaration that all entries are correct etc., which often they're not. I make copious notes in the "other information" box to explain why the wrong boxes are ticked, the wrong figures are entered, or in the wrong place, etc., to cover myself and client. But you shouldn't have to do that because the tax return software and website should be right. What's worse is that the accountancy and tax bodies and individual accountants regularly report these anomalies to HMRC but they take ages, we're talking years, to correct these known issues. If you're patient and lucky enough to get through to their technical helplines, it's clear that some of them know of the issues and can tell you the "workaround", i.e. entering date and ticking in wrong boxes etc, but others act as if you're the first person to mention it and that it must be your fault it doesn't work, or even worse, try to argue that what you know is wrong, is actually right after all!

So, I can very easily see how postmasters were fobbed off with a crap system and with crap technical support, and I can easily believe that many were fobbed off by being told to do things differently (i.e. do things the "wrong" way to get the right result), or to just "click accept" and hope it will sort itself out. If it happened (and still happens) with HMRC, there's no reason at all why the same wasn't happening with the Post Office and Horizon.

It'll be interesting to see if this is the rare case of a police investigation into an immensely powerful institution where a prosecution follows.

It won't be. Worth a £1 stake at odds of 1,000,000,000:1 though.

https://www.theregister.com/2024/01/19/post_office_threated_lawsuit_inquiry/

El Reg also has an article on the general problems of government IT procurement.

How governments become addicted to suppliers like Fujitsu
https://www.theregister.com/2024/01/11/fujitsu_public_procurement/

[Re Libraries Northern Ireland's reappointment of Fujitsu, the incumbent supplier:] The contract notice explained moving to an alternative supplier was not advisable as "the system and licenses are not readily interchangeable or interoperable. Any attempt to transfer systems without an adequate transition period poses an unjustifiable risk of business disruption and total network failure."
[...]
Chair of Parliament's spending watchdog Meg Hillier said last year that the government's technology programs are "hobbled by staff shortages, and a lack of support, accountability and focus from the top… The government talks of its ambitions for digital transformation and efficiency, while actively cutting the very roles which could help achieve them."
[…]
Meanwhile, the UK government is embarking on another multi-billion wave of major IT contracting.
[...]
When the media focus on Fujitsu dies down, under-resourced and under-skilled public sector tech and commercial teams will experience painful fiscal tightening, the same tech giants will return to the trough, their shareholders will reap the benefits almost regardless of performance... and the world of government IT will continue to turn.