To think Obama SHOULD apologise to the people of Japan?

[HappenstanceMarmite]

For his country decimating Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

Yes, he wasn't personally responsible. But I believe a heartfelt apology - and the taking of ownership for his country's atrocity - would mean a lot to the victims' families ...and all of Japan actually.

Just to provide some background to the USSBS, here's some analysis of its claim that Japan would have surrendered anyway:

Newman, R. (1995). Ending the War with Japan: Paul Nitze's "Early Surrender" Counterfactual. Pacific Historical Review, 64(2), 167-194. doi:1. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/3640894 doi:1

Gian Peri Gentile. (1997). Advocacy or Assessment? The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan. Pacific Historical Review, 66(1), 53-79. doi:1. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/4492295 doi:1

You need to be careful, because it's a contested area and these certainly aren't unbiassed reviews. And you'll need a university login or to be a pupil at a posh private school to get access. But if you can read them, they're worth reading.

Germany's war materiel problem was that the USSR and the US were producing many times more of everything, more efficiently, and both had access to raw materials.

Significant differences in the approach to production that were evident from the start meant that the US and the USSR would emerge victorious. An example is tank production - the T-34 turned out to be a remarkable tank both in terms of military capability and in its production. The Soviets kept to probably two basic designs for the T-34, and production, spare parts, repair and factory organisation were non-issues. It also ran on diesel, less flammable than petrol. By contrast, Germany kept on tinkering with its weapons and tanks, unable to resist the temptation of technological sophistication and missing the point of sensible mass production objectives. German domestic consumption sucked needed steel from the military. In the USSR and in the US, resources were directed into military production.

Germany was doomed after winter 1941-1942, when the invasion of the USSR stalled and thus failed. The German war machine and German military production were designed for short campaigns in manageable theatres. Barbarossa was neither short nor manageable. Both the US and USSR were far better equipped to conduct war on the vast scale that Germany embarked on. They both enjoyed economies of scale that Germany didn't. Air bombardment had been so successful by 1942 that hardly any German military equipment was produced from start to finish in the same factory or even in the same city. This wasn't a problem for the US or the USSR.

The USSR was also throwing millions of men with millions of simple, easily produced, and easily repaired tanks and artillery equipment against the superbly crafted German artillery and tanks complete with all sorts of special bells and whistles. There was nothing Germany could do about the westward approach of the decently equipped and numerically massively superior Red Army. Shambolic resistance in places like Breslau just tied up weapons and seasoned combatants and made resistance close to Berlin that much harder. The refusal to evacuate Army Group Kurland meant that an entire army group didn't even get news of the German surrender until 10 May because they were held dormant by encircling Soviet forces.

The Survey report committee was indeed repelled by the use of the A Bomb, but not by the use of conventional weapons to set alight over 60 Japanese cities and essentially starve Japan into submission. Unlike Germany, Japan did not have natural resources and once the sea blockade was established, starvation and the cessation of military production would have followed - lost planes could not have been replaced, nor could navel losses. A few destroyed airfields and that would have been the end. Starvation was already looming thanks to bombing of railways. Despite the stockpiling of fuel, Japan was scuppered once its navy was destroyed in Tokyo Bay. Japan had since 1932 used the resources and slave labour of Manchukuo (which as an industrial slave state). This was all over once Manchukuo fell to the Soviets. Together with the sea blockade, the end was inevitable once Manchukuo was lost and it might have come even sooner through gradual asphyxiation than the November home islands campaign the US had pencilled in. (The US was not unduly worried about opposition on the ground or an unruly population. As long as the position of the Emperor was ring fenced, they hoped the Japanese would accept Allied-American rule).

The recovery would have happened no matter how decimated Japan might have been, and no matter what the cost to the US because as in Germany recovery was in the US' strategic interests. In addition, the Japanese had learned much from their experiment in rapid industrialisation in Manchukuo, with the combination of central planning and capitalist investment. West Germany also had the experience of the wehrstaat of the 30s to draw on, as well as a highly developed capitalist culture on top of the Marshall Plan.

The influence of the Imperial family turned the tide when it came to the decision to surrender, and the Emperor was under the influence of a small coterie that had decided it was not in Japan's interests to fight on. From all accounts of the last days before the surrender, it appears that virtually every one of the key players was playing a game of chicken. (It may well be of course that everyone involved prefers to be remembered for posterity as convinced of the need for peace but for some reason reticent at most meetings). The exception was the hardliner army group that orchestrated the coup attempt. The Soviet declaration of war remains the catalyst that ended the inertia. Assuming they really were mostly all good readers of writing on the wall, they all knew the end was inevitable, but they still all waited in vain for the Soviet response to their feelers about negotiating better terms than the unconditional surrender required under the Potsdam statement.

Soviet neutrality was the linch-pin of Japanese strategy in the final months. It had been planned for and planned around, with the ultimate end of securing better terms than Potsdam by means of Soviet intercession. When all the plans came to nought overnight, the situation acquired a completely different complexion. The political consequences of Soviet entry were much more important than the military effects.

Paradoxically, the A bomb was so surprising that it could not register initially. As well as appearing literally out of the blue, it had the effect of yet another night of bombing by the USAF, and it had not affected Tokyo.

navel = naval. [doh]

Side-tracking slightly, I think the attitude to technological sophistication by post-war historians, and particularly by amateur historians and wargamers, is very interesting. Most of the stuff that the Germans built that was high-tech and had long-term influence was militarily useless or a response to a situation they shouldn't have been in in the first place.

You refer to the T34 tank, which as you say was a perfect piece of design, providing only the sophistication that could be manufactured in bulk while being just good enough to compete with German adversaries. The German response to this was the Panther, which is lauded to the skies as the progenitor of the modern main battle tank. But it was late, only available in small quantities, lacking in spares support, hugely compromised by shortage of effective engines and gearboxes which in turn were a consequence of amongst other things bombing (notably the Maybach factory) and in the end its design advantages were completely negatived by poor reliability and small numbers.

Similarly the late-war Mk XXI U Boat, which Germany simply couldn't manufacture, the V2 (and to a slightly lesser extent the V1), which used a vastly expensive and complex carcass to deliver one tonne of explosives with almost complete inaccuracy, when Bomber Command Main Force could put 500 tonnes of explosives into a small area night after night at 2% casualties, the Me262 for which there was a massive shortage of fuel, spares and ultimately pilots, the MP43/StG44 which required complex engineering and new ammunition to do little existing weapons couldn't do (albeit it a little less elegantly) provided you had sufficient troops, etc, etc.

All were responses to insufficient resources both in factories and on the front line, attempting to leverage more destructive effect out of less resource by technological sophistication. It couldn't, in the end, be manufactured in sufficient quantity and in any event delivered less additional military effect than could possibly justify the additional cost over cruder T34s and Sten guns.

Hitler and others in the Nazi command derided mass production as fit only for razor blades. They were clamorously wrong, and Germany was ultimately defeated by mass production.

It was all a case of 'shouldn't have been in in the first place' really.

They were simply not prepared for a long war in a large theatre, and their production and payment system and manufacturing culture were all geared towards high quality instead of the Henry Ford system the Russians had adopted from Ford himself. It was only during (or shortly before) the war that German airplane factories were converted into the sort of assembly line factories long established in the US, with components manufactured in many different locations.

The US used peacetime mass production and logistics expertise for wartime production and was unhampered by aerial bombing (though not by naval attack and much materiel was sunk).

economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Workshops-Seminars/Economic-History/streb-040929.pdf An interesting snapshot of plane manufacturers from an economics pov. The drive for technological sophistication may have been a means of cooking the books too.

Fascinating reference, thank you very much.

the Henry Ford system the Russians had adopted from Ford himself

One of the ironies of the post-war Japanese economy is that a lot of the manufacturing quality techniques brought by Deming et al originate either in the Ford Willow Run factory making B24s, or in Chrysler's "Big Room" making Bofors 40mm cannon. It was the inability to mass produce planes and guns (and tanks, and cargo ships, and even aircraft carriers) which doomed the Axis, but after the war the lesson was not lost.

Fascinating post mathanxiety.

Can I clarify: what you are saying is that the inner command in Japan was largely inclined to peace anyway, just hesitating to say it because of the risks of a coup and the chance to negotiate a better position before surrendering - i.e. that the whole 'they would have fought to the last man' idea is wrong - and that it was the Soviet entry to the war, not Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that made surrender inevitable?

And if that's the case (genuine question, as you clearly know way more about this than I do), how do you account for the fact that surrender comes immediately after H & N - co-incidence?

I think in the final months many were just hoping to get a better deal than unconditional surrender. They would have liked to hang onto a lot of the conquered territory, but that wasn't something they would keep on fighting for. Their main concern was maintaining the Emperor. To that end, they tried very hard to get Stalin onside. Once it was clear that this would not happen - late on 8 August, with troops pouring across the border of Manchukuo on 9 August, about an hour after the declaration of war - the decision came closer, but the comprehensive routing of the Kwangtung Army in the days immediately after the invasion began stunned the Emperor and emboldened those who did not value fighting to the last man.

A brief summing up of the first week of the Manchukuo campaign:
"'During the seven days of fighting the Soviets advanced 210 kilometers and prevented the Japanese from reinforcing the Kwangtung Army defenses in the south. The support of the Amur River Flotilla was a key element to this success. The Amur River Flotilla transported 91,000 soldiers, 150 tanks, 413 artillery pieces, 3,000 horses and 28,000 tons of supplies to the troops in combat.[46]

Throughout the campaign, especially in the Trans-Baikal Front and 1st Far East Front zones of attack, the Soviets continued to use tank-heavy forward detachments to quickly penetrate through and bypass Japanese defensive positions. Encircled and cut off from any possible reinforcements, follow-on forces methodically overwhelmed the defenders with massive air and artillery support in close coordination with the Soviet infantry. As a result of the Soviets' meticulous planning and bold offensive action, they took 594,000 Japanese prisoners including 143 generals, with 20,000 wounded. The Kwangtung Army suffered over 80,000 men and officers killed in combat which lasted less than two weeks. In contrast, the well- prepared Soviet Army had 8,219 killed and 22,264 wounded.[47]"

The author of that article quotes Lester Brooks, Behind Japan’s Surrender on the role of the Soviet campaign in Manchukuo as a factor in the decision making:
'Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki asked General Sumihisa Ikeda of the Cabinet Planning Bureau, and who had recently arrived from the Kwangtung Army, if that Army was capable of repulsing the Soviet attack? Ikeda replied “the Kwangtung Army was hopeless, within two weeks, Changchu, the major city in central Manchuria, will be occupied by the Soviets.” Suzuki, then asked if the Kwangtung Army was really that weak; when Ikeda replied it was, Suzuki realized the game was up.'

To illustrate the speed of the advance and the advantage of surprise, the Soviets were forced to halt on 12-13 August on the Trans-Baikal front only because their rapid advance (over mountainous terrain the Japanese considered impregnable) had led to supply line problems, and once they quickly sorted themselves out they resumed their virtually unopposed advance on the 13th. Tactics arising from the concept of bushido (fighting to the death, if necessary by suicide attacks) were no match for a vastly superior force in terms of men and weapons and meticulous planning.

The US needed the Emperor just as much as the Japanese wanted him. The US went to great lengths to ensure no accusation of war crimes would ever taint him. The Japanese War Crimes trials were to a large extent a farce, with Tojo taking one for the team, as it were.

*That may be a paraphrasing of Lester Brooks.

Then it had to be used twice until they surrendered

Nope, two different types of bombs, the cynic in me says they wanted to study the effects afterwards.

If you have any idea of how the Japanese treated its enemies and prisoners of war, I don't think you'd be quite so keen for the Americans to apologise.

Errr... so one side commits atrocities so that makes it OK for the other to do the same?

In Nagasaki about 150 of the people who died were soldiers, the rest of the 40-80 000 included POWs and forced labourers from Korea, although in much smaller numbers than the Japanese civilians.

Originally the Nagasaki bomb was intended for Kokura. Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki were alternates for Hiroshima in case of adverse conditions at Hiroshima. Hiroshima only joined the list when Kyoto was scratched.

You are correct that the bombs were different - uranium and plutonium. Oppenheimer spoke of the calculations of whether Fat Man would implode; it was considered more of a risk than Little Boy.

Despite the presence of a Mitsubishi plant and a torpedo plant at Nagasaki, the AF was ordered not to bomb Nagasaki once the final decision had been made to drop the bombs (the same order went out regarding the other listed cities). One possible reason for this is to be able to assess damage purely from the bombs themselves. The other cities on the list were notable for having escaped routine bombing to that point.

It is highly likely that at least two bombs were always contemplated. Since the two bombs were different, the possibility of a live test has to be suspected. The possibility of demonstrating military capability to the USSR also has to be seen as a factor. The hope for surrender was the foremost reason to justify them to Truman but he was also impressed by the need to demonstrate military power to the USSR.

It is highly unlikely that the second bomb would have been dropped if Japan had surrendered. Truman ordered a hiatus in the bombing on 10 August. But with no surrender forthcoming, the second bomb was dropped. There are suggestions that the Army and Truman were not marching in lockstep on the question of the second bomb and possible subsequent bombs. There was a serious objection among some scientists involved, news of which was kept from Truman.

Initially (7 August) the Japanese Atomic Bomb Countermeasure Committee, which was composed of representatives from the War, Navy, and Home ministries and Technical Board representatives did not believe that the Hiroshima bomb was an atomic bomb. They found it unlikely that such a bomb or its components could have been transported across the Pacific and assembled on an island outpost.

On the question of apologies, more damage was done by routine bombing of Japanese cities, 67 of which lay in ruins at the point at which the bombs were dropped, with starvation stalking the country as a result, and homelessness rampant.

*'The Army' = Groves and those who ran the Manhattan Project.

Oppenheimer spoke of the calculations of whether Fat Man would implode; it was considered more of a risk than Little Boy.

Which was why the trinity test was of the implosion assembly weapon. A lot of casual accounts of it neglect that, and assume the untested weapon was the Nagasaki weapon. No, the untested weapon was the Hiroshima weapon, because its physics were obvious and its design very certain. Fat Man included a load of new and untried technologies, hence the testing the previous month.