sleepyowl
You say 'The idea that Portuguese public healthcare is comparable to that in Papua New Guinea is somewhat bizarre". I take it though that PNG's GDP is a lot smaller so whilst they may spend the same proportion on healthcare as Portugal the actual spend will be lower, though? So not so bizarre?
That measure was the percentage of government expenditure spent on public healthcare, rather than the percentage of GDP. But yes, you are right. I was including that example to illustrate why such comparative measures (% of this and % of that) do not really tell us very much about the reality of healthcare on the ground.
Do you know whether Labour borrowed less than conservative govts between end of the 2WW to the 1970's?
Oh crikey. To give you a proper answer, I'd need to write a small lecture series. 
So this will be very rough.
The situation between 1945 and 1976 was rather complicated. Basically, the entire public expenditure paradigm was very different, and was much more about the instability of the overall economy and money supply.
You have to start from the point that Britain's national debt in 1945 was 238% of GDP (this is beyond horrendous). In order to deal with the fallout from the war, Britain saw the "Austerity Britain" period, was essentially forced to save many areas of industry through nationalisation, taxes were pretty crippling etc. As an anecdotal example, my DGM was paying superannuation tax on her job packing soap in a factory in the late 40s.
The real killer, though, was the 1970s period, particularly when Harold Wilson (Labour) resigned over the failure of the Public Expenditure White Paper in 1976. The prior circumstances around this are varied, but basically there was an oil crisis (petrol prices doubled), Bretton Woods had ended, currencies were free floating, energy and commodity prices went through the roof, credit had been deregulated, and Britain entered a period of stagflation (recession and inflation). This was not helped by a prior policy of printing money to cover costs.
Wilson's government was elected in 1974 with no overall majority and the campaign was driven with this notion of "going German", i.e. trying to get unions to work with employers in the German style, plus a commitment to public spending. This created a loss in confidence in sterling and the pound devalued, as pretty much the unions took this as an opportunity to seize control of whatever they could.
Then Denis Healey (Labour Chancellor) comes along and tries to stabilise the situation by decreasing the deficit by raising taxes and decreasing spend and restricting the supply of money ... and all hell breaks loose. They end up needing to borrow £9bn (which was a record at the time). Eventually, in 1975, the Cabinet agrees to Healey's limits on public expenditure, which go into the White Paper, which the left wing of the Labour party then defeats.
The pound then continues to lose value and needs a loan to support the currency. The IBS gives a loan of $5.3bn but wants it repaid six months later. It becomes obvious Britain can't do that, so it ends up going to the IMF.
Yes, the IMF. Britain requests $3.9bn, the largest loan ever requested from the IMF. So big, in fact, that the IMF has to go to the US and Germany to ask for more funds to cover it.
The conditions for this loan were harsh (Greek-style harsh) : massive cuts in public expenditure and the budget deficit. Things get very nasty and we end up with the Winter of Discontent.
It is into this economic disaster zone that Thatcher is elected in 1979, and basically starts to tackle the underlying issues, which then gets her labelled as the most demonic creature ever to have existed in Britain, despite the fact that "her" economic policies have been circulating through government since Harold Wilson, but neither Heath, Callaghan or Wilson could politically go anywhere near them.
I say all this because every government between 1945 and 1979 inherited a pretty stinky economic and financial situation on a range of measures. Yes, Wilson wasn't great (and very hobbled by the left wing of his party), but neither was Heath. Healey did what he could, but, again, he was battered by the leftwing of his own party.
#Disclaimer: I have a very soft spot for the late Denis Healey 
So when it comes to borrowing, deficits or public expenditure decisions from Labour in this period (and Conservative), I kinda think you have to recognise they were stuck in-between the devil and the deep blue sea, plus central government ministers had no control over local government expenditure, which, in some areas, was just potty and added to the PSBR.
What makes 1997 to 2010 different is that Labour wasn't caught between a rock and a hard place, and that's why I can't forgive them for their spending decisions during this period.
All that is very rough, and I've missed loads of important bits out, but my position is that the borrowing of Labour and Conservative governments prior to Thatcher tend to be a matter of necessity, rather than political gain.