Just to add though, that the "backstop" wasn't a known "problem" 2 years ago. It has been a concrete, problem since January this year, i.e. when the first vote didn't pass. Still plenty of time to have either secured the votes or developed a much better worked up alternative, but not 2 years.
LouiseCollins
The backstop was agreed to by Theresa May in late 2018, with much negotiation predating the agreement. Before the EU and UK sat down to discuss the backstop the Irish government had discussed the implications of Brexit as they related to a new EU border with the UK on the island of Ireland, and had very ably and completely publicly brought the matter to the notice of the EU, beginning as soon as the referendum results were counted.
The question of the new EU border with the UK had been known and discussed since before the referendum therefore. The fact that it only dawned on UK politicians that it was a problem in January of 2019 speaks volumes about British incompetence and a regrettable tendency to indulge in fantasy, not about the problem itself.
www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-12-14/how-ireland-outmaneuvered-britain-on-brexit
'Irish diplomats set the terms of the Brexit talks long before the British caught on. Here’s how they pulled it off.'
Basically, what they did is called 'keeping your eyes on the ball'.
By the time referendum result came in, Kenny and his team had already honed a message for their European allies: for you, this might be about market access, but for us, it’s about peace.
A second unspoken factor was also at play in Brussels.
Northern Ireland was a place where the “fantasies” of the Brexit camp clashed with reality, according to a former adviser. For those seeking to illustrate the difficulties inherent in the wider Brexit project, it was the perfect vehicle.
The Irish found they were pushing at an open door.
Though details of the conflict were fading, many EU leaders still recalled the atrocities—especially when reminded by the Irish diplomats—and fears of a return to violence were real. Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief negotiator, was particularly receptive—he’d worked on the peace process as an EU commissioner almost 20 years ago.
The British, who’d barely considered the issue, seemed unprepared. To compound their problems, Cameron had ordered his officials not to plan for a possible departure before the referendum to avoid handing arguments to the Leave campaign.
By the time Theresa May took office in July 2016, the Irish had already started framing the border issue and the EU was determined it wouldn’t allow anything to jeopardize the peace.
When May traveled to Dublin six months later, Kenny pressed home his advantage, wringing a pledge from May to avoid a return to the “borders of the past.”
The Irish suspected that May still didn’t realize the significance of the concession she had just made.
In April 2017, the Commission made the Irish border one of three key issues that needed “sufficient progress” before it would discuss its future trading relationship with the U.K.
The British couldn’t believe what was happening, said one Irish official involved. They had taken their eye off the ball.
By the time Varadkar succeeded Kenny that June, the template was set even though the backdrop had shifted dramatically.
In a surprise U.K. election, Tory losses cost May her majority and, in a cruel twist, left her dependent on Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party.
In U.K. politics, no one cares about the details of British control in Northern Ireland quite like the territory’s unionist parties. While the DUP is pro-Brexit, remaining an integral part of the U.K. is its raison d’etre and it opposes anything that suggests separation.
The narrative toughened in the U.K., inevitably triggering a reaction in Dublin. Some on the Irish side felt the British were just paying lip service to the importance of keeping the border open.
One phrase in particular stuck in their throats. May and her ministers stuck to the line that they were aiming to keep the border as “frictionless as possible.”
The Irish heard that as: we’ll do our best for you, but…
It wasn’t enough. Ireland and the EU demanded written guarantees that the border wouldn’t return. In December 2017, May made that commitment.
Everything flowed from that point.
Scrambling for a fallback plan to honor her promises even if trade negotiations falter, May settled on a compromise that pleases almost none of domestic factions.
She argues that she secured important concessions. But Brexiteers hate it because ties to the EU customs union limit their freedom to do trade deals. The DUP rejects it because it may create internal barriers in the U.K.