Oh and an update I missed which was posted on 12th Feb:
Day 353, February 11th. Summary of Arestovych and Feygin broadcast
Posted on 12 February 2023
⚡️ Missile attacks on Ukraine: 61 out of 71 missiles were shot down. The attacks began with a Shaheed strike followed up by cruise missiles, 28 of which were launched from the Black sea, and 43 from aircraft. The attacks continue (at the time of stream), mainly in the south and center of the country. A strike headed for Kyiv was shot down. Modified S-300 and S-400 missiles were also used on Zaporizhzhia and Kharkhiv. The type of attacks has changed since the New Year, with attacks now lasting for 2-3 days at a time as opposed to all at once. The missile attacks achieved less than previous strikes. The missile strikes have a very limited impact on the front.
⚡️ Ukraine-Romania-Moldova: A few days ago, President Zelensky informed his Moldovan colleague Sandu that Russia was preparing to destabilize the country from within. A few days after this, the Russian missiles flew over Moldovan airspace and the Moldovan president resigned in favor of her security advisor. Strikes were also carried out on the Zatoka bridge and Snake island. Both of these are regarded as important for both Ukraine and Moldova/Romania. These events are not coincidental and are part of a wider geopolitical game in the region, however, it is not clear why Russia is doing this. It is not clear how internal unrest in Moldova would benefit Russia in any way even if it does occur.
⚡️ Battlefield update: Incoherent Russian rumors that they repelled an amphibious attack of the AFU, and the AFU is now planning to leave the city of Kherson. The AFU carried out strikes on Russian military targets while the latter shelled the city. A Russian amphibious assault on Kherson is impossible and it is only mentioned as an attempt to tie down Ukrainian forces there. A successful strike on Berdyansk with up to 100 soldiers killed. In Vuhledar, the Russian 155th Brigade and attached elements were repulsed with heavy losses. No Russian advance in Mariinka or Avdiivka. In Bakhmut and Soledar, the Russians had success in their attacks south of the city on the Bakhmut Konstyantynivka road but were counter-attacked. The Ukrainian army continues to carry out “stabilization operations” as per Zaluzhny. The situation is difficult with up to 50 attacks a day, but overall so far everything is going according to plan. Near Kremina and to the north of Svatove, the Russians are attacking. The situation is difficult but under control. The Russians are reinforcing the Bakhmut and Lyman directions.
⚡️ Wagner: Wagner have stopped recruiting prisoners. Now the MOD under Gerasimov is recruiting convicts. This may be interpreted as the beginning of the end for Wagner. Since Wagner have failed in their objective of taking Bakhmut, Prigozhyn hinted that they may return to Africa.
⚡️ Internal situation in Russia: According to a survey in Russia, up to 70% of Russians know someone who is involved in the war in Ukraine. This means that the war is no longer “virtual” and is close to home. 73% would support the immediate end of the “special military operation”, even without it accomplishing any goals. 1/3 believe that the SMO has accomplished none of its goals. There was a sharp decline in people supporting a long-term war, in December 28% said it should go on “as long as it needs to” and this has fallen to just 12%. The majority of Russians support conducting a “special military operation” in Kazakhstan or the Baltic countries. The majority supporting both an end to the current war in Ukraine and starting new ones in Kazakhstan and the Baltics indicates that Russians are not anti-war, but are afraid of how a second mobilization would impact them personally.
⚡️ Russian economy: Profits from the export of goods have fallen by nearly 4 times. These are the first indications of sanctions working, the effects of which will be seen properly during the summer. Large Russian businesses refused to “voluntarily” contribute up to 250 billion rubles to the Russian budget. This indicates a widespread mistrust of the government. The Russian economy is having to transition to a ‘grey’ model to avoid international sanctions. this will reduce tax revenue for the Russian government. Russian businesses are beginning to consider the risks of being associated with the war for their future.
⚡️ Western aid: Chancellor Scholz says that Germany is ready to ship up to 80 tanks before the end of March. This is also faster than anticipated, with the initial 14 tanks expected to arrive later. Ukraine has requested F-16 fighter jets from the Netherlands. Secretary Blinken announced that the nature of weapon shipments to Ukraine is changing and that the West wants to see Ukraine return its occupied territories. This statement indicates the switch from mostly defensive to offensive weaponry.
⚡️ Biden: Biden is going to visit Poland on the one year anniversary of the war where he will meet with president Duda and most likely president Zelensky. Arestovych says “He will not come without presents for us”. This shows that both sides place an emphasis on symbolic dates, with Biden originally signing the lend-lease on the 9th of May and the EU will implement the 10th tranche of sanctions on the 24th of February.
⚡️ Russian offensive: The pace of the Russian offensive will be hindered by logistics stockpiles being 90km behind the front to avoid HIMARS. New 160km missiles will wreak havoc on Russian rear areas. Arestovich recalls when during the Summer the Russians took Popasna and Sieverodonetsk but with the arrival of just a few HIMARS, the Russian offensive was swiftly halted. This Russian offensive will go contrary to Russian plans and expectations. A lot of surprises await the Russians. Supporters of Ukraine will be pleasantly surprised. Judging by Vuhledar, the Russians are already experiencing massive problems with their offensive capabilities.
⚡️ Georgia: The head of the Georgian parliament and a member of the “Georgian Dream” party claims that Ukraine is trying to draw Georgia into the war to open a second front. This was apparently done through sending Mikhael Saakashvili to Georgia. International pressure is mounting on Georgia concerning Saakashvili. There will be a NATO summit in Vilnius in July to which Georgia may not be invited as a result of their treatment of Saakashvili.