They did.
But you could also say that Israel might have had the opportunity to learn the truth of that lesson too when the people they had stamped under their feet and stolen from, turned on them horrifically and savagely, even though it was madness given their lack of military resources compared to Israel’s.
It is all an endless cycle of trouble from the very beginning.
This is an interesting article from Haaretz about the problem that Israel’s response to Oct 7 is unlikely to be a solution. It is written by Omer Bar-Lev (Israeli politician who formerly served as Minister of Public Security, former IDF officer).
Does the Israeli Army Chief Truly Believe Hamas Can Be Defeated Solely Through Military Means?
As political leaders push for endless war, the military's top brass must answer whether destroying Hamas is truly achievable, or just another illusion
*The claim that additional military pressure will destroy Hamas' rule reminds me of an argument made by security officials during Operation Protective Edge in Gaza in 2014, when I was a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.^
At that time, security officials supported a brief cease-fire to allow, in their words, the heads of Hamas to emerge from their tunnels and witness the immense destruction caused by the operation – destruction they were responsible for – as well as the high number of civilian casualties (referred to in military jargon as "collateral damage"). They believed that after seeing the damage, Hamas members would beg to stop the fighting.
That never happened. Not after the first cease-fire, not after the assassination attempt on Mohammed Deif – in which his wife and children were killed – and not after a dozen additional cease-fires over those 50 days. The rational (Western?) logic of Israel's security officials, as well as that of Benjamin Netanyahu, who was prime minister then and remains so now, proved irrelevant.
In 1982, Israel entered the First Lebanon War with the goal of striking terrorists and replacing Lebanon's regime. The IDF captured far more territory than today's political leadership intends to take in Gaza. Yet the regime in Lebanon was never replaced with one favorable to Israel. Instead, the IDF became mired in Lebanon's quagmire for 18 years, losing hundreds of soldiers. One direct outcome of Israel's failed attempt to reshape Lebanon's government was the rise of Hezbollah, which gradually became the most significant operational threat to Israel.
No enemy – especially Hamas – can be defeated solely through military means aimed at ending the war. The messianists leading Israel's governmentseem invested in an unending, apocalyptic war. But what about the Chief of Staff, whose job is to assess, professionally and operationally, the feasibility of destroying Hamas? I am asking you, Eyal Zamir. Is it reasonable to believe that what was unattainable for the previous Chief of Staff and for all the brigade commanders who fought bravely in Gaza is suddenly within reach for Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir? After all, the government is the same.
And what about the head of Military Intelligence, responsible for the national intelligence estimate? Has Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder learned nothing from the First Lebanon War – or from the past year and a half, during which, despite the dismantling of much of Hamas's military infrastructure, the terrorist group continues to recruit fighters and strike IDF forces? Is there any serious expectation that this will now stop?
The most dreadful of all the false claims is the idea that additional military pressure will lead to the release of the hostages still held by Hamas. The many days that have passed since October 7 prove the opposite. From the war's first week, it was clear to any sensible observer that Hamas would not release all the hostages without a ceasefire and a full IDF withdrawal from Gaza.
We cannot undo the blow suffered on October 7, nor erase the national humiliation. It is time to face reality, end the war, leave Gaza, and bring all the hostages home.