My understanding of Gillick is that it really demands a case by case assessment, considering the impact of the treatment, the impact of not having it, the age and understanding of the child etc, rather than a blanket "no child can consent to treatment x". I think it's unlikely that a court would make any blanket statements that no child could ever consent to PBs, although they could set the bar high in terms of requiring a very sophisticated level of understanding from a child before they were said to have Gillick competence, due to the impact of the treatment
Hi, TheCuriousMonkey thank you - that is very helpful and interesting. WRT Gillick, you are right that there is at present AFAIK no specific treatment that is excluded from consent if a child is Gillick competent. However, as discussed earlier in the thread, there is a precedent as regards clinical trials, to which a child cannot consent, regardless of Gillick competence. So there is an entire category of treatments for which Gillick cannot be used.
Also, as you probably know better than me, Gillick case law is limited as, usually, when Gillick is invoked, the parents are unaware that medical treatment has taken place, so there is no one to bring a case (as, obviously, the child who is the patient is unlikely to do so). So most case law that has involved Gillick hasn't directly tested the principle of a child consenting to treatment - Gillick competence has been used more as a guideline for judges in determining when to order treatment than as the deciding factor: the judges have taken Gillick competence into account, but ultimately the court has determined whether the treatment should take place, not the child. A downside of this is that case law is both sparse and arguably inconsistent. (apologies- I'm sure I am teaching you to suck eggs, am just laying out the situation as I understand it).
I would guess that the pending case may use Re E [1993] as a precedent, in which a judge over-rode a 15 year old Jehovah Witness' refusal to have a blood transfusion to treat leukaemia (even though his parents supported his refusal), on the grounds that a 15 year old cannot fully comprehend dying, so he could not meet the test of needing to understand the consequences of refusing.