One significant point in the judgement relates to "for all purposes" in section 9(1) of the GRA:
see section 9(1) of the GRA. This is, however, subject to exceptions, to which we will return.
discussed further at paragraph 54:
It follows that, although for most purposes a person must be regarded in law as being of their acquired gender after the certificate has been issued, where an exception applies, they are still to be treated as having their gender at birth.
This is saying that "for all purposes" in section 9(1) of the GRA doesn't actually mean "for all purposes". This is significant because it is often argued, and I think was done so in Maya's case, that "for all purposes" means this and exactly this. This has always been clearly wrong but now the Court of Appeal is saying it's wrong.
Paragraph 58 is also cause for relief:
The question is not whether it would be in the best interests of YY to have the person who gave birth to him described as his mother on the long-form birth certificate. The question is whether the rights of children generally include the right to know who gave birth to them and what that person’s status was.
In the judgement effort was made to distinguish "sex" and "gender" although this wasn't wholly successful.
This is a very "legal" judgement. The decision is made based up the actual words present in the GRA and other statutes. It wouldn't take much amendment to the GRA for this judgement to have gone the other way.