I have no legal background and am as ignorant as the next lay person but I find myself aghast at the sections around the underpinning inferences of consent in the sentencing report.
Professor Catharine McKinnon some useful observations on the issue of consent as it is interpreted legally around issues of rape and sexual assault:
Consent as a legal standard in the law of sexual assault commonly ex- onerates sexual interactions that are one-sided, nonmutual, unwanted, nonvoluntary, nonreciprocal, constrained, compelled, and coerced.41 Consent in sexual assault law is consistent with economic, psychological, and social hierarchical threats, so long as severe physical injury (rape itself is usually not considered a physical injury42) or life (that one fears HIV if no condom is used may not be included43) are not threatened. Sex imposed by an employer on an employee by threats to someone’s job, for example, is consensual sex in the criminal law, because submission under threat to economic survival does not satisfy standards that require that for rape, sex be compelled under threat of bodily harm to oneself or others.44
Legally valid consent in the law of sexual assault ranges from desire to despair to defeat to death. Desire, presumably, can be present even if rape is later charged, although its marks are seldom perceptible in the facts of cases.45 It operates mainly hypothetically. Despair, in which a woman re- signs herself to sexual intercourse she abhors because fighting is futile or dangerous or otherwise expensive, is ubiquitous.46 So is defeat, when resis- tance is overcome or the consequences of refusal are judged worse than the consequences of acquiescence.47
harvardlpr.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10.2_6_MacKinnon.pdf (pdf)
I state here and now that I could not bring myself to quote the immediately following section about the issue of consent with someone who dies or is deemed to have been unconscious or comatose.