An important element to the Tribunal judgment (in my opinion, caveat: IANAL) is the finding that her employer and SWE were pre-disposed in favour of one side of the argument. That seems to me to be a more relevant point than the question of whether she discussed her views in the workplace. The Tribunal doesn’t get into that, other than as a passing remark, for the absolutely fundamental reason that she wasn’t being subjected to a disciplinary for behaviour in the workplace she was being subjected to a disciplinary for private social media activity, following a complaint by someone campaigning on the opposite side who posted very questionable posts in pursuit of their campaign goals. That bias on the part of CoW and SWE - together with poor process - is why they lost.
The Tribunal judgment describes what happened when Rachel was allowed to come back to work…..
“Claimant’s return to work interview with Ms Harris and Ms Barry on 25 July 2022
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139. During this meeting there was discussion that boundaries around behaviours would need to be maintained and Ms Harris would be carefully monitoring the Claimant and the situation between her and her team. The Claimant was informed that the expectation was that she would not be discussing her views with team members who may not previously have been aware of this issue but now are. This represented a clear reference to the Claimant’s gender critical beliefs.”
In her defence at the SWE fitness to practise hearing in October 2022, this evidence was presented….
“The Claimant’s response to the Second Respondent in a document dated 12 October 2022
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143. At paragraph 5(a) the Claimant referred to the Second Respondent having a pre-existing position that gender critical belief is necessarily bigoted and transphobic. She says that this submission is supported by the July 2022 Statement of Case prepared on behalf the Second Respondent.
Claimant’s statement of case for Fitness To Practice hearing dated 17-18 October 2022
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145. At paragraph 66 the Claimant complained that the investigator had made no attempt to establish the veracity or otherwise of Mr Woolton’s narrative.
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146. At paragraph 67 she complained that the investigator just took Mr Woolton’s word for it that the Claimant’s posts were discriminatory and transphobic.
- At paragraph 78 she referred to Mr Woolton being very active on social media and at paragraph 82 that he used the word “terf”, which is widely accepted as derogatory and used as a slur against many gender critical women and that he refers to gender critical arguments as “hate” or “terrorism”.”
In the judgment, the Tribunal finds that SWE and CoW did not treat both sides of the argument equally…..
“199. We do not consider that the First or Second Respondent has established that a restriction on the Claimant’s manifestation of her beliefs was required in accordance with the criteria set out by Lord Sumption at paragraph 20 in Bank Mellat. In particular we do not consider that the Respondents struck a fair balance between the Claimant’s right to freedom of expression and the interests of those who they perceived may be offended by her Facebook posts. In reality it was only Mr Woolton, who we have found to have a direct interest in the gender identification/gender critical debate, who was offended and there was no evidence that the Claimant’s views had been expressed in the context of her professional duties.”
The Tribunal found that SWE and CoW were biased against her. And due to that bias, they discriminated against her.
“201. We find that the Respondents’ contemporaneous state of mind was that the beliefs expressed by the Claimant were inherently discriminatory and transphobic and therefore unacceptable. […]
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The burden of proof
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202. We are satisfied that for both Respondents there are facts from which we can infer that they discriminated against the Claimant on the grounds of her
protected belief. “