Thank you again for being so clear. Now that I can see your position in black and white, I have to say that I disagree with several of your assumptions. Whilst, as noted, I know little about law, I do have expertise on cognitive biases, and I'm deeply skeptical that the jury would have overcome theirs simply by repetition, trying hard and taking the job seriously.
The claim of "very little risk" is an empirical one. It goes against most of the research on the topic, and also my own experience of learning and teaching statistics. I've cited research up thread which shows that medics themselves are terrible at statistical inference, despite it being something they're trained in and part of their daily job. I would need to see some compelling empirical evidence to convince me that your assumptipn of low risk was correct, given that it contradicts my priors so strongly.
I contend that if I had not been trained in statistical reasoning, I would have regarded that shift data as damning, even if it had been presented merely as "evidence of presence" and, probably, even if I'd been told not to. This is because it typically takes a long time and a clear exposition in order to overcome such biases, even if you have a natural affinity for mathematics (which most people don't). As an example, most people argue against the Monty Hall problem for a long time after it's been explained to them.
Once I'd adopted this view, it would likely have influenced my concern with, and interpretation of, the strength of the medical evidence. Again, there's lots of evidence that this is how humans think (Bayesian conditioning on priors). That report by the RSS covered this in the section on suspicious deaths. I would therefore have adopted a lower threshold for "beyond doubt" for the evidence of murder than I should or otherwise would have..
I reiterate my point about there being too much emphasis on what the prosecution did, and not enough on how the jury responded. It's not sufficient to say that they were "directed" to respond a certain way by the prosecution. That's simply not how human cognition works (see, for example, "don't think of a pink elephant "). And it's not sufficient to say that the prosecution relied exclusively on a simple deductive argument - because it's unlikely, a priori, that the jury did similarly.