Sorry, just to add to the above, even if the Labour government were to reject the guidance it still wouldn't have any effect on the law. At least, according to Ben Cooper KC (he represented Sex Matters at the For Women Scotland case in the Supreme Court).
He said:
It has been drawn to my attention that a number of commentators on social
media (which I avoid) have suggested that the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in FWS are in some way unclear and/or that they do not take effect until the Equality and Human Rights Commission (‘EHRC’) publishes its final updated guidance taking account of that decision. Consequently, there seems to have been some encouragement to service providers, employers and other duty bearers to do nothing in response to the Supreme Court’s judgment and to await the EHRC’s guidance.
Duty bearers would be ill-advised to follow such encouragement. All duty
bearers should understand the following points (which really ought not to need
stating, and certainly ought to be obvious to any lawyer):
The Supreme Court’s decision in FWS as to the meaning of ‘sex’ in the EA 2010 determines what the law is, and always has been.
It is the Supreme Court, and not the EHRC, that authoritatively determines the law. The EHRC’s role is to provide guidance to assist people to understand and comply with their rights and obligations under the EA 2010; its role is not to determine the law or to interpret the EA 2010 (see Grosset v City of York Council [2018] ICR 1492, CA, §42 per Sales LJ; §68 per Arden LJ).
Therefore, if a service provider, employer or other duty bearer is currently following policies or practices that, in consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in FWS, are unlawful under the EA 2010, it will be no defence to any claim against them to say that they are awaiting guidance from the EHRC.
So, for example, if a service provider is currently operating a service or facility for women based on a ‘trans inclusive’ definition of ‘woman’, they will be exposing themselves to a serious risk of (i) claims for direct sex discrimination by men who are excluded from that service; and/or (ii) claims for indirect sex discrimination by women who are put at a particular disadvantage by the undermining of their sex-based protections that the admission of men who identify as women into the service is likely to represent.